Summary
concluding allegations that other similarly situated individuals of a different race were treated differently satisfies Rule 12(b)
Summary of this case from Brewster v. Am. Mensa Ltd.Opinion
4:01-CV-0103-E
November 19, 2001
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Now before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss filed by defendant Mid Century Insurance Company of Texas ("Mid Century") in the above-styled and numbered case. Plaintiff Kamal Taiyeb has responded in opposition, and Mid Century has submitted a reply brief. After considering the motions and arguments of the parties, the record before the Court, and the applicable law, the Court makes the following determinations.
I. BACKGROUND
For this Motion to Dismiss, the Court will accept plaintiff Taiyeb's version of events as true. On July 6, 1999, Taiyeb and defendant Jamie Snyder were involved in an automobile accident in Arlington, Texas. The Arlington police officer responding to the accident ticketed Snyder for failing to maintain control, and noted on the police report that Snyder disregarded a stop-and-go signal and was inattentive while driving.
Following the accident, Taiyeb requested payment from Snyder's insurers, Mid Century and Farmers Insurance Company. The insurance companies refused to pay any of Taiyeb's claims. Taiyeb, a self-described "middle eastern, non-white and . . . tan brown complected" man, believes that the companies chose not to pay because of his race, color, and national origin.
Taiyeb filed his Complaint in this case on January 31, 2001, asserting claims for a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, tortious interference with contract, and tortious interference with prospective contract. Taiyeb subsequently amended his Complaint on May 30, 2001, and filed a motion for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint on September 14, 2001. In its Motion to Dismiss, Defendant Mid Century asks the Court to dismiss Taiyeb's claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
II. DISCUSSION
A. Dismissal Standards Under Federal Rule 12(b)(6).
In evaluating a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), this Court must construe the plaintiff's complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and take the factual allegations contained therein as true. See Mitchell v. McBryde, 944 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir. 1991); Mann v. Adams Realty Co., Inc., 556 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1977). A motion to dismiss should only be granted when the plaintiff could not prove any set of facts, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, which would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also Hitt v. City of Pasadena, 561 F.2d 606, 607 (5th Cir. 1977). A plaintiff, however, must plead specific facts, not mere conclusory allegations, to avoid dismissal. See Guidry v. Bank of LaPlace, 954 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 1992).
B. Taiyeb's § 1981 Claim
To establish a claim under § 1981, a plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating: (1) the plaintiff is a member of a racial minority; (2) an intent to discriminate on the basis of race by the defendant; and (3) the discrimination concerns one or more of the activities enumerated in the statute (i.e. make and enforce contracts, sue and be sued, give evidence, etc.). See Green v. State Bar of Tex., 27 F.3d 1083, 1086 (5th Cir. 1994). Under § 1981, the defendant's acts must be "purposefully discriminatory . . . and racially motivated."Albert v. Carovano, 851 F.2d 561, 571 (2d Cir. 1988).
Defendant Mid Century asserts in its Motion to Dismiss that while Taiyeb arguably has satisfied the first and third prongs of a prima-facie case under § 1981, he has not sufficiently plead the second element — that Defendants intended to discriminate against Taiyeb on the basis of his race. The Court agrees that Taiyeb's lackluster First Amended Complaint is devoid of any factual support for the allegation that Defendants' actions were motivated by Taiyeb's race. (Pl.'s First Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 5, 10.)
If Taiyeb were standing just on his First Amended Complaint, therefore, this case surely would be appropriate for Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal. After Mid Century's Motion to Dismiss was filed, however, Taiyeb submitted a "Motion for Leave to Amend and File Plaintiff's Second Amended Original Complaint." In this pleading, Taiyeb attempts to buttress the intent element of his § 1981 claim by alleging that Mid Century, while refusing to pay Taiyeb's insurance claims, settled similarly-situated claims of at least three named white individuals. (Second Am. Compl. at ¶ 5.)
