Opinion
15-P-651
02-24-2016
RICHARD J. SYRJALA v. WILLIAM RICHARD SYRJALA.
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 (2009), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The defendant appeals from an order, pursuant to G. L. c. 258E, entered against him based on a complaint brought by his father. The complaint alleged that the defendant (1) contacted local police and told them that the plaintiff had locked up the defendant's medical equipment, had tried to break down the defendant's door, and was trying to kill him, (2) contacted the Department of Children and Families (DCF) and told them that the plaintiff's grandchildren were in danger, (3) verbally accused the plaintiff of being insane, and (4) sent the plaintiff an electronic mail message saying that he (the defendant) had weapons in the house. After conducting an evidentiary hearing in which nothing more was elicited, the judge entered the one- year harassment prevention order that is before us on appeal. We reverse.
The father has not appeared in this appeal nor has he offered any arguments in opposition to the appeal.
"Civil harassment, insofar as is relevant here, is defined as '[three] or more acts of willful and malicious conduct aimed at a specific person committed with the intent to cause fear, intimidation, abuse or damage to property and that does in fact cause fear, intimidation, abuse or damage to property.'" Seney v. Mohey, 467 Mass. 58, 60 (2014), quoting from G. L. c. 258E, § 1. "[T]here are two layers of intent required to prove civil harassment under c. 258E: the acts of harassment must be wilful and 'malicious,' the latter defined as 'characterized by cruelty, hostility or revenge,' and they must be committed with 'the intent to cause fear, intimidation, abuse or damage to property.' . . . Second, the multiple acts of civil harassment must 'in fact cause fear, intimidation, abuse or damage to property,' while the multiple acts of criminal harassment [G. L. c. 265, § 43A,] must 'seriously alarm[]' the targeted victim." O ' Brien v. Borowski, 461 Mass. 415, 420 (2012).
Although there was evidence of at least three events, it does not follow that the requirements of the statute were met in this case. Most of the allegations concerned statements allegedly made by the defendant to third parties, and there was no evidence to suggest that they were "aimed at" the plaintiff. We do not foreclose the possibility that statements to third parties can, in some circumstances, be aimed at another for purposes of the statute. But even in those circumstances, the remaining requirements of the statute must be met. Here, there was no evidence that the defendant acted with the requisite intent "to cause fear, intimidation, abuse or damage to property." G. L. c. 258E, § 1. Nor was there evidence that the defendant's acts caused actual "fear, intimidation, abuse or damage to property." Ibid.
For these reasons, the order dated February 27, 2015, is reversed.
So ordered.
By the Court (Green, Wolohojian & Henry, JJ.),
The panelists are listed in order of seniority. --------
/s/
Clerk Entered: February 24, 2016.