Opinion
19-CV-9988 (VEC) (VF)
01-09-2024
ALPHONSO SYVILLE, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, et al., Defendants.
THE HONORABLE VALERIE E. CAPRONI, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
VALERIE FIGUEREDO, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Alphonso Syville, proceeding pro se, commenced this action on October 28, 2019, asserting claims of false arrest, denial of a right to a fair trial, and excessive force against the City of New York (the “City”), the Department of Homeless Services (“DHS”), and several individual officers from DHS (collectively, “Defendants”). See ECF No. 1 (“Compl”). On June 17, 2020, Plaintiff and Defendants settled the action, and the matter was dismissed with prejudice on July 10, 2020. See ECF No. 33. Plaintiff now moves to reopen the case, seeking to vacate or modify the general release he signed in connection with the settlement agreement in this action. See ECF Nos. 38 (motion to reopen), 32 (stipulation of settlement containing general release). For the following reasons, I recommend that Plaintiff's motion be DENIED.
BACKGROUND
A. The instant lawsuit
On October 28, 2019, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, commenced this action against Defendants alleging violations of Plaintiff's civil rights under federal and state law. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on February 14, 2020, ECF No. 15, and a second amended complaint on February 21, 2020, ECF No. 17. On March 16, 2020, Defendants filed their answer to Plaintiff's second amended complaint. See ECF No. 18.
On May 8, 2020, the Honorable Debra C. Freeman directed the parties to file a joint status report. See 5/8/20 Text Only Order. Defendants filed a status report on May 29, 2020, which indicated that the parties had discussed the prospect of settlement and requested a settlement conference. See ECF No. 27. On June 3, 2020, the parties appeared before the Court for a telephonic settlement conference. See 6/3/20 Minute Entry. On June 9, 2020, the parties notified the Court that they had reached an agreement and would soon file a stipulation of settlement. See ECF No. 29.
On June 10, 2020, the Honorable Valerie E. Caproni entered an order dismissing the case with prejudice and without costs (including attorneys' fees) to either party. See ECF No. 30. The Court's order stated that either party could seek to reopen the case within 30 days of the order on a showing of good cause. Id. The order explained, however, that any request to reopen filed after 30 days had elapsed or without a showing of good cause “may be denied solely on that basis.” Id.
On July 10, 2020, the parties submitted a fully executed Stipulation and Order of Dismissal for the Court's endorsement, ECF No. 31, along with a copy of the executed Stipulation of Settlement, ECF No. 32. The Stipulation of Settlement provided that the case would be dismissed “with prejudice, and without costs, expenses, or attorney's fees except as specified in paragraph ‘2'” of the Stipulation. See id. at ¶ 1. Paragraph 2 of the Stipulation of Settlement required the City to pay Plaintiff $10,000 “in full satisfaction of all claims.” Id. at ¶ 2. In consideration for that payment, Plaintiff agreed to a “General Release.” Id. The terms of the release required Plaintiff to
release defendant City of New York; its successors or assigns; and all past and present officials, employees, representatives, and agents of the City of New York
or any entity represented by the Office of the Corporation Counsel, from any and all liability, claims, or rights of action alleging a violation of plaintiff's civil rights and any and all related state law claims, from the beginning of the world to the date of the General Release, including claims for costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees with the exception of claims relating to Alphonso Syville v. City of New York, et al., 20-CV-571 (LTS)(SDA), which [was then] pending in the Southern District of New York.Id. That same day, Judge Caproni signed the Stipulation and Order of Dismissal. See ECF No. 33.
Nearly three years later, on April 6, 2023, Plaintiff filed a motion to reopen the case and set aside the settlement agreement. See ECF No. 38 (“Pl.'s Mem.”). In his motion, Plaintiff stated that he was unaware that the General Release in the settlement agreement related to “every city worker in New York [C]ity.” Id. at 1 (emphasis added). Specifically, Plaintiff states that he thought “every” City worker meant only DHS officers. Id. Plaintiff contends that he did not think “every worker in New York [C]ity” would also include City workers who were not mentioned in his lawsuit, such as “bus or transit worker[s].” Id. Plaintiff states that he signed the Stipulation of Dismissal without “a lawyer [or somebody else] fully explain[ing] the general release to [him].” Id. at 2. According to Plaintiff, if he had known that the General Release barred claims against “every city worker,” he “would've never signed” it. Id. at 1-2.
