Opinion
B229822
12-01-2011
In re the Marriage of JAMES SYLVESTER and MUMTAZ CHUNARA JAMES SYLVESTER, Appellant, v. MUMTAZ CHUNARA, Respondent.
James Sylvester, in pro. per., for Appellant. No appearance for Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BD490518)
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Thomas T. Lewis, Judge. Affirmed.
James Sylvester, in pro. per., for Appellant.
No appearance for Respondent.
James Sylvester (appellant) appeals from an order denying his motion to vacate divorce judgment. Appellant has failed to make a showing of error, therefore we affirm the order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On July 9, 2009, appellant and Mumtaz Chunara (appellant's former wife) entered into a marital settlement agreement. On July 28, 2009, a divorce judgment, which incorporated the marital settlement agreement, was finalized.
Appellant's former wife is the named respondent in this appeal. However, she has not filed a responsive brief.
On March 16, 2010, appellant's debts were discharged in bankruptcy court.
On August 26, 2010, appellant filed a motion to vacate divorce judgment and a motion for immediate spousal support. Appellant attached to his motion numerous receipts for payment to his former lawyer. He also attached, as part of exhibit A, a document titled "Declarations of [Appellant]," in which he claimed "[i]t's obvious to me that I was either mentally unstable or under duress when I signed the petition."
This document was not signed under penalty of perjury nor was it dated concurrently with the filing of the motion. Instead, appellant provided his signature for the purpose of showing that his normal letter "m" has only three humps, in contrast to a purported photocopy of his signature on the marital settlement agreement, in which the letter "m" has four humps. Appellant provided this signature only to show a "normal, mentally stable/uncoerced" signature, as compared with the signature allegedly done under duress.
As part of exhibit B to his motion, appellant attached a second document entitled "Declarations of [Appellant]," which is not signed or dated. In this document, appellant pointed out that his former wife's first attorney, Pedram Mansouri (Mansouri), stated in his declaration a belief that appellant is "mentally unstable." Appellant also pointed out that in a police report made on July 9, 2009, minutes before the marital settlement was signed, the police stated an opinion that appellant was delusional. Appellant alleged that by the testimony of both Mansouri and the police, he was not of sound mind on the day the marital agreement was signed.
The incident report appears to be written by a private security company, not the police.
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As part of exhibit C to his motion, appellant attached a third document entitled "Declarations of [Appellant]," which is also not signed or dated. In it, appellant alleged that he was coerced by Mansouri into signing the settlement agreement on July 9, 2009. He further stated that he filed a complaint against Mansouri with the State Bar, and that the series of events alleged in that complaint show that Mansouri "continuously and systematically" broke down his mental stability during the seven-month time period leading up to the signing of the settlement agreement. In addition, appellant claimed, he was terrified of the consequences if he didn't sign the marital agreement. Specifically, he was "worried [he] might get killed before the trial date so my wife could collect $250,000 on my life insurance policy."
Appellant's motion was heard on November 1, 2010. Appellant appeared in pro. per., and attorney Keith Allen appeared on behalf of appellant's former wife. The motion was argued and denied.
On December 22, 2010, appellant filed his notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
An appellate court presumes that a judgment appealed from is correct. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) We adopt all intendments and inferences to affirm the judgment unless the record expressly contradicts them. (See Brewer v. Simpson (1960) 53 Cal.2d 567, 583.) The appellant has the burden of overcoming the presumption of correctness and affirmatively showing error. (People v. Sullivan (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 524, 549.)
Appellant has failed to meet this burden. Appellant has failed to provide a single citation to any legal authority. In fact, appellant did not even direct this court to the statutory basis for the trial court's decision. As set forth above, in the absence of such information, we must presume that the trial court was "aware of and followed the applicable law." (People v. Mosley (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 489, 496.) In addition, this glaring omission violates California Rules of Court, rule 8.204, subdivision (a), which requires that an appellant "support each point by argument and . . . citation of authority." As set forth in Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852: "An appellant must provide an argument and legal authority to support his contentions. This burden requires more than a mere assertion that the judgment is wrong." Appellant's failure to provide any legal authority in his opening brief constitutes a waiver of the issues raised. (Jones v. Superior Court (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 92, 99.)
Appellant's "request for consideration," set forth on page 1 of his opening brief, does not salvage his appeal. In it, appellant asserts that he has been economically indigent since December 2007 and therefore could not afford an attorney to assist him. Appellant asks that where legal citations are missing, the appellate court "search for the correct ones and apply them accordingly." This we decline to do. "It is the duty of [an appellant], not of the courts, 'by argument and the citation of authorities to show that the claimed error exists.' [Citation.]" (Sprague v. Equifax, Inc. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 1012, 1050.) Appellant's election to act in pro. per. on appeal does not entitle him to any leniency as to the rules of practice and procedure; otherwise, ignorance is unjustly rewarded. (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984-985; Lombardi v. Citizens Nat'l Trust & Sav. Bank (1955) 137 Cal.App.2d 206, 208-209.) Certainly, appellant's decision to proceed in pro. per. does not excuse his complete failure to cite to any legal authority whatsoever or provide any comprehensible argument in favor of reversal.
Appellant has failed to provide any reasoned argument or citation to legal authority supporting any claim of error. We therefore presume that the trial court's decision was correct, and affirm the court's order.
DISPOSITION
The order of the trial court is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
______ J.
CHAVEZ
We concur:
______, P. J.
BOREN
______J.
ASHMANN-GERST