Opinion
NO. 03-20-00237-CV NO. 03-20-00239-CV NO. 03-20-00240-CV
07-24-2020
T. L. H., Appellant v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Appellee
FROM THE 419TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY
NOS. D-1-FM-11-004725 , D-1-FM-12-006612, D-1-FM-18-004896, THE HONORABLE MAYA GUERRA GAMBLE, JUDGE PRESIDING MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant T.L.H. (the mother) appeals from the district court's orders, following a jury trial, terminating her parental rights to four children: D.L. (cause number D-1-FM-11-004725); M.H. and A.H. (cause number D-1-FM-12-006612); and A.W. (cause number D-1-FM-18-004896). In each case, the mother's counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). We will affirm the district court's termination orders.
The district court also terminated the parental rights of the fathers of the children: E.D., the father of D.L.; M.A.H., the father of M.H. and A.H., and A.B.W., the father of A.W. The fathers have not appealed the district court's orders.
The jury heard evidence that in August 2018, Detective Patrick Oborski of the Austin Police Department initiated a traffic stop on the mother's vehicle after observing the mother not wearing a seatbelt. Shortly after the mother had pulled over on the side of the road and Oborski had stopped behind her, the mother sped away. Oborski proceeded to pursue the mother with his emergency lights and siren activated. During the pursuit, Oborski observed the mother driving over 70 miles per hour in a 35-miles-per-hour zone, "weaving in and out of traffic," and running multiple stop signs. The pursuit ended when the mother's vehicle swerved to avoid colliding with another vehicle and collided instead with a concrete barrier on the side of the road. The mother got out of the vehicle and attempted to walk away from the scene, but Oborski apprehended her before she could do so. Oborski noticed four children inside the mother's vehicle, none of whom were wearing seat belts, and he arrested the mother for evading detention and child endangerment.
Following the mother's arrest, the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (the Department) filed a petition requesting temporary managing conservatorship of the children. The children were placed first with the mother's grandfather and then with the mother's friend, T.J. (the foster mother), who is the current placement for the children.
The district court ordered the mother to complete certain services before she could obtain the return of the children, including submitting to random drug tests. During the first four months of the case, the mother took zero out of sixteen requested drug tests. In January 2019, the mother tested positive for cocaine. The mother also missed multiple drug tests in 2019, and in January 2020, approximately one month before trial, the mother again tested positive for cocaine.
While the case was ongoing, the children made outcries of physical and emotional abuse by the mother. D.L. reported that the mother had accused her of sleeping with the mother's boyfriend and, when D.L. denied doing so, the mother hit her in the face. D.L. also reported that the mother had hit her on other occasions. M.H. reported that the mother had pointed a gun at him on one occasion, threatening to shoot him, and had hit him on other occasions. The two younger children, A.H. and A.W., reported that they had observed the mother hit the two older children. All four children reported that they did not feel safe with the mother and did not want to return to her care.
The Department's plan for the children was adoption by the foster mother. All four children reported that they felt safe with the foster mother, loved her, and wanted to continue living with her. The foster mother testified that she was willing to adopt all four children and that the children got along well with her two biological daughters.
Both the Department caseworker and the CASA volunteer assigned to the case testified that it was in the children's best interest for the mother's parental rights to be terminated. They explained that the children were not safe with the mother and did not want to live with her, that the children were doing well in their current placement, and that the foster mother provided safety and stability for the children. According to the CASA volunteer, the foster mother has "been that consistent, loving, stable person in their life and she's really been there for them."
At the conclusion of trial, the district court submitted in its charge to the jury the following statutory grounds for termination regarding the mother: (1) that she had knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the children; (2) that she had engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the children; and (3) that she had failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that established the actions necessary for her to obtain the return of the children. See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O). The jury found that the mother had committed at least one of the alleged grounds for termination and that termination of the mother's parental rights was in the best interest of the children. See id. § 161.001(b)(2). Consistent with the jury's verdict, the district court rendered judgment terminating the mother's parental rights to each child. These appeals followed.
Court-appointed counsel has filed an Anders brief, concluding that the appeals are frivolous and without merit. See 386 U.S. at 744; In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 & n.10 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam) (approving use of Anders procedure in appeals from termination of parental rights because it "strikes an important balance between the defendant's constitutional right to counsel on appeal and counsel's obligation not to prosecute frivolous appeals" (citations omitted)). The brief meets the requirements of Anders by presenting a professional evaluation of the record and demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to be advanced on appeal. See 386 U.S. at 744; Taylor v. Texas Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 160 S.W.3d 641, 646-47 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, pet. denied). Counsel has certified to this Court that she has provided her client with a copy of the Anders brief and informed her of her right to examine the appellate record and to file a pro se brief. No pro se brief has been filed.
Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of the record to determine whether the appeal is wholly frivolous. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988); Taylor, 160 S.W.3d at 647. After reviewing the entire record and the Anders brief submitted on the mother's behalf, we have found nothing in the record that might arguably support an appeal. Our review included the endangerment findings, see Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1) (D), (E), and we have found no issues that could be raised on appeal with respect to those findings, see In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 237 (Tex. 2019). We agree with counsel that the appeals are frivolous. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's termination orders.
/s/_________
Gisela D. Triana, Justice Before Chief Justice Rose, Justices Baker and Triana Affirmed Filed: July 24, 2020