Defendants opposed Plaintiff's motion to reopen on July 14, 2023, contending that the motion should be denied for three reasons. See ECF No. 44 (“Defs.' Mem.”) at 3-8. First, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's motion is untimely under both Judge Caproni's June 10, 2020 order and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c). Id. at 3-4. Second, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to show good cause warranting reopening of the case. Id. at 4-7. Lastly, Defendants contend that Plaintiff is collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue of the General Release because it has already been determined to be enforceable by another Court in this District. Id. at 7-8. Plaintiff did not file a reply brief in further support of his motion.
B. Plaintiff's other lawsuits in this Court
As is relevant to the instant motion, Plaintiff has initiated two other actions in this Court. On January 21, 2020, Plaintiff filed a civil-rights action claiming that individuals at the Fort Washington Men's Shelter denied him access to his medication and refused his request for bed rest. See Syville v. City of New York, Case No. 20-cv-571 (“Syville I”), ECF No. 2. That case is the named suit that is exempted from the General Release in Paragraph 2 of Plaintiff's settlement agreement in the instant action. See ECF No. 32 at ¶ 2. On January 4, 2022, after Plaintiff executed the settlement agreement in the present case, the Court dismissed Syville I for Plaintiff's failure to prosecute. See Syville I at ECF No. 63.
On June 16, 2020, Plaintiff initiated another civil-rights action against the City and an employee of DHS, alleging discrimination and retaliation in the provision of shelter services. See Syville v. City of New York, Case No. 20-cv-4633 (“Syville II”), ECF No. 2. The City moved to dismiss the complaint on October 29, 2021, arguing that the claims were barred by the General Release that Plaintiff signed pursuant to the settlement agreement in this case. See id. at ECF Nos. 48, 50. On May 17, 2022, the Honorable James L. Cott issued a Report and Recommendation, recommending that (1) the City's motion to dismiss be converted to a motion for summary judgment and (2) summary judgment be granted to defendants. Syville II, 2022 WL 1549795, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2022). In an order adopting Judge Cott's Report and Recommendation, the Honorable Paul G. Gardephe determined that the General Release Plaintiff signed in this case barred Plaintiff from bringing civil-rights claims that arose before July 17, 2020, against the City or its employees. Syville II, 2022 WL 16541162, at *7-8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2022). Judge Gardephe also concluded that the General Release's language was unambiguous, and that Plaintiff had signed the release knowingly and voluntarily. Id. Specifically, Judge Gardephe concluded that Plaintiff “understood the simple language of the General Release” as was evident from Plaintiff “explicitly exempting] another lawsuit from the terms of the General Release.” Id. at 8.
LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits relief from a final judgment, order, or proceeding under the following circumstances:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any other reason that justifies relief.Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1)-(6).
A motion under Rule 60(b)(1) must be filed “no more than a year after entry of the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(c); Saavedra v. Mrs. Bloom's Direct, Inc., No. 17-CV-2180 (OTW), 2019 WL 4727578, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2019); see also Niederland v. Chase, 425 Fed.Appx. 10, 11 (2d Cir. 2011) (“Rule 60(b)(1) motions must be made within a reasonable time not to exceed one year.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “This limitation is ‘absolute.'” Saavedra, 2019 WL 4727576, at *5 (quoting Warren v. Garvin, 219 F.3d 111, 114 (2d Cir. 2000)) (emphasis added); see also Chambers v. Kirby Psych, No. 17-CV-6315 (CM), 2019 WL 6340959, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2019) (concluding that motion for relief under Rule 60(b)(1) was untimely because it was filed a year and a half after entry of judgment); Ritchie Cap. Mgmt., L.L.C. v. Coventry First LLC, No. 07-CV-3494 (DLC), 2016 WL 6952248, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2016) (motion under Rule 60(b)(1) was time-barred because it was filed eight years after order of dismissal).
