Taco Mac v. City of Atlanta Board of Zoning Adjustment

10 Citing cases

  1. Mortg. Alliance Corp. v. Pickens Cnty.

    S12G1885 (Ga. Nov. 4, 2013)

    Final determinations by county authorities regarding the application of land use restrictions to a particular property constitute "decisions" within the meaning of § 5-3-20. See Chadwick v. Gwinnett County, 257 Ga. 59, 59 (354 SE2d 420) (1987) (county commission's denial of request for rezoning); Taco Mac v. Atlanta Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 255 Ga. 538, 539 (340 SE2d 922) (1986) (city board of zoning adjustment's denial of variance application); Hollberg v. Spalding County, 281 Ga. App. 768, 771 & n.13 (637 SE2d 163) (2006) (county commission's grant of request for rezoning). The 30-day deadline applies even if the challenge to the county's land use decision is couched in terms of inverse condemnation. See Mayor of Savannah v. Savannah Cigarette & Amusement Servs., Inc., 267 Ga. 173, 174 (476 SE2d 581) (1996).

  2. Mortg. Alliance Corp. v. Pickens Cnty.

    294 Ga. 212 (Ga. 2013)   Cited 10 times

    Final determinations by county authorities regarding the application of land use restrictions to a particular property constitute “decisions” within the meaning of OCGA § 5–3–20. See Chadwick v. Gwinnett County, 257 Ga. 59, 59, 354 S.E.2d 420 (1987) (county commission's denial of request for rezoning); Taco Mac v. Atlanta Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 255 Ga. 538, 539, 340 S.E.2d 922 (1986) (city board of zoning adjustment's denial of variance application); Hollberg v. Spalding County, 281 Ga.App. 768, 771 & n. 13, 637 S.E.2d 163 (2006) (county commission's grant of request for rezoning). The 30–day deadline applies even if the challenge to the county's land use decision is couched in terms of inverse condemnation. See Mayor of Savannah v. Savannah Cigarette & Amusement Servs., Inc., 267 Ga. 173, 174, 476 S.E.2d 581 (1996).

  3. Chadwick v. Gwinnett County

    257 Ga. 59 (Ga. 1987)   Cited 7 times
    Holding that the time to appeal under OCGA § 5–3–20 began to run when the chair of the county commission executed the minutes of the public meeting where the commission denied the rezoning request

    He filed this lawsuit in the superior court on June 19, 1986. Chadwick contends that he should have thirty days from his receipt of official notice through the mail in which to file his lawsuit. In Taco Mac v. City of Atlanta Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 255 Ga. 538 ( 340 S.E.2d 922) (1986), we determined the date of the "pivotal order" in an appeal to the superior court under OCGA § 5-3-20, where the Board of Zoning Adjustment had rendered an oral decision which was not apparently reduced to writing until the Board sent a letter to the appellant notifying it of the decision. We held: "[T]he pivotal order was the official notification sent by letter to the appellant.

  4. Fortson v. Tucker

    307 Ga. App. 694 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011)   Cited 6 times
    Finding lawsuits challenging a "zoning ordinance as applied to the property involved [are] untimely when no suit challenging the zoningclassification is filed within 30 days of the local authorities' final act on the zoning issue"

    OCGA § 5-3-20 (a).Wilson v. City of Snellville, 256 Ga. 734, 735 (2) ( 352 SE2d 759) (1987); Taco Mac v. City of Atlanta Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 255 Ga. 538, 539 ( 340 SE2d 922) (1986).Rowell v. Parker, 192 Ga. App. 215, 216 (2) ( 384 SE2d 396) (1989).

