Opinion
C.A. No. 00A-09-008-CG
Date Submitted: June 4, 2001
Date Decided: July 16, 2001
On appeal from the Industrial Accident Board. Affirmed.
Sajid L. Syed, pro se, Wilmington, Delaware, Appellant.
Anthony M. Frabizzio, Heckler Frabizzio, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for Appellee.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is an appeal by the claimant from a decision of the Industrial Accident Board dated August 31, 2000. Claimant below and Appellant, Sajid L. Syed, sustained a compensable work accident on January 31, 1992 while working as a chemical operator for employer below and Appellee, Hercules, Inc. Pursuant to an Agreement as to Compensation dated April 19, 1993, Syed received total disability benefits for two weeks for the period from March 8, 1992 to March 21, 1992.
On May 4, 1993, Syed and Hercules reached a settlement for the payment of workers' compensation benefits to Syed. The specific terms of the settlement were outlined in a Stipulation and Order signed by Syed, his attorney, Hercules' attorney, and Board members. Specifically, the parties agreed that Hercules would acknowledge that Syed had sustained a loss of earning capacity and was entitled to receive benefits in the amount of $25 per week, payable in a single sum in the amount of $7,500. At the time of the settlement, Syed was receiving benefits through a long term disability plan administered by Hercules. As part of the settlement, it was agreed that any payment of workers' compensation benefits would not be set off against "any other benefits to which the claimant may be entitled, including, but not limited to, permanent impairment or medical expenses." Both Syed and Hercules agree that this language encompassed Syed's benefits through the long term disability plan.
Syed subsequently filed a petition seeking payment of permanency benefits. On May 13, 1994, the parties filed an Agreement as to Compensation with the Board. The Agreement acknowledged a five percent impairment to Syed's neck, low back, right upper extremity, left upper extremity, right lower extremity, and left lower extremity related to the January 31, 1992 work injury.
Syed subsequently filed a Petition to Determine Additional Compensation Due, alleging recurrence of total disability from July 1994 ongoing and requesting payment of medical bills and expenses related to cervical surgery. On November 14, 1994, the Board held a hearing to consider Syed's petition. The Board ruled that Syed's surgery was causally related to the work accident and granted Syed's petition as to payment of medical expenses. However, the Board determined that Syed was not totally disabled from all employment, but was capable of doing sedentary work until surgery, if he elected to pursue that treatment.
On April 8, 1996, Syed filed another Petition to Determine Additional Compensation Due for payment of medical bills and expenses for which the parties reached a settlement. The Board issued an order on May 22, 1997 approving the settlement and dismissing Syed's petition. The Order specified that Syed waived his right to seek payment for additional expenses accruing before February 27, 1997 and to seek payment of additional indemnity benefits accruing before February 27, 1997.
On March 23, 2000, Syed filed a Petition to Determine Additional Compensation Due, requesting the payment of permanency benefits and medical expenses and for the review of the Board's May 4, 1993 and May 22, 1997 orders. Syed requested a legal hearing to consider his allegation that both prior agreements were procured by "fraud, fraudulent misrepresentations, and intentional deception" by Hercules. Syed filed additional correspondence with the Board on April 20, 2000, again requesting a legal or evidentiary hearing, alleging that he had been paid total disability benefits by from April 1, 1992 until March 31, 1994 50 that an implied agreement had arisen. Syed submitted correspondence to the Board on June 20, 2000 asking for a legal hearing concerning the Board's decision on the issue of Syed's total disability at the November 14, 1994 hearing, again alleging that the order resulted from Hercules' fraudulent actions.
The Board held a hearing on May 25, 2000 to consider Syed's allegations. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Board allowed the parties to submit additional written briefing. On August 30, 2000, the Board issued its written decision. In its decision, the Board denied Syed's motion for recission of the Board's orders dated May 4, 1993 and May 22, 1997. The Board found that Syed's allegations of fraud were raised beyond the applicable statute of limitations of three years from the "accruing of the cause of action" or the date of the discovery of fraud. The Board also found that concealment of material information in conjunction with the long term disability plan was not properly within the subject matter jurisdiction of the Board. The Board ruled that no implied agreement existed between the parties since the issue of total disability ongoing from July 1994 was denied by the Board after its November 14, 1994 hearing. Finally, the Board found that any recission of a Board order dated May 22, 1997 was inappropriate. The Board explained that, while the order was inappropriately captioned, the terms of the agreement were clear and had been accepted by both parties. The Board did not address the issues raised in Syed's June 20, 2000 correspondence.
Syed has now appealed the Board's August 30, 2000 decision to this Court pursuant to 19 Del. C. § 2350. Syed argues on appeal that the Board erred as a matter of law by denying his motion for recission of the Board's May 4, 1993 and May 22, 1997 orders due to fraud, by concluding that Syed's allegations of fraud were untimely, and by concluding that Syed's allegations concerning the long term disability plan are not properly within the subject matter jurisdiction of the Board. Syed also argues that the Board erred as a matter of fact and law by denying his motion that an implied agreement existed between Hercules and Syed for the payment of total disability benefits because the Board's decision is not supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. Finally, Syed argues that the Board denied him due process of law.
