Morse v. Osborne, 75 N.H. 487. See Parker v. Carpenter, 77 N.H. 453; Kimball v. Penhallow, 60 N.H. 448; Jenkins v. Jenkins, 64 N.H. 407; Petition of Wolcott, 95 N.H. 23; Sylvester v. Newhall, 97 N.H. 267, 271. This view represents the overwhelming weight of authority. Annot. 86 A.L.R. 2d 12, 80.

The "determination of the ultimate fact of the intent of the [settlor] rests with [this] court." Sylvester v. Newhall, 97 N.H. 267, 272 (1952); see also In re Trust u/w/o Smith, 131 N.H. 396, 397 (1988). [4, 5] To determine the settlor's intent, we first look to the language of the trust.

In devising the remainder, after the termination of life estates, "to the issue of my son, if he shall have any then surviving him" it seems to us that the testator expressed a clear intention that the identity of the issue of his son who were to receive this remainder was to be determined at the termination of the life estates which as the events have taken place means at the death of Parker M. Merrow. Colony v. Colony, supra. The word "issue" in its ordinary meaning is descriptive of the lineal descendants of the deceased which include children, grandchildren and greatgrandchildren. RSA 21:20; Morse v. Osborne, 75 N.H. 487, 488; Sylvester v. Newhall, 97 N.H. 267, 271. RSA 561:1 provides that the real estate of a deceased shall descend to his issue in the following manner: it "shall descend in equal shares . . . to the children of the deceased and the legal representatives of such of them as are dead." We are of the opinion that this is what the testator intended by the devise "in equal shares to the issue of my son, if he shall have any then surviving him.

"The word `issue' is not ordinarily the equivalent of the word `child' or `children.'" Sylvester v. Newhall, 97 N.H. 267, 271, 85 A.2d 378, 381 (1952). Rather, "[t]he word `issue' means child, grandchild, or other lineal descendant."

[1, 2] The determination of the ultimate fact of the intent of the testator rests with this court. Sylvester v. Newhall, 97 N.H. 267, 272, 85 A.2d 378, 382 (1952). The term "trustees of trust funds" is found throughout RSA 31:19 through :38. Hence, a bequest to the trustees of trust funds, given the plain meaning of those words, is to those persons who have been duly elected by the town to serve in that position, in their official capacities.

" Article fourth bequeaths to a sixth relative "such of the contents of my house as have not been selected under paragraph Third hereof." Since no contrary intent appears in the will, the words "the contents of my house" are to be given the ordinary meaning they bear in common usage. Sylvester v. Newhall, 97 N.H. 267, 270, 85 A.2d 378, 381 (1952). Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines "content" as "something that is contained. . . ."

The second part of the instrument states specifically that its purpose was to "disencumber the property owned by Sara. . . of any trust" and to transfer to the decedent all the net assets of Sara's estate "free from the terms and conditions of the will of Sara Y. Peabody." The language of this agreement is so plain that we believe we need not labor the point that the Trial Court's findings were correct. While it is axiomatic that the interpretation of all written instruments is for this court (Sylvester v. Newhall, 97 N.H. 267), we see no error in the result reached by the Trial Court. Hogan v. Lebel, 95 N.H. 95; Aldrich v. Beauregard Sons, 105 N.H. 330, 336. Since this is so, the defendant Sarah Morris derives her rights from William H. Peabody's will and the agreement of September 30, 1953. In the agreement of September 30, he agreed to leave to each party, including this defendant, "a share equivalent to that to which he and she would be entitled under the will of Sara Y. Peabody had this agreement not been executed.

We are also thereby lead to the further conclusion that when the testator provided for the substitution of children to receive the parent's share of the trust income he was using the word "children" in its ordinary meaning which does not include grandchildren. Sylvester v. Newhall, 97 N.H. 267, 271; 4 Page on Wills (Bowe-Parker Rev.) ss. 34.14, 34.19. See Annot. 104 A.L.R. 282; 14 A.L.R. 2d 1242.

The existence of this fact, explaining why the plaintiff's attorney requested the addendum, is supported by the record and is binding upon us. Pettee v. Chapter, 86 N.H. 419, 423. The Trial Court also found it was the intention of the parties that a performance bond be furnished and construed the obligation of the defendant to be such. It is true that the question of intention is ultimately for this court, although in a true sense it is a question of fact. Sylvester v. Newhall, 97 N.H. 267, 272. Nevertheless, the determination of this fact is initially for the Trial Court (NewComb v. Ray, 99 N.H. 463, 465), and such is entitled to weight. In reaching its conclusion, it was the duty of that Court to consider, among other circumstances, the familiar principle that all parts of an agreement are to be given a meaning whenever reasonably possible.

That finding, which does not appear in its decision, is not controlling here, however, since the "determination of the ultimate fact of the intent of the [testator] rests with the law court." Sylvester v. Newhall, 97 N.H. 267, 272. The subsidiary facts concerned with the surrounding circumstances of this case, so far as the school bequest was concerned, were not found by the Trial Court but were agreed to by the parties.