“Motions under Rule 60(b) are addressed to the sound discretion of the district court,” Mendell on Behalf of Viacom, Inc. v. Gollust, 909 F.2d 724, 731 (2d Cir. 1990) (citation omitted), and relief is permitted “only upon a showing of exceptional circumstances.” Nemaizer v. Baker, 793 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1986) (citations omitted). Thus, even if the motion is timely filed, courts recognize that “[Rule] 60(b) allows extraordinary judicial relief, [and] it is invoked only upon a showing of exceptional circumstances.” Wilmington Tr., N.A. v. Rafiq, No. 22-CV-6177 (JPO), 2023 WL 6237680, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2023) (quoting Nemaizer, 793 F.2d at 61). Motions for relief under this rule “are generally disfavored in the Second Circuit.” Esposito v. New York, No. 07-CV-11612 (SAS), 2012 WL 5499882, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2012) (citing Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. Gen. Cigar Co. Inc., 385 Fed.Appx. 29, 31 (2d Cir. 2010)). And with respect to settlement agreements, “the burden to obtain Rule 60(b) relief is heavier.” Edelstein v. 360 Sports Mgmt., Inc., No. 15-CV-2077 (PAE), 2017 WL 1434476, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2017) (citing Nemaizer, 793 F.2d at 63). This is because when there is a “deliberate, strategic choice to settle,” a party “cannot be relieved of such choice merely because [his] assessment of the consequences was incorrect.” New York SMSA Limited Partnership v. City of Rye, No. 19-CV-10159, 2022 WL 2965981, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2022) (quoting U.S. v. Bank of N.Y., 14 F.3d 756, 759 (2d Cir. 1994)).
DISCUSSION
A. Plaintiff's motion is untimely.
Plaintiff's motion to reopen this case is plainly untimely. First, as Judge Caproni noted in her June 10, 2020 order, motions to reopen had to be filed within 30 days of the date of that order- that is, by July 10, 2020. See ECF No. 30. Judge Caproni's order further stated that any request to reopen made after July 10, 2020, may be denied “solely on that basis.” Id. Plaintiff does not explain or set forth any basis to justify his delay in bringing this motion. Therefore, Plaintiff's motion, filed on April 6, 2023-almost three years after the June 2020 order-is unquestionably untimely under the Court's order dismissing the case.
Plaintiff's motion is also untimely under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60. Motions under Rule 60(b)(1) must be filed within a year of the date of the final judgment, and that limitation is “absolute.” Prince of Peace Enters., Inc. v. Top Quality Food Mkt., LLC, No. 07-CV-0349 (LAP) (FM), 2012 WL 4471267, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Courts have repeatedly denied motions for relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1) where the motion was filed after the one-year period in Rule 60(c). See, e.g., Williams v. 563-569 Cauldwell Assocs. LLC, No. 10-CV-09 (DAB), 2013 WL 1344672, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2013) (motion for relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1) denied as untimely because it was filed a year and a half after entry of the order from which plaintiffs were seeking relief); Soto v. Cnty. of Westchester, No. 08-CV-5066 (AJN), 2018 WL 527977, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2018) (motion pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1) untimely because it was filed almost five years after the original action's dismissal). Here, Plaintiff's motion was filed on April 6, 2023-almost three years after the final judgment entered by the Court on July 10, 2020.
Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion to reopen is untimely under Rule 60 and the Court's June 10, 2020 order dismissing the action. I thus recommend that Plaintiff's motion to reopen be denied on that basis.
B. Plaintiff's motion lacks merit.
The only argument raised by Plaintiff in support of his motion to reopen is that he mistakenly agreed to the terms of the General Release. See Pl.'s Mem. at 1-2. Defendants argue, however, that Plaintiff cannot show good cause to reopen the case because: (1) the general release is “an enforceable contract” and Plaintiff “explicitly agreed to all its terms”; and (2) Plaintiff “was not mistaken when he signed the settlement agreement” as is evidenced by his request to exclude from the scope of the General Release another lawsuit (Syville I) that he had filed in this Court. See ECF No. 44 at 5-6.
