The Legislaturehas expressly required that litigants submit to that compelled, nonbinding alternative dispute resolution process in certain instances. See L. 1983, c. 358 (codified as amended by N.J.S.A. 39:6A–24 to –35); Taha v. De Palma, 214 N.J.Super. 397, 398–401, 519 A.2d 905 (App.Div.1986) (explaining Legislature's establishment of mandatory but nonbinding arbitration for personal injury auto negligence claims under N.J.S.A. 39:6A–24 to –35); see also L. 1987, c. 329 (codified as amended at N.J.S.A. 2A:23A–20 to –30). We have reviewed those legislative enactments and collected their procedures in Rule 4:21A–1(a):

We note with respect to the arbitration that each party is required to submit a "concise statement of the factual and legal issues," R. 4:21A-4(a), and that the arbitrator is empowered to "determine the law and facts of the case," R. 4:21A-4(b). Although we have taken note of the informality of these proceedings, Taha v. DePalma, 214 N.J. Super. 397, 400-01, 519 A.2d 905 (App.Div. 1986), the Supreme Court has observed "that the Legislature sought to preserve judicial resources and improve efficiency by providing for [this form of] arbitration," Hartsfield v. Fantini, 149 N.J. 611, 616, 695 A.2d 259 (1997). Defendant's attorney's failure to raise the statute-of-limitations defense at the arbitration obviously interfered with achievement of that legislative goal.

We note with respect to the arbitration that each party is required to submit a "concise statement of the factual and legal issues," R. 4:21A-4(a), and that the arbitrator is empowered to "determine the law and facts of the case," R. 4:21A-4(b). Although we have taken note of the informality of these proceedings, Taha v. DePalma, 214 N.J. Super. 397, 400-01 (App.Div. 1986), the Supreme Court has observed "that the Legislature sought to preserve judicial resources and improve efficiency by providing for [this form of] arbitration," Hartsfield v. Fantini, 149 N.J. 611, 616 (1997). Defendant's attorney's failure to raise the statute-of-limitations defense at the arbitration obviously interfered with achievement of that legislative goal.

The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel apply only after the party to be foreclosed has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the matter. See Taha v. DePalma, 214 N.J. Super. 397, 400, 519 A.2d 905 (App.Div. 1986); Zoneraich v. Overlook Hospital, 212 N.J. Super. 83, 93-95, 514 A.2d 53 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 107 N.J. 32, 526 A.2d 126 (1986). Here, the preemption issue was first raised in plaintiffs' brief opposing the bus defendants' motion to file the third-party complaint against Hyundai.

The procedural due process afforded by the Office of Administrative Law and the caliber of its hearing officers place those proceedings on a par with plenary judicial proceedings. Compare Taha v. DePalma, 214 N.J. Super. 397, 519 A.2d 905 (App.Div. 198 6) (where preclusive effect was not given to an arbitrator's decision in a statutory auto arbitration proceeding because those proceedings were not intended as "a substitute for litigation"). The fourth exception does not apply because the burden of persuasion with respect to justification of Ensslin's termination was placed on the employer in the administrative proceeding.

"Among the recognized exceptions to the general rule of preclusion are cases where a new determination is warranted by differences in the quality or extensiveness of the procedures in the two tribunals." Taha v. DePalma, 214 N.J. Super. 397, 400, 519 A.2d 905 (App.Div. 1986). Accordingly, if the child support provisions of the domestic violence order are "final," the order must be enforced — it would be, after all, a permanent order modifiable only on a showing of changed circumstances.