Opinion
21224/06.
Decided March 24, 2010.
Plaintiff was represented by Tarik Davis, Esq., Brooklyn, NY.
Defendants Blacknall were represented by Jeffrey S. Schwartz, Esq., Jericho, NY.
Defendant 700 Lexington Ave. Church of God was represented by Pamela M. Fairclough, Esq., Bronx, NY.
Defendants move to vacate the stipulation of settlement entered on May 21, 2007. The defendants have not submitted that stipulation with the instant motion. However, a stipulation of settlement was entered into on June 23, 2008 in front of a Judicial Hearing Officer and placed on the record, which is attached to the instant motion. This Court finds the June 23, 2008 stipulation superceding and presently at issue.
Stipulations of settlement are favored by the courts and not lightly cast aside. This is all the more so in "open court" stipulations, where strict enforcement not only serves the interests of efficient dispute resolution but also is essential to management of court calendars and integrity of litigation process. Hallock v. State, 1984, 64 NY2d 224. Stipulations of settlement are contracts and are subject to the rules of contract law. A party will only receive relief from a stipulation made during litigation where there is cause sufficient to invalidate a contract such as fraud, collusion, mistake, or accident. Diarassouba v. Urban, 892 NY2d 410(citations omitted).
Stipulations are governed by CPLR § 2104 which provides that a stipulation between parties or their counsel is binding if it is an oral agreement between counsel in open court. The stipulation at issue here satisfied the requirement of CPLR § 2104. "Open court" is a technical term that refers to the formalities attendant upon documenting the fact of the stipulation and its terms, not to the particular location of the courtroom itself. Popovic v. New York City Health and Hosp. Corp., 180 AD2d 493 (1st Dep't 1992). The term refers to a judicial proceeding before a court convened, with or without a jury, to do judicial business. Deitsch Textiles, Inc. v. New York Property Ins. Underwriting Ass'n., 62 NY2d 999.
Stipulations made before arbitrators, administrative law judges and judicial hearing officers are considered binding. See, Cent. NY Reg'l Mkt. Auth. v. John B. Pike, Inc., 120 AD2d 958 [4th Dep't], Acot v. New York Technical College, 99 Fed. Appx. 317 (holding that under New York State law, an oral agreement before an administrative law judge is considered to have occurred in "open court"), Halpern v. Goldstein Halpern, 294 A.S.2d 468 [2002]. The parties in this case appeared before the JHO to "do judicial business" i.e to hold a hearing when the stipulation was entered into on the record. Therefore the stipulation is considered entered into "in open court" and binding.
Defendants allege that the stipulation should be vacated as the superior church, The National Church of God, was not properly represented, did not approve of, or give authority to enter into the stipulation of settlement. Defendant's argument is unpersuasive as no evidence has been submitted which proves that Bishop Andrew Binda (Bishop Binda) the Administrative Bishop for New York, who appeared for the Church at the hearing lacked authority when he entered into the stipulation. In fact, at the hearing, Bishop Binda was specifically asked by the JHO if he possessed the requisite authority from the Superior Church to enter into the stipulation, to which he answered in the affirmative. Additionally, Bishop Binda's affidavit submitted in support of the instant motion does not deny or excuse his asserted authority. Lastly, defendant's memorandum of law specifically states that the State Overseer, another tile Bishop Binda holds, "is the party to represent the Church on any matters relating to the Church's real property." Therefore, the stipulation may not be vacated based on a lack of authority.
It does not appear that the stipulation could be vacated even if the National Church of God presented credible evidence that Bishop Binda lacked the authority to enter into the stipulation. As discussed above, the causes sufficient to void a stipulation are limited to those of contracts namely, fraud, collusion, mistake or accident. The allegations by the National Church of God regarding the lack of authority, insufficient time with counsel and lack of approval are insufficient to satisfy those criteria.
It would seem that if Bishop Binda was mistaken regarding his authority such erroneous belief would be considered a unilateral mistake. Unilateral mistake alone is an insufficient basis for reformation or rescission. Angel v. Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Ltd. , 39 AD3d 368 , 835 NYS2d 57 (1st Dep't 2007). Further, the mistake must not have arisen from negligence, where the means of knowledge were easily accessible. Surlak v. Surlak, 95 AD2d 371, 466 NYS2d 461 (2d Dep't 1983); Bailey Ford, Inc. v. Bailey, 55 AD2d 729, 389 NYS2d 181 (3d Dep't 1976). Obviously Bishop Binda was in the position to ascertain whether he had actual authoirty or not from the National Church of God.
Lastly, defendants assert that the stipulation should be vacated as it violates the applicable religious corporation and not-for profit statutes. Transfers of church property are governed by the Religious Corporation Law § 12 (1) which states in pertinent part "[a] religious corporation shall not sell, mortgage or lease for a term exceeding five years any of its real property without applying for and obtaining leave of the court. . ." Regardless, the stipulation is not in derogation of the controlling statutes because the it does not require the sale of the property without such approvals.
As the stipulation was entered into in "open court," there is no evidence of lack of authority to bind the Church, and the stipulation does not violate the controlling statutes the stipulation is valid and enforceable. Defendant's motion is denied. This constitutes the decision and order of the court.