Taber Pontiac, Inc. v. Osborne

8 Citing cases

  1. Burch v. Lawrence

    258 S.E.2d 35 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979)   Cited 9 times

    Central of Ga. R. Co. v. Little, 126 Ga. App. 502, 506 (6) ( 191 S.E.2d 105). See Taber Pontiac v. Osborne, 116 Ga. App. 274 ( 157 S.E.2d 33); Smith v. General Finance Corp. of Ga., 143 Ga. App. 390, 391 ( 238 S.E.2d 694). Only in those situations where the testimony of the witness reveals there was no rational basis or reason for the opinion should the testimony be excluded. Moreover, there was some evidence from which the jurors might draw from their own experience in forming estimates of market value.

  2. Smith v. General Finance Corporation of Georgia

    238 S.E.2d 694 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977)   Cited 11 times

    This was competent evidence of value as the plaintiff stated reasons for the opinion. See Code §§ 38-1708 and 38-1709; Hoard v. Wiley, 113 Ga. App. 328 ( 147 S.E.2d 782); Taber Pontiac v. Osborne, 116 Ga. App. 274 ( 157 S.E.2d 33). Thus, there was a jury issue presented as to actual damages and it was error to grant defendant's motion for directed verdict as to plaintiff's claim. 2.

  3. Dickens v. Adams

    224 S.E.2d 468 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976)   Cited 13 times
    Holding that statements made by psychiatrist's patient were not inadmissible as hearsay, as the psychiatrist was not expressing a belief as to the truth or falsity of the statements, but merely expressing the basis of his opinion concerning the cause of the patient's anxiety and depression

    Landrum v. Swann, 8 Ga. App. 209 (1) ( 68 S.E. 862). Mr. Adams clearly established a sufficient foundation to properly express his opinion as to the fair market value of the automobile before and after the collision. Taber Pontiac, Inc. v. Osborne, 116 Ga. App. 274 ( 157 S.E.2d 33) and cits. 6. The trial court did not err in refusing to allow in evidence a certified copy of a divorce complaint filed by Mrs. Adams against Clark Adams. Mrs. Dickens sought admission of this document to prove that a divorce had been filed.

  4. Rustin Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Kendricks

    182 S.E.2d 178 (Ga. Ct. App. 1971)   Cited 17 times

    There was evidence in the record of the purchase price and sale price of the Oldsmobile, the length of time it was kept, the defects which appeared and in some cases the cost of repair, and opinion evidence a proper foundation for which was established of the cost of a 1968 Oldsmobile 98 as a new car and as a used car, all of which was sufficient to afford a basis for a jury decision as to the amount of damages. Taber Pontiac v. Osborne, 116 Ga. App. 274 ( 157 S.E.2d 33). Further, the jury was in fact instructed to decide the case on the basis of the evidence presented, and it was not, of course, absolutely bound by the opinion testimony as to value but could conclude from the evidence before it the true value and therefore the damage sustained.

  5. Crowe v. Harrell

    176 S.E.2d 190 (Ga. Ct. App. 1970)   Cited 4 times
    In Crowe v. Harrell, 122 Ga. App. 7, 8 (176 S.E.2d 190) it was held in a similar instance: "Although the evidence of automobile damage is limited to an opinion by the plaintiff of a decrease in value of $400, and the reasons therefor, the jury, in considering the facts on which the opinion was based, was not necessarily limited to the exact figures as stated by the witness, and we conclude that a finding of $500 was authorized."

    The court did not err in allowing the plaintiff owner to state his opinion of the value of his automobile immediately before and immediately after the collision as supported by the reasons therefor, including the purchase price, the manner in which he had maintained the automobile, the over-all condition of the automobile immediately before the collision, and details concerning the extent of damage. See Taber Pontiac, Inc. v. Osborne, 116 Ga. App. 274 ( 157 S.E.2d 33); Johnson v. Rooks, 116 Ga. App. 394 ( 157 S.E.2d 527). The circumstances here shown distinguish this case from those cases where a lay witness, in stating an opinion of value, fails to give "his reasons therefor" and fails to show that "he has had an opportunity for forming a correct opinion." See Code §§ 38-1708, 38-1709.

  6. Wilkins v. Hester

    167 S.E.2d 167 (Ga. Ct. App. 1969)   Cited 2 times

    4. The next two enumerations are that the trial court erred in admitting the plaintiff's testimony as to the market value of the automobile before and after the damage. The record shows that he stated the facts upon which he based his opinions; therefore there was no error. Hoard v. Wiley, 113 Ga. App. 328, 331-334 ( 147 S.E.2d 782); Taber Pontiac v. Osborne, 116 Ga. App. 274 ( 157 S.E.2d 33); Code §§ 38-1708, 38-1709. 5. The next three enumerations of error relate to the admission of testimony, over objection, by H. S. Hester, Sr., the plaintiff's father, as to the market value of the automobile before and after the damage, and also regarding its rental value.

  7. City of Atlanta v. Williams

    166 S.E.2d 896 (Ga. Ct. App. 1969)   Cited 3 times

    Aside from the fact that there was no objection to any of the above testimony, and no rulings invoked, the testimony as to value was admissible since the plaintiff had described the prior condition of his automobile and the extent of the physical damage thereto. See Taber Pontiac, Inc. v. Osborne, 116 Ga. App. 274 ( 157 S.E.2d 33); Johnson v. Rooks, 116 Ga. App. 394 ( 157 S.E.2d 527); Nail v. Hiers, 116 Ga. App. 522 ( 157 S.E.2d 771); Hoard v. Wiley, 113 Ga. App. 328 ( 147 S.E.2d 782). 4. The last enumeration of error, that the trial court erred in overruling its motion for new trial, is unsupported by argument or citation of authority and is deemed abandoned.

  8. Nail v. Hiers

    157 S.E.2d 771 (Ga. Ct. App. 1967)   Cited 18 times
    In Nail, this court held that "we do not regard [plaintiff's] testimony of the actual salvage price as admissible or of probative value to establish the market value of the automobile after the collision in the absence of supporting evidence as to the extent of the damage other than the mere statement that the rear end was crumpled and that the automobile could not be driven away.

    In two recent cases this court reviewed the admissibility of testimony of before and after market value of automobiles damaged in collisions, and recognized the admissibility of opinion evidence of market value by the owner if the witness shows a sufficient foundation for his opinion. Taber Pontiac, Inc. v. Osborne, 116 Ga. App. 274 ( 157 S.E.2d 33), and Johnson v. Rooks, 116 Ga. App. 394 ( 157 S.E.2d 527). See Code §§ 38-1708, 38-1709.