Opinion
No. 3:01-CV-1549-P
May 29, 2002
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Now before the Court are the following:
1. Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint and Add Party Defendants, filed January 14, 2002;
2. Defendant's Response to Sylvie's Motion for Leave to Amend, filed February 4, 2002; and
3. Plaintiff's Reply to Defendant's Response to Sylvie's Motion for Leave to Amend, filed February 20, 2002.
After a thorough review of the parties' briefs and the applicable law, for the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint and Add Party Defendants should be GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Charlie Sylvie ("Plaintiff" or "Sylvie") filed this action against Defendant City of Dallas ("City") on August 10, 2001, alleging that, as an African-American male employed by Defendant in the Dallas Water Department Purification Division, he was denied equal employment opportunities and was discriminated against because of his race in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e et seq. See Pl.'s Orig. Compl. at 1-2. Plaintiff further alleged that he was denied his rights to freedom from race discrimination and equal protection of the law. Id. at 1.
On January 14, 2002, Plaintiff brought this motion to amend seeking to add additional claims and party defendants to this suit. More specifically, Plaintiff now asserts that Ted Kilpatrick ("Kilpatrick"), Michael Rickman ("Rickman"), and Gary Fox ("Fox") (collectively "Individual Defendants"), all Caucasian or White individuals, were the persons primarily responsible for the adverse employment actions taken against him by the City. See Pl.'s Mot. to Amend at 1; see also Pl.'s First Am. Compl. at 4. Sylvie alleges that Kilpatrick and Rickman, as Water Department supervisors, purportedly investigated claims of improper computer use by Plaintiff, while Fox improperly used Water Department computers and caused the City to falsely conclude that Plaintiff was improperly using a City computer. Pl.'s First Am. Compl. at 4. Plaintiff brings this action against the Individual Defendants in their individual capacities, for race discrimination and for the deprivation of the Plaintiff's property right in his employment under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 12-13.
Specifically, Plaintiff's allegations in his First Amended Complaint are that:
"On and/or prior to March 2000, in the City of Dallas, State of Texas, the individual Defendants, and each of them, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause and/or Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and/or § 1985, did conspire and agree between themselves and with other persons, whose names are presently unknown to the Plaintiff, for the purpose of impeding, hindering, obstructing, or defeating the due course of justice in the State of Texas, and with the intent to deny to the Plaintiff, Charlie Sylvie, the equal protection of the laws because of his race and to injure the Plaintiff, Charlie Sylvie."
Pl.'s First Am. Compl. at 13, ¶ 24.
Defendant opposes Plaintiff's motion for leave because it believes the amendments sought are futile, and if granted, would not survive a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment. Def.'s Resp. at 1. These arguments shall be considered in turn.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard for Leave to Amend Complaint
Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, leave to amend a pleading "shall freely be granted when justice so requires." Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). The decision to grant leave to amend lies within the discretion of the trial court. However, in the context of motions to amend pleadings, "discretion" may be a misleading term because rule 15(a) severely restricts the court's freedom due to the bias in favor of granting leave to amend. Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Inv. Corp., 660 F.2d 594, 598 (5th Cir. 1981). The policy of the federal rules is to permit amendment to facilitate determination of claims on the merits and to prevent litigation from becoming a technical exercise in the fine points of pleading. Id. Thus, unless there exists a substantial reason for denying leave to amend, the district court should permit the filing of a proposed amendment. Id.
Nevertheless, the parties' ability to amend their pleadings is by no means unlimited. See In re Southmark, 88 F.3d 311, 315 (5th Cir. 1996); In re Circuit Breaker Litigation, 175 F.R.D. 547 (C.D. Cal. 1997). In determining whether to grant leave to amend, the court may consider several factors, including undue delay or prejudice to the non-movant, bad faith or dilatory motives on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies, and futility of amendment. Foman, 371 U.S. at 182.
The Court may deny a motion to amend if it concludes that the proposed amendment would be futile. JR. Stripling v. Jordan Production Co., LLC, 234 F.3d 863, 872-73 (5th Cir. 2000). The Fifth Circuit has defined "futility" to mean that "the amended complaint would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted" and has further held that the legal standard developed under Rule 12(b)(6) guides this analysis. Id. at 873. In this context, the court may not deny the motion for leave to amend "unless it appears beyond doubt that the Plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
The court must render its decision taking the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and taking its allegations as true. Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996). Moreover, the court limits its inquiry to whether plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence to support claims and does not address whether plaintiff will ultimately prevail on the merits. Johnson v. Dallas Ind. School Dist., 38 F.3d 198, 199 (5th Cir. 1994). Dismissal shall still be proper when "even the most sympathetic reading of [the] pleadings uncovers no theory and no facts that would subject the present defendants to liability." Jacquez v. Procunier, 801 F.2d 789, 791-92 (5th Cir. 1986).