  5. Department of Human Resources v. Lewis

    217 Ga. App. 399 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995)   Cited 7 times
    Holding that the superior court erred when it considered an untimely appeal from an agency decision over which it lacked jurisdiction, under the guise of "a reconsideration of its decision to adopt the agency decision," because doing so would permit a party "to do indirectly that which the law does not allow to be done directly"

    The superior court lacks jurisdiction when an appeal of an adverse decision by an administrative agency is filed beyond the time allowed by law and may take no action other than to dismiss the case. Miller v. Ga. Real Estate Comm., 136 Ga. App. 718 (1) ( 222 S.E.2d 183). Accord Chambers v. City of Atlanta Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 255 Ga. 538 ( 340 S.E.2d 922); Rowell v. Parker, 192 Ga. App. 215, 216 (2) ( 384 S.E.2d 396). While the superior court's final order includes language which may indicate that it considered the appeal to be a reconsideration of its decision to adopt the agency decision rather than the consideration of a matter beyond its jurisdiction, the substance of the matter is the same: an appellate review of the final agency decision.

  6. Back v. City of Warner Robins

    457 S.E.2d 582 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995)   Cited 3 times

    However, the language of the statute clearly allows the condemnor of property for transportation purposes to utilize OCGA § 32-3-4 et seq. if it desires a judicial determination of any question for any reason. Where statutory language is clear, judicial construction is forbidden. See Taco Mac v. City of Atlanta c. Adjustment, 255 Ga. 538, 539 ( 340 S.E.2d 922) (1986). We also note that we have reviewed numerous cases in which condemnors relied on OCGA § 32-3-4 et seq., and title problems do not appear in any of them. See, e.g., Dept. of Transp. v. City of Atlanta, 255 Ga. 124 (3) (b) ( 337 S.E.2d 327) (1985); West v. Dept. of Transp., 176 Ga. App. 806 (1) ( 338 S.E.2d 45) (1985); Dept. of Transp. v. Wright, 169 Ga. App. 332 ( 312 S.E.2d 824) (1983).

  7. Rowell v. Parker

    192 Ga. App. 215 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989)   Cited 7 times

    The requirement of OCGA § 5-3-20 (a) that appeals to superior court must be filed "within 30 days of the date the judgment, order, or decision complained of was entered" is not a statute of limitation but is jurisdictional in nature. See Taco Mac v. Atlanta Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 255 Ga. 538 ( 340 S.E.2d 922) (1986). Thus, OCGA § 9-2-61 (a) has no applicability to the present situation, and the superior court did not err in dismissing Count 2 of the Rowell-Marbach appeal. Cf. Albert v. Bryan, 150 Ga. App. 649 ( 258 S.E.2d 300) (1979).

  8. Chattahoochee Valley, Etc. v. Healthmaster, Inc.

    381 S.E.2d 56 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989)   Cited 9 times

    City of Jesup v. Bennett, 226 Ga. 606, 609 ( 176 S.E.2d 81) (1970). See also Taco Mac v. Atlanta Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 255 Ga. 538, 539 ( 340 S.E.2d 922) (1986). In the case before us, the SHPA went beyond merely interpreting the language of the statute and, in effect, added an entirely new basis for an exemption.

  9. City of Lagrange v. Ga. Power Co.

    185 Ga. App. 60 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987)   Cited 10 times

    "`[W]here the language of an Act is plain and unequivocal, judicial construction is not only unnecessary but is forbidden' [cit.], the only exception being the case where an unequivocal meaning ascribes to the legislature an unreasonable or senseless intent." Taco Mac v. Atlanta Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 255 Ga. 538, 539 ( 340 S.E.2d 922) (1986). Moreover, "statutes must not be interpreted to thwart the avowed purpose of the legislature."

  10. Mortg. Alliance Corp. v. Pickens Cnty.

    316 Ga. App. 755 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012)   Cited 3 times

    However, in a case similar to this one, the Georgia Supreme Court held that a letter sent by a zoning board to notify the appellant of a zoning decision constituted the “pivotal order” for purposes of determining when the 30–day period under OCGA § 5–3–20 began running; and since the appeal was filed within 30 days of the date the letter had been signed, it was timely under the statute. Taco Mac v. City of Atlanta Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 255 Ga. 538, 539, 340 S.E.2d 922 (1986). As further clarified in Chadwick v. Gwinnett County, 257 Ga. 59, 60(1), 354 S.E.2d 420 (1987), the Supreme Court has “chose[n] the signing of the initial document reducing the decision to writing as the commencement for the running of the clock under OCGA § 5–3–20.”