Contrary to the petitioner's contention, we find that the Supreme Court did not err in dismissing her petition. A proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 may not be used to challenge a determination "which is not final" (CPLR 7801), and a court will not "'interfere in the procedure before an administrative agency in a pending matter in which the agency had been granted the authority by statute to hear and review'" (Matter of Taibbi v. New York State Liq. Auth., 48 A.D.2d 568, 571, quoting Matter of Amigone v. State Liq. Auth., 47 Misc.2d 809, 810; see also, Matter of Rainka v. Whalen, 73 A.D.2d 731, affd 51 N.Y.2d 973). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly determined that it could not review evidentiary rulings made by the respondent Administrative Law Judge prior to the conclusion of the expungement hearing and a final agency determination.

This court will not interfere in any pending matter properly before an administrative agency." However, at such time as the Tax Commission renders a final determination upon petitioner's application for redetermination, any error alleged to have been committed is subject to review pursuant to CPLR article 78 ( id.; see, also, Matter of Taibbi v. New York State Liq. Auth., 48 A.D.2d 568, 571-572; cf. Matter of Rainka v. Whalen, 73 A.D.2d 731, affd 51 N.Y.2d 973).

Approval of the agency's acceptance of the complainant's testimony provides substantial evidence to support the determinations that the altercation was caused by petitioner's employees. Based upon our decision in Matter of Taibbi v State Liq. Auth., ( 48 A.D.2d 568), we find no error in the SLA's refusal to make certain witnesses' statements available to petitioner until just prior to cross-examination. With respect to any statement from Joseph Ferrucci, who was a party involved in the incident, the SLA denies that it possesses any such state- ment.

The determination of the administrative agency fell within the category of "merely intermediate procedural rulings incidental to the administrative process which are reviewable only in the event that appellant conceives himself aggrieved by the ultimate consequence of the [case]." (Carville, supra, p 867; accord Matter of Art Metal Constr. Co. v McGoldrick, 260 App. Div. 153, 154; Matter of Taibbi v State Liq. Auth., 48 A.D.2d 568, 571.) The extremely liberal system of interlocutory appeals from court orders which we have in this State has been the subject of considerable discussion and controversy.

On the authority of West Bronx Auto Paint Shop (supra), the court in La Monica v Kretchmer ( 64 Misc.2d 821, 823), refused to enjoin the enforcement of the rules and regulations of the Board of Air Pollution Control on behalf of "Plaintiffs `a corporation and its officers and employees * * * [stating] "The drastic remedy of temporary injunction is very rarely granted against enforcement of a criminal provision."'" (To the same effect see Matter of Taibbi v New York State Liq. Auth., 48 A.D.2d 568; Snap `N' Pops v Dillon, 66 A.D.2d 219; Kelly's Rental v City of New York, 44 N.Y.2d 700.) As relates to civil enforcement of the Housing and Maintenance Code by the Housing and Development Administration of the City of New York (see Rubin v Hevro Realty Corp., 84 Misc.2d 1074, affd 55 A.D.2d 536; Housing Dev. Admin. of City of N Y v Bryant Westchester Realty Corp., 90 Misc.2d 816; Housing Dev. Admin. of City of N.Y. v Johan Realty, 93 Misc.2d 698; Lange v Joy, NYLJ, Dec. 9, 1977, p 4, col 2).