II. Plaintiff's Claims against the Individual Defendants
A. Claims Under Section 1983
Section 1983 provides that "[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State. . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen. . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2001). Rather than create substantive rights, § 1983 provides a remedy for the rights that it designates; thus, an underlying constitutional or statutory violation is a predicate to liability under § 1983. See Harrington v. Harris, 118 F.3d 359, 365 (5th Cir. 1997). In this case, Plaintiff's claim that the Individual Defendants violated his rights to equal protection because of his race provides the underlying constitutional violation.
The Court notes that Sylvie's claims against Defendant City under Title VII and his claims against the Individual Defendants pursuant to § 1983 arise out of the same set of underlying facts. The intersection of remedies under Title VII and § 1983 has been the subject of discussion by a number of Fifth Circuit panels, most recently in Southard v. Texas Board of Criminal Justice, 114 F.3d 539 (5th Cir. 1997).
In Southard, the Court reviewed its previous decisions in this area, namely those in Johnston v. Harris Country Flood Control Dist., 869 F.2d 1565, 1573 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990) and Jackson v. City of Atlanta, Tx., 73 F.3d 60 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, U.S. 519 U.S. 818 (1996). In Johnston, the court allowed a former county employee to sue the county and its individual directors for retaliation after being terminated for testifying in a co-worker's discrimination suit because:
"Although Title VII supplements and overlaps § 1983, it remains an exclusive remedy when a state or local employer violates only Title VII. When, however, unlawful employment practices encroach, not only on rights created by Title VII, but also on rights that are independent of Title VII, Title VII ceases to be exclusive. At this point, § 1983 and Title VII overlap, providing supplemental remedies."
Southard, 114 F.3d at 549 (quoting Johnston, 869 F.2d at 1576). In contrast, the Jackson panel dismissed the plaintiff's § 1983 claims when it found that the claimant was precluded from seeking redress for employment discrimination under both Title VII and § 1983 when both were based on the same allegedly discriminatory facts. Id. (citing Jackson, 73 F.3d at 61). Noting this inconsistent result, the Southard panel followed the Fifth Circuit's earlier decision and declined to follow Jackson, maintaining that "[s]ex discrimination and sexual harassment in public employment violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment", and as such, that the Plaintiff's assertions of sex discrimination and sexual misconduct under § 1983 were not preempted by Title VII. Id., 114 F.3d at 550. This Court, therefore, will follow Johnston and Southard, and hold that Sylvie may assert causes of action under both Title VII and § 1983 against Defendants based upon the same set of facts and allegations of racial discrimination. See Davis v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, No. 3:01-CV-2595-M, 2002 WL 172646 at *3-4 (N.D.Tex. Feb. 1, 2002) (Lynn, J.) (holding same in context of race discrimination).
Meanwhile, the City opposes the claims brought against Kilpatrick and Rickman in their individual capacities because they are entitled to qualified immunity. Def.'s Resp. at 2. Generally, state actors sued in their individual capacities under § 1983 are entitled to invoke the defense of qualified immunity. Burns-Toole v. Byrne, 11 F.3d 1270, 1273 (5th Cir. 1994). "Qualified" or "good faith" immunity shields government officials performing discretionary functions from liability unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Babb v. Dorman, 33 F.3d 472, 477 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)); see also Goodson v. City of Corpus Christi, 202 F.3d 730, 736 (5th Cir. 2000) (the shield of qualified immunity is generally available to government officials sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
In Seigert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226 (1991), the United States Supreme Court set forth the analytical framework for determining whether a Plaintiff's allegations are sufficient to overcome a defendant's defense of qualified immunity. As a threshold matter, the court must first determine whether the plaintiff has alleged a violation of a clearly established constitutional right. Seigert, 500 U.S. at 231-232. If the plaintiff is successful, the court must then determine whether the defendants conduct was objectively reasonable in light of the "clearly established" law at the time of the alleged violation. Spann v. Rainey, 987 F.2d 1110, 1114 (5th Cir. 1993); see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987).
