Tad, Inc. v. Siebert

25 Citing cases

  1. Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Sipula

    776 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1985)   Cited 51 times
    Noting in dicta that, under Illinois law, " defendant's inducement of the cancellation of an at-will contract constitutes at most interference with a prospective economic advantage, not interference with contractual relations"

    A defendant's inducement of the cancellation of an at-will contract constitutes at most interference with a prospective economic advantage, not interference with contractual relations. See Belden Corp. v. Internorth, Inc., 90 Ill.App.3d 547, 45 Ill.Dec. 765, 413 N.E.2d 98 (1980); Candalaus Chicago, Inc. v. Evans Mill Supply Co., 51 Ill.App.3d 38, 47-49, 9 Ill. Dec. 62, 69-70, 366 N.E.2d 319, 326-27 (1977); Supreme Savings Loan Association v. Lewis, 130 Ill.App.2d 16, 264 N.E.2d 857 (1970); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 768 comment i; cf. TAD, Inc. v. Siebert, 63 Ill.App.3d 1001, 1006-07, 20 Ill. Dec. 754, 759-60, 380 N.E.2d 963, 967 (1978). As the court explained in Belden, 90 Ill.App.3d at 552, 45 Ill.Dec. at 550-51, 413 N.E.2d at 101-02:

  2. Lincoln Towers Ins. Agency v. Farrell

    99 Ill. App. 3d 353 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981)   Cited 31 times
    Discussing cases in which customer lists have been protected because they have been developed over many years and at considerable expense

    In their decisions in this area, Illinois courts generally have sought to encourage competition in the business sector in order to avoid the restriction of an employee's freedom and the possibility of industrial servitude. ( ILG Industries, Inc. v. Scott (1971), 49 Ill.2d 88, 273 N.E.2d 393; Schulenburg v. Signatrol, Inc. (1965), 33 Ill.2d 379, 212 N.E.2d 865, cert. denied (1966), 383 U.S. 959, 16 L.Ed.2d 302, 86 S.Ct. 1225; ImageSupplies, Inc. v. Hilmert (1979), 71 Ill. App.3d 710, 390 N.E.2d 68; TAD, Inc. v. Siebert (1978), 63 Ill. App.3d 1001, 380 N.E.2d 963.) Therefore, restraints have not been lightly placed upon an employee's right to compete in a field in which he is most familiar.

  3. CNA Financial Corp. v. Local 743 of International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America

    515 F. Supp. 942 (N.D. Ill. 1981)   Cited 17 times
    Granting motion to dismiss corporation's claim of invasion of privacy noting, "Many courts that have considered the question have concluded that a corporation cannot maintain an action for invasion of the right to privacy and we believe this represents the better reasoned approach."

    While it is conceivable that an employee list may contain such extensive and detailed information that would so devastate a company if disclosed to the wrong person that it could be characterized as a trade secret, this does not appear to be such a case. CNA has cited no Illinois cases holding that an employee list such as the one involved in the case at bar constitutes a trade secret and its reliance on TAD, Inc. v. Siebert, 63 Ill. App.3d 1001, 20 Ill.Dec. 754, 380 N.E.2d 963 (1st Dist. 1978), for that proposition is misplaced. In TAD, the court noted twice that the defendants did not misappropriate any customer or employee lists nor did they memorize any material or confidential information when they left the plaintiff's employ.

  4. Chapman v. Crown Glass Corp.

    197 Ill. App. 3d 995 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)   Cited 22 times
    In Chapman v. Crown Glass Corp. (1990), 197 Ill. App.3d 995, 597 N.E.2d 256, the court explained that the elements of the tort of intentional interference with contractual rights are (1) the existence of a valid enforceable contract between the plaintiff and another; (2) the defendant's awareness of the relationship; (3) the defendant's intentional and unjustified inducement of a breach of the contract which causes a subsequent breach by the other; and (4) damages.

    Defendant next contends that plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence on the element of the existence of a valid contractual relationship or the reasonable expectancy of entering into a valid business relationship. He asserts that Crown was not willing and desirous of continuing plaintiff's employment relationship and therefore plaintiff could not prevail as a matter of law. • 9 The fact that the employment relationship or prospective employment relationship is at will is immaterial to whether there exists a valid contractual relationship or prospective business relationship in tortious interference actions. ( TAD, Inc. v. Siebert (1978), 63 Ill. App.3d 1001, 1006, 380 N.E.2d 963, 967.) Plaintiff need show only that both parties would have been willing and desirous of continuing the employment relationship for an indefinite period of time.

  5. Dangeles v. Muhlenfeld

    548 N.E.2d 45 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)   Cited 18 times
    In Dangeles, the plaintiffs made no claim that the defendants solicited customers or employees or engaged in any demonstrable business activity prior to resigning from the plaintiff company; thus, no such breach of fiduciary duty was alleged.

    This principle is not implicated by plaintiffs' allegations. It is not alleged that Muhlenfeld solicited customers or employees for Centennial, or engaged in any demonstrable business activity prior to resigning from First American, and, hence, no breach of fiduciary duty appears in the allegations. (See TAD, Inc. v. Siebert (1978), 63 Ill. App.3d 1001, 1005-06, 380 N.E.2d 963; see also Radiac Abrasives, Inc. v. Diamond Technology, Inc. (1988), 177 Ill. App.3d 628, 633, 532 N.E.2d 428.) Nor is it alleged that the communications with financial institutions and First American's sales force occurred while Muhlenfeld owed First American a fiduciary duty. These allegations are not saved by the principle prohibiting transactions based on information acquired during a former officer's association with a corporation.