“It is well-settled in the Second Circuit that ‘settlement agreements are contracts and must therefore be construed according to general principles of contract law.”' Bolling v. City of New York, No. 18-CV-5406 (PGG) (RWL), 2020 WL 8671940, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 961758 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2021) (quoting Mateo v. Carinha, 799 Fed.Appx. 51, 53 (2d Cir. 2020)). “Similarly, ‘[a] release is a species of contract law and is governed by the principles of contract law.'” Id. (quoting Golden Pacific Bancorp v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 273 F.3d 509, 514 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Under New York law, courts “enforce valid releases that are clear and unambiguous on their face and which were knowingly and voluntarily entered into and were not the product of fraud, duress, or undue influence.” Hummel v. AstraZeneca LP, 575 F.Supp.2d 568, 570 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (collecting cases) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Where the language of [a] release is clear, effect must be given to the intent of the parties as indicated by the language employed.” Mateo, 799 Fed.Appx. at 53 (cleaned up). If “general language is used in the releasing document, the release is to be construed most strongly against the releasor.” Tromp v. City of New York, 465 Fed.Appx. 50, 52 (2d Cir. 2012).
“It is ‘an open question in the Second Circuit whether the enforceability of a settlement agreement in a federal action [is] to be determined under state or federal law.'” Alli v. Warden of A.R.N.D.C., No. 12-CV-3947 (GBD) (GWG), 2016 WL 7176979, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 118023 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2017) (quoting Silas v. City of New York, 536 F.Supp.2d 353, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) and citing Kaczmarcysk v. Dutton, 414 Fed.Appx. 354, 355 (2d Cir. 2011) (summary order)). “[T]he Second Circuit has,” however, “stated that there ‘is no material difference between the applicable state law or federal common law standard'” for determining when parties have entered a binding contract. Id. (quoting Ciaramella v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 131 F.3d 320, 322 (2d Cir. 1997) and citing Kaczmarcysk, 414 Fed.Appx. at 355). I therefore analyze the Stipulation of Settlement and the General Release contained therein according to New York law. See Rosado-Acha v. Red Bull Gmbh, No. 15-CV-7620 (KPF), 2016 WL 3636672, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2016) (analyzing the validity of a similar release under New York law).
As part of the settlement agreement in this case, Plaintiff agreed to:
release defendant City of New York; its successors or assigns; and all past and present officials, employees, representatives, and agents of the City of New York or any entity represented by the Office of the Corporation Counsel, from any and all liability, claims, or rights of action alleging a violation of plaintiff's civil rights and any and all related state law claims, from the beginning of the world to the date of the General Release, including claims for costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees with the exception of claims relating to Alphonso Syville v. City of New York, et al., 20-CV-571 (LTS)(SDA), which [was then] pending in the Southern District of New York.ECF No. 32, ¶ 2. “[C]ourts in this Circuit have consistently concluded that similarly phrased releases between federal civil rights claimants and the City of New York bar suit against the City and its employees for alleged conduct predating the release.” Lloyd v. City of New York, No. 15-CV-8539 (RJS), 2017 WL 2266876, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2017) (collecting cases); see also Roberts v. Doe 1, No. 14-CV-9174 (AJP), 2015 WL 670180, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2015) (identical language “not reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation”); Rodriguez v. City of New York, No. 18-CV-4805 (NRB), 2021 WL 5360120, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2021) (noting that “numerous courts have considered [identical] language . . . and found it unambiguous”) (citations omitted). Moreover, “courts have found parties' intent to be clear where they entered into an agreement that explicitly included the term ‘general release,' even where one party was pro se and later asserted confusion as to the meaning and effect of the term.” Pullman v. Alpha Media Pub., Inc., No. 12-CV-01924 (PAC) (SN), 2014 WL 5043319, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2014) (collecting cases). Consequently, the language in the General Release unambiguously bars Plaintiff from bringing any civil-rights claim against the City or any of its employees for any conduct that occurred prior to the date of the release.
