Opinion
Case No. 00 C 652
February 27, 2001
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant City of Chicago's ("Defendant" or "City") Motion to Reconsider the Court's earlier ruling granting Plaintiff's Motion to Deem Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Request to Admit as Admitted. For the following reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant's Motion.
DISCUSSION
Defendant City of Chicago makes two arguments in its Motion to Reconsider: (1) the Court erred in concluding that Judge Leinenweber ordered Defendant to speak to the officers; and (2) Defendant was not obligated to speak to the officers before answering Plaintiff's Request to Admit because the Officers might also be sued individually. Both arguments are unpersuasive.
First, whether or not Judge Leienenweber actually ordered Defendant to speak to the officers was immaterial to the Court's earlier decision. During the hearing, Judge Leinenweber sought to impress upon Defendant its obligation to conduct a reasonable investigation. Judge Leinenweber clearly communicated his belief that Defendant had an obligation to speak to the Officer(s) at the scene. During the hearing, counsel for Defendant stated:
There is one officer whose name appears on the report. Other than that I can't imagine what my obligation would be since there is no other officer . . .
(Hrg. Trans. ¶ 6-8, at 7). Judge Leinenweber responded:
You have an obligation to talk to that officer to see who was there.
(Hrg. Trans. ¶ 9-10, at 7).
Later on, counsel for Defendant stated:
Judge, in this request to admit I am being asked to admit that an officer working for the City of Chicago touched the body of Mr. Horwitz' client.
(Hrg. Trans. ¶ 7-9, at 8). Judge Leinenweber then responded:
All right. You have to talk to the officers to find out whether they touched her.
(Hrg. Trans. ¶ 10-11, at 8).
Whether or not these statements constituted a formal order is immaterial to the Court's earlier decision. The fact is that Defendant was put on notice of its obligation to speak to the Officer(s). Its failure to do so, in turn, resulted in the requests to admit being deemed as admitted.
Defendant persists in its contention that it had no legal obligation to speak to the Officers for the purpose of answering Plaintiff's Request to Admit. Defendant argues that the general principle that employers need to make a reasonable inquiry of their employees "was never intended to apply to the situation presented in this case." However, Defendant fails to cite any authority as to why this Court should not apply the finding of the court in T. Rowe Price Small-Cap Fund, Inc. v. Oppenheimer Co., 174 F.R.D. 38, 42 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). In that case, the court concluded, "[r]easonable inquiry includes investigation and inquiry of any of defendant's officers, administrators, agents, employees, servants, enlisted or other personnel, who conceivably, but in realistic terms, may have information which may lead to or furnish the necessary and appropriate response."
Defendant argues that attorneys for the City should not be obligated to interview officers whose legal interests may be in conflict with those of the City. If interest in preserving these officers' legal rights was Defendant's chief concern, then it could have easily arranged to have attorneys from the "other division," which represents Officers in their individual capacity, present for the interviews.
Referenced in footnote 2 of Defendant's Motion.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Defendant's Motion is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.