Opinion
May 20, 1996
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Nassau County (McGinity, J.).
Ordered that the order and judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from; and it is further,
Ordered that the order and judgment is reversed insofar as cross-appealed from, on the law, and the third decretal paragraph thereof is deleted; and it is further,
Ordered that the defendants are awarded one bill of costs.
The record supports the Supreme Court's finding that the Town of Hempstead's restrictions on the amount of solid waste refuse it will remove from the plaintiffs' premises and the means by which it will do so do not reduce the benefit to the plaintiffs "to the point where it is, in effect, nonexistent" ( cf., Matter of Sperry Rand Corp. v. Town of N. Hempstead, 53 Misc.2d 970, affd 29 A.D.2d 968, affd 23 N.Y.2d 666). The fact that limits are placed upon refuse collection from commercial users and not upon residential users does not call for a different conclusion ( see, Industrial Refuse Sys. v. O'Rourke, 134 Misc.2d 45, 53, affd sub nom. Pelliccio v. Axelrod, 129 A.D.2d 76, citing Leroy Franz, Inc. v. City of New Rochelle, 124 N.Y.S.2d 525). Furthermore, the fact that the per-pound cost of solid waste removal for commercial and industrial users is increased as a result of the volume and weight limitations in question does not render the ad valorem tax inequitable pursuant to Town Law § 198 (9) (b).
In view of our determination that the Supreme Court's declaration that the ad valorem tax as applied to the plaintiffs' properties is valid, we find that the imposition of injunctive relief requiring the Town to provide on-site, as opposed to curbside, collection of solid waste was erroneous.
In view of the foregoing, we need not consider the plaintiffs' demand for a refund of the ad valorem taxes in question. Thompson, J.P., Santucci, Joy and Altman, JJ., concur.