Plaintiff does not contend that he entered into the Stipulation of Settlement under duress or fraud. Instead, Plaintiff states that he did not understand that the General Release discharged all City employees, as opposed to only DHS employees, from liability for conduct preceding the date of the Stipulation of Settlement. See Pl.'s Mem. at 1-2. In order for a court to allow rescission of a contract based on a unilateral mistake, “a party must establish that (i) he entered into a contract under a mistake of material fact, and that (ii) the other contracting party either knew or should have known that such mistake was being made.” Kraft Foods, Inc. v. All These Brand Names, Inc., 213 F.Supp.2d 326, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (quoting Ludwig v. NYNEX Serv. Co., 838 F.Supp. 769, 795 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)).
Notably, Plaintiff does not allege that he has a claim that he wants to file against a City employee who is not a DHS officer for conduct predating the General Release.
As an initial matter, Plaintiff puts forth no basis to suggest that the City-the other contracting party to the Stipulation of Settlement-either knew or should have known that Plaintiff was mistaken about the scope of the General Release at the time Plaintiff signed the settlement agreement. To the contrary, the record here indicates that Plaintiff understood the scope of the General Release and did not agree to its terms under a mistake of material fact. During the settlement negotiations, Plaintiff successfully negotiated for a specific lawsuit he had brought against the City and other city employees (Syville I) to be exempted from the General Release. See ECF No. 32 at ¶ 2 (exempting claims related to Syville I from the General Release). The exemption of that specific lawsuit demonstrates Plaintiff's clear understanding of the scope of the General Release, as Judge Gardephe concluded in Syville II. See Syville II, 2022 WL 16541162, at *8 (pointing to Plaintiff having exempted Syville I from the scope of the General Release to support conclusion that Plaintiff understood scope of the release in the instant action).
What's more, Plaintiff made the “deliberate, strategic choice to settle” this matter with Defendants, and as such he “cannot be relived of such choice merely because [his] assessment of the consequences was incorrect.” New York SMSA, 2022 WL 2965981, at *8 (citation omitted). Plaintiff raises no allegations suggesting that he did not want to settle the instant lawsuit or that he did not enter into the settlement agreement voluntarily. That Plaintiff did not “carefully review” the terms of the General Release prior to signing the settlement agreement “does not render it unclear, unknowing or involuntary.” Figueroa v. MRM Worldwide, No. 12-CV-4115 (HBP), 2014 WL 902953, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2014). Although Plaintiff attributes his lack of understanding to his status as a pro se litigant, Pl.'s Mem. at 2, “courts in this district have consistently enforced similar general releases in civil rights actions brought by pro se litigants against the City and its agents.” Bolling, 2020 WL 8671940, at *5 (enforcing a general release against a pro se plaintiff and noting that the plaintiff's “status as a pro se litigant . . . does not alter his accountability for his end of the bargain”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
As such, the General Release contained within the Stipulation of Settlement is unambiguous and enforceable. Thus, even if Plaintiff's motion to reopen were timely, it would fail on the merits, presenting an additional basis to deny the motion.
C. Collateral Estoppel
Defendants also argue that a motion to vacate or modify the General Release is barred by collateral estoppel. See Def.'s Mem. at 7-8. Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, a court is precluded from “deciding an issue where ‘(1) the identical issue was raised in a previous proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated and decided in the previous proceeding; (3) the party had full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue; and (4) the resolution of the issue was necessary to support a valid and final judgment on the merits.'” Reeves v. City of Yonkers, No. 17-CV-5341 (KMK), 2019 WL 2602897, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2019) (quoting Ball v. A.O. Smith Corp., 451 F.3d 66, 69 (2d Cir. 2006)). That Plaintiff is proceeding pro se in this litigation does not exempt him from application of this doctrine. Reeves, 2019 WL 2602897, at *4 (citations omitted).
As noted, see supra at 4-5, in granting summary judgment and dismissing the claims in Syville II, Judge Gardephe determined on October 28, 2022-nearly five months before Plaintiff filed the instant motion to reopen-that the General Release Plaintiff signed in connection with his settlement in this case was enforceable. See Syville II, 2022 WL 16541162, at *7-8. As discussed below, all the elements necessary for application of collateral estoppel are present here.
