Opinion
2012-12-20
Richard L. Herzfeld, P.C., New York (Richard L. Herzfeld of counsel), for appellant. Law Offices of James M. Abramson, PLLC, New York (Dawn M. Orsatti of counsel), for respondent.
Richard L. Herzfeld, P.C., New York (Richard L. Herzfeld of counsel), for appellant. Law Offices of James M. Abramson, PLLC, New York (Dawn M. Orsatti of counsel), for respondent.
Tamara A. Steckler, The Legal Aid Society, New York (Diane Pazar of counsel), attorney for the children.
TOM, J.P., SWEENY, DeGRASSE, MANZANET–DANIELS, CLARK, JJ.
Orders of disposition, Family Court, Bronx County (Carol R. Sherman, J.), entered on or about November 18, 2011, which, upon a finding of permanent neglect, terminated respondent mother's parental rights to the subject children, and committed custody and guardianship of the children to petitioner agency and the Commissioner of Social Services for the purposeof adoption, unanimously affirmed, without costs.
Petitioner met its burden of establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that the children were permanently neglected ( seeSocial Services Law § 384–b[7][a] ). Respondent failed to plan for the future of her children despite the diligent efforts of the agency to strengthen and encourage her relationship with the children by, among other things, scheduling visitation with them, providing respondent with referrals for appropriate services, and assisting respondent in obtaining suitable housing ( see Matter of Shaqualle Khalif W. [Denise W.], 96 A.D.3d 698, 698–699, 947 N.Y.S.2d 116 [1st Dept. 2012] ). Respondent failed to remain drug and alcohol free or to secure appropriate housing or employment, and she interacted poorly with the children during visitation. Consistent visitation with the children does not preclude a finding of permanent neglect where, as here, there is a failure to plan for the children's future ( see Matter of Jonathan Jose T., 44 A.D.3d 508, 509, 843 N.Y.S.2d 326 [1st Dept. 2007] ).
Respondent's contention that she was deprived of a fair trial because the court asked questions regarding how one of her older children felt when respondent refused to allow her to be adopted and whether she was concerned with the children's wishes regarding adoption that were speculative and/or lacked a foundation is unavailing. Respondent's perception of and response to the children's wishes and needs is material and relevant to the issue of whether or not it was in the children's best interest that they be freed for adoption ( seeFamily Ct. Act § 624; Matter of Jamaal DeQuan M., 24 A.D.3d 667, 668, 808 N.Y.S.2d 384 [2d Dept. 2005];Matter of Chelsea K., 15 A.D.3d 794, 794–795, 790 N.Y.S.2d 273 [3rd Dept. 2005],lv. dismissed4 N.Y.3d 869, 797 N.Y.S.2d 814, 830 N.E.2d 1142 [2005];Matter of Ricky A.B., 15 A.D.3d 838, 839, 789 N.Y.S.2d 379 [4th Dept. 2005] ).
Lastly, a preponderance of the evidence establishes that it is in the best interests of the children to terminate respondent's parental rights ( see Matter of Khalil A. [Sabree A.], 84 A.D.3d 632, 923 N.Y.S.2d 107 [1st Dept. 2011] ). The children have been residing in a stable and nurturing environment with their foster mother, who is willing and able to adopt them, for approximately three and a half years. In view of the foregoing, a suspended judgment is not appropriate ( see id.; Matter of Fernando Alexander B. [Simone Anita W.], 85 A.D.3d 658, 659, 925 N.Y.S.2d 823 [1st Dept. 2011] ).