  6. Independence Tube Corp. v. Copperweld Corp.

    691 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1982)   Cited 36 times
    In Independence Tube Corp. v. Copperweld Corp., 691 F.2d 310, 324-25 (7th Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 469 U.S. 827 (1984), the Seventh Circuit held that reliance on the advice of counsel was a factor but not a complete defense in an action for tortious inducement of breach of contract.

    That, in the words of Learned Hand, "is so extraordinary a doctrine that we do not feel called upon to consider it at large." Triangle Film Corp. v. Artcraft Pictures Corp., 250 F. 981, 983 (2d Cir. 1918), quoted in TAD, Inc. v. Siebert, 63 Ill. App.3d 1001, 1007, 20 Ill.Dec. 754, 758, 380 N.E.2d 963, 967 (1st Dist. 1978). See also Perlman, Interference with Contract and Other Economic Expectancies, 49 U.Chi.L.Rev. 61, 111-115 (1982).

  7. Finish Line, Inc. v. Foot Locker, Inc. (S.D.Ind. 2006)

    1:04-cv-877-RLY-WTL (S.D. Ind. Jan. 18, 2006)   Cited 3 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding list of retail shoe chain's management personnel not protected as trade secret; noting "'it is conceivable that an employee list . . . could be characterized as a trade secret'"

    Case law holds, however, that companies are free to offer higher salaries to their competitor's at-will employees. See Tad, Inc. v. Siebert, 380 N.E.2d 963, 967 (Ill.Ct.App. 1978). Indeed, Finish Line itself engages in the exact same type of conduct and offers wages above its normal pay scale to entice Foot Locker employees to leave Foot Locker and work for Finish Line. (Facts, ¶ 5).

  8. Hegy v. Community Counseling Center of Fox Valley

    158 F. Supp. 2d 892 (N.D. Ill. 2001)   Cited 7 times
    Dismissing IIED claim of 78-year-old female plaintiff in ill health who alleged that employer tried to force her to retire from company where she had worked for 32 years by locking her out of her office and posting a sign on the door that stated, "Locked by Order of the Board of Directors"; such behavior was "inappropriate" but did not constitute the type of extreme and outrageous conduct that would give rise to an IIED claim

    First, Defendants assert that Hegy did not allege that she had a reasonable expectation of continued employment. Illinois courts, however, have repeatedly held that an at-will employee can have a reasonable expectation of continued employment sufficient to sustain an action for intentional interference with employment. See, e.g., Cavalieri-Conway v. State of California, Case Nos, 94 C 6826, 94 C 7776, 1996 WL 65997, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 12, 1996); Fellhauer v. City of Geneva, 568 N.E.2d 870, 878 (Ill. 1991); Marczak, 542 N.E.2d at 791; TAD, Inc. v. Siebert, 380 N.E.2d 963 (Ill.App.Ct. 1978). Therefore we conclude that, because Hegy was an employee of the Center for 32 years, she had a reasonable expectation that her employment would continue.

  9. Regal-Beloit Corp. v. Drecoll

    955 F. Supp. 849 (N.D. Ill. 1996)   Cited 11 times
    Applying Wisconsin law

    Def. Objections p. 7.) Yet, Defendants offer this Court no support, and no viable rationale for this contention; if the deal would be profitable now, it will presumably be profitable in six months. Although Defendants assert that the requested injunctive relief is against the public interest, as the proposed injunction would injure Brad Foote, an innocent third-party, there is ample evidence to suggest that Brad Foote was not entirely "innocent" in its dealings with Regal-Beloit and the Individual Defendants. While Brad Foote unquestionably had the right to approach Drecoll to inquire as to his interest in changing employment, participating in an ESOP, or buying the company, TAD, Inc. v. Siebert, 63 Ill. App.3d 1001, 20 Ill.Dec. 754, 380 N.E.2d 963, 967 (1978), Brad Foote's contact with Drecoll went far beyond a mere opening inquiry. Rather, Brad Foote engaged in discussions and/or negotiations with Drecoll for more than six months while Drecoll was still employed as a vice president and General Manager of Illinois Gear. During this six month period, Brad Foote received numerous letters and phone calls from Regal-Beloit indicating Regal-Beloit's continued interest in acquiring Brad Foote; yet, at no time, did Brad Foote ask the Individual Defendants to resign their positions at Regal-Beloit, inform Regal-Beloit of their negotiations with Regal-Beloit employees, or, significantly, notify Regal-Beloit of the Brad Foote owners' purported distrust for Regal-Beloit personnel and their resulting refusal to sell to Regal-Beloit. Thus, while it is unclear whether Brad Foote is subject to any legal liability for its conduct, Brad Foote was not truly an innocent third-party — it knew or should have known of the impropriety of the Individual Defendant

  10. Haupt v. International Harvester Co.

    582 F. Supp. 545 (N.D. Ill. 1984)   Cited 10 times
    In Haupt v. International Harvester Co. (N.D. Ill. 1984), 582 F. Supp. 545, 550, the court stated that "Illinois courts consider privilege a defense to tortious interference, and not an element whose absence must be pleaded (or, more importantly, proved) by plaintiff."

    Because either party could terminate Haupt's employment contract without liability for breach, that contract of course is capable of being performed within one year. Of course City of Rock Falls reveals the flaw in McGrath's analysis: Enforceability of the underlying contract is not required. TAD, Inc. v. Siebert, 63 Ill. App.3d 1001, 1006, 20 Ill.Dec. 754, 758, 380 N.E.2d 963, 967 (1st Dist. 1978) reinforces the proposition: Under familiar Erie v. Tompkins principles, cases from Illinois' First Appellate District would control here on any issues to which the Illinois Supreme Court has not addressed itself and as to which there is a divergence of views among the Appellate Districts. Abbott Laboratories v. Granite State Ins. Co., 573 F. Supp. 193, 195 (N.D.Ill. 1983).