The Court of Appeals directed that if this application is timely filed the circuit court shall hold the plaintiffs civil suit in abeyance pending the bureau's decision. This is a procedure that the Court of Appeals has ordered in a number of other cases, each time relying on this Court's opinion in Szydlowski v General Motors Corp, 397 Mich. 356; 245 N.W.2d 26 (1976), or the Court of Appeals opinion in this plaintiff's suit against Bathey, Sewell v Bathey Mfg Co, 103 Mich. App. 732; 303 N.W.2d 876 (1981). In Szydlowski, supra, pp 357-358, this Court agreed with the trial court that the bureau should decide a claim that GM had breached a statutory duty to provide medical services:

Sewell's assumption of jurisdiction shared with the WCB violated the plain language of MCL 418.161 without even so much as an analytic nod to the statutory scheme conferring jurisdiction in the WDCA. Sewell overruled longstanding authority that had correctly implemented the statute, including Szydlowski v Gen Motors Corp, 397 Mich. 356; 245 N.W.2d 26 (1976). 4 Moreover, it contradicted the legislative scheme established [473 Mich. 543] to determine disputes involving the award of worker's compensation benefits.

Also, whether there existed an employee-employer relationship and the exclusive remedy provision of § 131(1) were not at issue in St Paul Fire. Subsequently, in Szydlowski v General Motors Corp, 397 Mich 356; 245 NW2d 26 (1976), our Supreme Court cited St Paul Fire with approval. In Szydlowski, the plaintiff initially filed two claims for worker's compensation benefits, but the claims were dismissed for lack of progress.

" Farrell v Dearborn Mfg Co, 416 Mich. 267, 274; 330 N.W.2d 397 (1982). See also Szydlowski v General Motors Corp, 397 Mich. 356, 358; 245 N.W.2d 26 (1976). A

Const 1963, art 6, § 13.Szydlowski v General Motors Corp, 397 Mich. 356; 245 N.W.2d 26 (1976), does not alter this conclusion. "Properly stated, the Szydlowski principle is that the bureau [of workers' compensation] has exclusive jurisdiction to decide whether injuries suffered by an employee were in the course of employment."

(Emphasis added.) In Szydlowski v General Motors Corp, 397 Mich. 356, 359; 245 N.W.2d 26 (1976), we quoted with approval Herman v Theis, 10 Mich. App. 684, 691; 160 N.W.2d 365 (1968): "`plaintiff's remedy against an employer based on an injury allegedly arising out of an employment relationship properly belongs within the workmen's compensation department for initial determination as to jurisdiction and liability.'" (Emphasis added.)

This review shall include, as a minimum, the determination whether such final decisions, findings, rulings and orders are authorized by law; and, in cases in which a hearing is required, whether the same are supported by competent, material and substantial evidence on the whole record". In Szydlowski v General Motors Corp, 397 Mich. 356; 245 N.W.2d 26 (1976), the plaintiff, a widow, filed a circuit court action based on employment-related injuries to her husband. The Court of Appeals said "the circuit court does have subject matter jurisdiction, concurrent with the workmen's compensation bureau".

It is true that our Supreme Court has stated that "`[i]ssues concerning injuries and whether they grew "out of and in the course of the employment relationship" are to be exclusively within the purview of the work[er]'s compensation [bureau], and the merits of such a claim are to be first evaluated by the [bureau].'" Szydlowski v. General Motors Corp, 397 Mich. 356, 359; 245 N.W.2d 26 (1976), quoting Herman v. Theis, 10 Mich. App. 684, 689; 160 N.W.2d 365 (1968); see also MCL 418.841(1); MSA 17.237(841)(1). More recently however, the Court has acknowledged that, taken literally, the rule lends itself to an overbroad interpretation and that, "[p]roperly stated, the Szydlowski principle is that the bureau has exclusive jurisdiction to decide whether injuries suffered by an employee were [sustained] in the course of employment."Sewell v. Clearing Machine Corp, 419 Mich. 56, 62; 347 N.W.2d 447 (1984).

The trial court erred in ruling that the dispute regarding subject-matter jurisdiction could be waived by defendants' conduct. The determination regarding whether an employee's injuries grew out of or occurred in the course of the employment relationship is initially within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Worker's Disability Compensation. Adams v Nat'l Bank of Detroit, 444 Mich. 329; 508 N.W.2d 464 (1993); Szydlowski v General Motors Corp, 397 Mich. 356; 245 N.W.2d 26 (1976). Lack of subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, and parties to an action can neither confer jurisdiction by their conduct or action nor waive the defense by not raising it. Paulson v Secretary of State, 154 Mich. App. 626; 398 N.W.2d 477 (1986).

In Sewell v Clearing Machine Corp, 419 Mich. 56, 62; 347 N.W.2d 447 (1984), our Supreme Court held: Properly stated, the Szydlowski [ Szydlowski v General Motors Corp, 397 Mich. 356; 245 N.W.2d 26 (1976)] principle is that the bureau has exclusive jurisdiction to decide whether injuries suffered by an employee were in the course of employment. The courts, however, retain the power to decide the more fundamental issue whether the plaintiff is an employee (or fellow employee) of the defendant.