Opinion
00 Civ. 0150 (JSM).
December 26, 2000.
Plaintiff, William Tager, pro se 96-A-7476 Sing Sing Correctional Facility Ossining, N.Y. 10562
For Defendants, Edward Rodriguez Assistant Attorney General New York, N.Y. 10271
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
In this pro se action, William Tager ("Plaintiff"), a prisoner in state custody, claims that prison doctors wrongfully refused to give him medication that had been prescribed for his mental condition and instead gave him less effective medication. plaintiff also alleges that he was improperly screened by prison staff and, as a result, he was improperly assigned to a double bunk cell. He claims that these actions caused a relapse of his mental condition for which he seeks damages. Other than John and Jane Does, the only named defendant is the Deputy Superintendent of Security at the Sing Sing Correctional Facility.
Defendants now move to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds: 1) plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies; 2) the complaint fails to state a claim for deliberate indifference to plaintiff's medical needs; and 3) the suit is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Since the suit must be dismissed because plaintiff has not exhausted his administrative remedies, the Court will not reach the other issues.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e et seq., states in pertinent part that, "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(a) (West Supp. 1998). The PLRA mandates complete administrative review of all claims before an inmate may bring a § 1983 action. This Court has recently joined a majority of Judges in this district in holding that the exhaustion requirement applies to an action which seeks only money damages. See Rowe v. LILLY, 99 Civ. 4317, 2000 WL 1677710, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2000)
Plaintiff claims that exhaustion is not required because his complaint is against the doctors who treated him and the prison grievance procedures do not apply to the Office of Mental Health. None of the doctors are identified in the complaint other than as Doe defendants, and the complaint identifies them as members of the prison mental health staff. In addition, the only specifically identified defendant is a prison official. Thus, Plaintiff is required to exhaust his administrative remedies. For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted and the complaint is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.