"Objective reasonableness" is a matter of law for the court to decide. Goodson, 202 F.3d at 736. The touchstone of this inquiry is whether a reasonable person would have believed that his conduct conformed to the constitutional standard in light of the information available to him and the clearly established law. Id. Therefore, "even law enforcement officials who `reasonably but mistakenly commit a constitutional violation,' are entitled to immunity." Id.; see also Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641. The burden is on the plaintiff to overcome a defendant's defense of qualified immunity. Burns-Toole, 11 F.3d at 1274.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws," which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982). The Supreme Court has instructed time and again that disparate impact alone cannot suffice to state an equal protection violation. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246-250 (1976). Thus, a party who wishes to make out a cause of action under section 1983 for an equal protection violation is required to prove "the existence of purposeful discrimination" motivating the state action which caused the complained-of injury. See Johnson v. Rodriguez, 110 F.3d 299, 306 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292-293 (1987)); see also Nat'l Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. City Pub. Serv. Bd. of San Antonio, Tex., 40 F.3d 698, 714-715 (5th Cir. 1994). "Discriminatory purpose in an equal protection context implies that the decision-maker selected a particular course of action at least in part because of, and not simply in spite of, the adverse impact it would have on an identifiable group."Johnson, 110 F.3d at 307 (citing Woods v. Edwards, 51 F.3d 577, 580 (5th Cir. 1995)).
In this case, Sylvie has alleged that the Defendants Kilpatrick and Rickman violated his rights to equal protection under the law when they placed Plaintiff on administrative leave and later terminated his employment with the City for allegedly violating City policy by accessing sexually explicit internet site on various dates. Pl.'s First Am. Compl. at 8. Plaintiff claims that these Defendants falsely indicated that City records showed that he was on duty on these dates and that the Plaintiff was solely and completely responsible for accessing these sites because he was the exclusive user of the computer in this office. Id. at 8-9. In his amended complaint Sylvie claims that (i) he did not have exclusive use of the computer in his office; (ii) even if Plaintiff's office was closed and locked five other individuals, including Defendant Fox, had a key to the office; (iii) Kilpatrick and Rickman were advised and given records by Plaintiff that he was not at the facility during the times of the day that the computer was used to access sexually explicit sites; (iv) because of racism on the part of Rickman and Kilpatrick, Fox's denial was given more weight than Plaintiff's; and (v) Defendants accepted without question denials from several other Caucasian Water Department employees who had possession of computers with sexually explicit materials in their data banks, while refusing to accept denials from several Black Water Department employees under similar circumstances. Id. at 8-12.
Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the Court concludes that a question of fact exists at this time as to whether Defendants Kilpatrick and Rickman were deliberately indifferent in the investigation leading up to Plaintiff's suspension and termination by the City. As such, qualified immunity shall be denied and Plaintiff will be permitted to pursue these claims under § 1983 against the Individual Defendants.
B. Claims Under Section 1985
Sylvie also brings a claim for conspiracy against the Individual Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. A successful section 1985 claim requires a plaintiff to establish: "(1) a conspiracy; (2) that the purpose of the conspiracy was to deprive a person of equal protection of the law, or to deprive a person of his privileges and immunities under the laws; (3) that an act was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (4) that an injury occurred as a result." Riggs v. City of Pearland, 177 F.R.D. 395, 408 (S.D.Tex. 1997) (citing Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102-104 (1971)).
Defendant City argues that any allegations of a conspiracy cannot survive a motion to dismiss or summary judgment since, as a matter of law, a single entity cannot conspire against itself. Def.'s Resp. at 3. However, as the Plaintiff correctly points out, his complaint does not allege that the City is part of a conspiracy, but only the these individual Defendants were involved in a conspiracy.
Defendant City also urges that any claims brought against Kilpatrick and Rickman under § 1985(3) are futile since it would simply be duplicative of Plaintiff's Title VII claims because the only claimed right violated is the right to be free of discrimination in employment. See Def.'s Resp. at 3. Nevertheless, as previously noted by the Court, Plaintiff may assert both a cause of action under § 1983 and Title VII based on the same factual allegations. See Southard, 114 F.3d at 550.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court shall and hereby GRANTS the Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint and Add Party Defendants. Accordingly, the Clerk is directed to file Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand, and to issue summons to Defendants Ted Kilpatrick, Michael Rickman and Gary Fox.
So ordered.