1. An identical issue was raised, actually litigated, and decided in a previous proceeding.
Where an issue in a proceeding was “clearly raised” and “decided” in a prior proceeding, it is barred from being relitigated by means of collateral estoppel. Tutor Perini Bldg. Corp. v. New York City Reg'l Ctr., LLC, 525 F.Supp.3d 482, 513 (S.D.N.Y. 2021); see also Bronzini v. Classic Sec., LLC, No. 11-CV-2096 (KBF), 2012 WL 1681745, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2012) (barring re-litigation through collateral estoppel because plaintiff's instant complaint “contain[ed] allegations identical to those pursued by plaintiff' in his previous case).
The issue regarding the enforceability of the General Release was actually litigated and decided by the court in Syville II. In support of its motion, the City argued that the General Release in the settlement agreement in this case barred Plaintiff's suit. See Syville II, 2022 WL 1549795, at *2. And, Judge Gardephe granted summary judgment, dismissing Plaintiff's claims because he determined that the General Release barred Plaintiff from asserting his claims. Syville II, 2022 WL 16541162, at *8. Further, in adopting Judge Cott's Report and Recommendation, Judge Gardephe held that the language of the General release was unambiguous and that Plaintiff had signed it knowingly and voluntarily. Id.
2. Plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the enforceability of the General Release.
“It is well settled that a fully litigated and opposed summary judgment determination can constitute a full and fair opportunity to litigate a claim.” In re Arfa, No. 14-CV-7895 (AJN), 2015 WL 5610864, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2015) (quoting Deutsch v. Integrated Barter Int'l, Inc., 700 F.Supp. 194, 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)). Plaintiff therefore had a full and fair opportunity to present his claim that the General Release was unenforceable in Syville II, a case disposed of after litigation of the City's summary judgment motion. Additionally, courts apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel, concluding that a litigant had a full and fair opportunity to present a claim, even where the litigant is pro se. Goodson v. Sedlack, 212 F.Supp.2d 255, 258 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“[T]he mere fact that . . . plaintiff proceeded pro se does not sufficiently establish that he was denied a full and fair opportunity to be heard, particularly given that he is proceeding in the same manner in the present case.”) (alteration, italics, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff's lack of legal training therefore does not satisfy his burden to show that he has not had an adequate opportunity to litigate his claim concerning the enforceability of the General Release.
3. Resolution of the enforceability of the General Release was necessary to support a valid and final judgment on the merits.
Finally, the resolution of the enforceability of the General Release was necessary to support a valid and final judgment on the merits in Syville II. “Claims adjudicated through summary judgment are regarded as final judgments on the merits.” Manbeck v. Micka, 640 F.Supp.2d 351, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (citation omitted). Resolution of whether Plaintiff was bound to the terms of the General Release was necessary to support a final judgment in the previous case. After finding that the General Release was enforceable, Judge Gardephe granted summary judgment to Defendants in Syville II because Plaintiff's suit was barred by that release. Syville II, 2022 WL 16541162, at *8-9.
* * *
In sum, I recommend that Plaintiff's motion to reopen be denied as untimely under this Court's June 2020 and Rule 60(c). Additionally, the motion fails on the merits, and Plaintiff's attempt to relitigate the scope of the General Release is barred by collateral estoppel.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, I recommend that Plaintiff's motion to be DENIED .
SO ORDERED.
PROCEDURE FOR FILING OBJECTIONS TO THIS REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties have fourteen (14) days (including weekends and holidays) from service of this Report and Recommendation to file any objections. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b), 6(d). A party may respond to any objections within 14 days after being served. Any objections and responses shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. Any request for an extension of time to file objections or responses must be directed to the Honorable Valerie E. Caproni. If a party fails to file timely objections, that party will not be permitted to raise any objections to this Report and Recommendation on appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72; Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), 6(b), 6(d); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wagner & Wagner, LLP v. Atkinson, Haskins, Nellis, Brittingham, Gladd & Carwile, P.C., 596 F.3d 84, 92 (2d Cir. 2010).