Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-4P5P-11T4
05-20-2013
STEPHEN TAFARO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HON. HANY MAWLA, J.S.C., Defendant-Respondent.
Stephen Tafaro, appellant, argued the cause pro se. Brian P. Wilson argued the cause for respondent (Jeffrey S. Chiesa, Attorney General, attorney; Lewis A. Scheindlin, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Mr. Wilson, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Graves and Ashrafi.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County, Docket No. L-1271-12.
Stephen Tafaro, appellant, argued the cause pro se.
Brian P. Wilson argued the cause for respondent (Jeffrey S. Chiesa, Attorney General, attorney; Lewis A. Scheindlin, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Mr. Wilson, on the brief). PER CURIAM
In a complaint filed on February 15, 2012, plaintiff Stephen Tafaro alleged that defendant Superior Court Judge Hany Mawla (Judge Mawla), violated his constitutional and civil rights "to parent his children and make decisions regarding their education and welfare." Plaintiff sought "declaratory and injunctive relief" and a credit to his child support account in the amount of $40,217.55. Plaintiff appeals from an order entered pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e) on April 27, 2012, dismissing his complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We affirm.
Following a seventeen-year marriage, plaintiff and his former spouse, Melanie Miller, were divorced on June 2, 2004. Two children were born of the marriage: Andrew in 1989, and Emily in 1990. The parties' property settlement agreement provided for joint legal custody of the children and stated future college costs would be addressed "at the time they are incurred." Unfortunately, the parties have been involved in various post-judgment disputes, which were addressed in six prior opinions.
On August 9, 2011, Judge Mawla granted an application by plaintiff's former spouse to enforce litigant's rights and ordered plaintiff to pay "full arrearages of $41,187.55." According to plaintiff's complaint, he was arrested on August 10, 2011, and transported to "the Hunterdon County Justice Center, where the order was paid in full to avoid incarceration." Plaintiff did not appeal the order entered by Judge Mawla on August 9, 2011. Instead, he filed the present action alleging that Judge Mawla violated his right to parent his children.
Judge Mawla filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint on March 22, 2012. In a brief in support of his motion, Judge Mawla argued: (1) plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata and collateral estoppel, because there is a "final and valid judgment" that required plaintiff to pay seventy-five percent of his children's college costs; (2) plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity; (3) plaintiff's claims should be dismissed because Judge Mawla is not a person amenable to suit pursuit to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; and (4) plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed because his allegations are "nothing more than dissatisfaction with undesirable adjudications requiring [him] to support his children financially."
In response to the motion, plaintiff claimed Judge Mawla violated his rights under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 10:6-1 to - 2. by "coercing [him] to pay excessive college costs that [he has] the right to refuse to pay." Judge Mawla's motion was scheduled for oral argument, but plaintiff waived his appearance. In an oral decision on April 27, 2012, Judge Arthur Bergman characterized plaintiff's claims as "vexatious" and "frivolous," and the judge dismissed the complaint with prejudice.
Plaintiff presents the following arguments on appeal:
POINT IWe conclude from our review of the record and the applicable law that these arguments are without merit, Rule 2:11-3(e)(1)(E), and only require the following comments.
JUDGE BERGMAN COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR BY FAILING TO RECOGNIZE OR PROPERLY INTERPRET ANY INFORMATION PRESENTED IN THE PLAINTIFF'S CERTIFICATION OR PLEADINGS.
POINT II
DEFENSE COUNSEL DAG WILSON HAS FAILED TO PRESENT ANY LEGAL ARGUMENT THAT WOULD ALLOW THE DISMISSAL OF THIS SUIT.
POINT III
PLAINTIFF HAS CLEARLY ESTABLISHED A CLEAR CAUSE OF ACTION THAT IS SUPPORTED BY RULE 4:6-2(e).
POINT IV
JUDGE BERGMAN HAS ABUSED HIS JUDICIAL DISCRETION IN NOT PROVIDING A WRITTEN STATEMENT ON THIS DECISION THAT WOULD CLARIFY HIS REASONING TO DISMISS THE SUIT.
A court decides as a matter of law whether a party enjoys a common law or statutory immunity, Norris v. Borough of Leonia, 160 N.J. 427, 438 (1999). "A motion to dismiss filed early in a proceeding is a particularly effective device to resolve any claim of immunity." Malik v. Guttenberg, 398 N.J. Super. 489, 494 (App. Div. 2008).
"'Few doctrines were more solidly established at common law than the immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction.'" Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 199, 106 S. Ct. 496, 499-500, 88 L. Ed. 2d 507, 513 (1985) (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54, 87 S. Ct. 1213, 1217, 18 L. Ed. 2d 288, 294 (1967)). This immunity is absolute. K.D. v. Bozarth, 313 N.J. Super. 561, 568 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 156 N.J. 425 (1998). "Like other forms of official immunity, judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages." Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11, 112 S. Ct. 286, 288, 116 L. Ed. 2d 9, 14 (1991).
The immunity applies even to judicial acts that are wrong, malicious, or beyond the judge's authority. Delbridge v. Schaeffer, 238 N.J. Super. 323, 334 (Law Div. 1989). As the New Jersey Supreme Court has explained:
The doctrine that an action will not lie against a judge for a wrongful commitment,
or for an erroneous judgment, or for any other act made or done by him in his judicial capacity, is as thoroughly established as are any other of the primary maxims of the law. Such an exemption is absolutely essential to the very existence, in any valuable form, of the judicial office itself; for a judge could not be either respected or independent if his motives for his official actions or his conclusions, no matter how erroneous, could be put in question at the instance of every malignant or disappointed suitor. Hence we find this judicial immunity has been conferred by the laws of every civilized people. That it exists in this state in its fullest extent, has been repeatedly declared by our own courts.
[Bedrock Foundations, Inc. v. Geo. H. Brewster & Son, Inc., 31 N.J. 124, 139-40 (1959) (quoting Grove v. Van Duyn, 44 N.J.L. 654, 656 (E. & A. 1882).]
Guided by these principles, we conclude, as did Judge Bergman, that the facts set forth in plaintiff's complaint fail as a matter of law to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Affirmed.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Tafaro v. Tafaro, No. A-6134-10 (App. Div. June 13, 2012) (Tafaro VI); Miller v. Tafaro, No. A-3709-09 & A-5461-09 (App. Div. May 27, 2011) (Tafaro V); Miller v. Tafaro, No. A-2120-09 & A-3039-09 (App. Div. Jan. 7, 2011) (Tafaro IV); Miller v. Tafaro, No. A-4469-07 (App. Div. May 12, 2009) (Tafaro III); Tafaro v. Tafaro, No. A-1189-05 (App. Div. Aug. 16, 2006) (Tafaro II); and Tafaro v. Tafaro, No. A-4402-04 (App. Div. July 13, 2006) (Tafaro I).