Because Federal Rule of Civil 15(a) instructs that a party shall be "freely given" leave to amend its pleading "when justice so requires," and this case is relatively early in its proceedings, Taiyeb is hereby GRANTED leave to file his Second Amended Complaint. See Rule 15(a); Stripling v. Jordan Prod. Co., LLC, 234 F.3d 863, 872 ("Unless there is a `substantial reason to deny leave to amend, the discretion of the district court is not broad enough to permit denial'," quoting Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Inv. Corp., 660 F.2d 594, 598 (5th Cir. 1981)). Accordingly, the Court DENIES Mid Century's Motion to Dismiss the § 1981 claim, as Taiyeb's allegations in the Second Amended Complaint that at least three similarly-situated white individuals were treated differently by Mid Century are sufficient to satisfy the low burden required to defeat a motion under Rule 12(b)(6). See Riley v. ITT Fed. Servs. Corp., 2001 WL 194067, at *2 (D. Conn.) ("[t]he intent element of a § 1981 claim may be satisfied by an allegation that similarly situated [individuals] who are not members of the protected class were treated differently."); see also Gagliardi v. Village of Pawling, 18 F.3d 188, 193 (2d Cir. 1994).
Whether Taiyeb's § 1981 claim will survive Rule 56 scrutiny or the scrutiny of a jury is another matter. It is certainly true, as Mid Century argues, that there may be many non-racial or non-discriminatory reasons to explain why Mid Century decided not to settle Taiyeb's claim, and Taiyeb must provide greater factual proof to support his allegations as this case develops. For purposes of this Motion to Dismiss, however, this Court is not prepared to determine that Taiyeb cannot prove his § 1981 claim under the facts alleged.
C. Taiyeb's Claim for Tortious Interference With Prospective Contract
Taiyeb's Complaint also alleges that Mid Century tortiously interfered with his prospective contract with Jamie Snyder. (Second Am. Compl. at ¶ 9.) Under Texas law, a plaintiff asserting a cause of action for interference with a prospective contract must satisfy each of the following elements: (1) reasonable probability that the parties would have entered into a contractual relationship; (2) an intentional and malicious act by the defendant that prevented the relationship from occurring, with the purpose of harming the plaintiff; (3) the defendant lacked privilege or justification to do the act; and (4) actual harm or damage resulted from the defendant's interference. See Stewart Glass Mirror v. U.S. Auto Glass Discount Ctrs., Inc., 200 F.3d 307, 316 (5th Cir. 2000) ( citing Exxon Corp. v. Allsup, 808 S.W.2d 648, 659 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi, 1991, writ denied)).
Because Taiyeb acknowledges that he did not have a contract with defendant Snyder, he does not attempt to assert a claim for tortious interference with contract, as Mid Century initially believed in its first briefing on this Motion to Dismiss. (Br. in Supp. of Pl.'s Resp. to Def. Mid Century Ins. Co. of Tex. Mot. to Dismiss at 15; Br. in Supp. of Def. Mid Century Ins. Co. of Tex. Mot. to Dismiss at 12.)
In this case, Taiyeb has failed to allege any of the elements required for a tortious interference with prospective contract claim. Despite having two opportunities to replead his Complaint, Taiyeb states only that "[d]efendants are liable for tortiously interfering with Plaintiff's right and attempts to contract with Defendant Snyder." (Second Am. Compl. at ¶ 9.) This conclusory statement, completely devoid of well-pleaded facts establishing the required elements of the tortious interference claim, is insufficient to survive Rule 12(b)(6) scrutiny. Therefore, Taiyeb's claim for tortious interference with prospective contract is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
III. CONCLUSION
Having considered the parties' briefing regarding defendant Mid Century's Motion to Dismiss, the record before the Court, and the applicable law, the Court ORDERS that:
1. Plaintiff Taiyeb's Motion for Leave to Amend and File Plaintiff's Second Amended Original Complaint is GRANTED, and the Clerk shall file Taiyeb's Second Amended Original Complaint;
2. Defendant Mid Century's Motion to Dismiss is DENIED as to Taiyeb's § 1981 claim; and
3. Mid Century's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED as to Taiyeb's tortious interference with prospective contract claim and, accordingly, this state law claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS SO ORDERED.