In reviewing a decision of the Board, the Court's review is limited to examination of the record and a determination of whether there is substantial evidence to support the Board's findings and conclusions. Histed v. E. I. duPont de Nemours, Del. Supr., 621 A.2d 340, 342 (1993). "Substantial evidence" has been defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Olney v. Cooch, Del. Supr., 425 A.2d 610, 614 (1981). If the Court finds that substantial evidence exists, it must affirm the Board's decision, absent error of law. General Motors Corp. v. Freem, Del. Supr., 164 A.2d 686, 689 (1960).
Initially, Syed argues that the Board erred as a matter of fact and law by denying Syed's motion for recission of the May 4, 1993 and May 22, 1997 agreements. Syed argued before the Board that he was induced to enter into the May 4, 1993 settlement agreement by Hercules, who promised to pay him long term disability benefits in exchange for the settlement. According to Syed, this promise was the "whole basis of the workers [compensation] settlement." Syed testified at the hearing that he received long term disability payments through Hercules' plan until March 31, 1994 when Hercules discontinued the payments. However, Syed claimed that Hercules concealed material information from him until May 25, 1997. Prior to that date, Syed claimed that Hercules had provided him with misleading and outdated documents concerning the long term disability plan.
In its written decision, the Board stated:
The Board agrees with Hercules that Claimant's allegations of fraud are beyond the applicable statute of limitations of three years from "the accruing of the cause of action" or the date of the discovery of the fraud, see 10 Del. C. § 8196; Pack and Process, inc. v. Celotex Corp., Del. Super., 503 A.2d 646, 650 (1985). Claimant admitted at the May 25, 2000 legal hearing that the long term disability benefits ceased as of March 21, 1994. The Board agrees with Hercules that March 21, 1994 is the appropriate date of discovery of fraud, if any, in this matter because Claimant had constructive notice at that time. Therefore, Claimant's action filed on March 23, 2000 is beyond the applicable three year statute of limitations.
On appeal, Syed reiterates the arguments he made before the Board alleging that he was induced by Hercules' fraudulent claims regarding the long term disability payments into accepting the 1993 settlement. Syed argues that he did not become aware of the fraud until March 25, 1997 50 that his petition was filed in a timely manner and that the Board therefore erred in its determination of the date of the discovery of the fraud. Syed also claims that the Board failed to make factual findings necessary to its conclusion.
The Court concludes that the Board's decision that the date Syed should have discovered the fraud he alleges would have been March 21, 1994 is supported by substantial evidence in the record. Syed claimed that Hercules induced him into entering into the workers compensation settlement agreement by promising him benefits under the long term disability plan. It is undisputed that Hercules stopped payments under that plan on March 31, 1994. Despite Syed's exhaustive allegations regarding Hercules' concealment of certain documents relating to the long term disability plan until 1997, it is logical that Syed would have been put on notice of Hercules' alleged fraud as soon as Hercules stopped payments under the long term disability plan. Therefore, the Court cannot find that the Board erred by finding that the applicable statute of limitations would begin to run as of that date.
However, the Court finds that the Board erred in its determination that the applicable statute of limitations to the action before it was the three year time limit set forth in 10 Del. C. § 8106. This Court has previously held that the Board has the power to set aside voluntary compensation agreements if it can be proven that the agreement was obtained through fraud, despite the absence of express statutory authority in the workers compensation statutes. Comegys v. Chrysler Corp., Del. Super., C. A. No. 83A-SE-5, Taylor, J. (July 20, 1984). Order at 3-4. The Court must determine whether the general statute of limitations contained in 10 Del. C. § 8106 is applicable to proceedings before the Board. This statute of limitations has been applied to administrative board proceedings previously. See Minner v. State Bd of Pension Trustees, Del. Super., C. A. No. 91A-05-003 (Aug. 18, 1992)(ORDER). This Court has also found that a general statute of limitations "may apply to administrative proceedings, in the absence of a specially applicable provision." Johnson v. Williams, Del. Super., 728 A.2d 1185, 1188, n. 9 (1998) (quoting 2 Am. Jur. 2d § 272 (1994)).
Delaware's workers' compensation statute, unlike the provisions at issue in Johnson, sets forth time limits for claims in 19 Del. C. § 2361. Nineteen Del. C. § 236 1(a) provides that a claimant has two years from the date of personal injury to claim workers' compensation benefits. Nineteen Del. C. § 2361(b), which is applicable to Syed's petition filed March 25, 2000, provides for a five year statute of limitations "where payments of compensation have been made in any case under an agreement approved by the Board. . . ." The statutory period begins to run at the time "of the making of the last payment for which a proper receipt has been filed with the Board."
The agreement signed by Syed and his attorney and approved by the Board provides that "for purposes of calculating the applicable statute of limitations, such statute of limitations will be deemed to have commence as of the date of this Order," specifically May 4, 1993. Therefore, because the applicable statute of limitations began to run on that date, it would have expired on May 4, 1998. Therefore, Syed's petition, filed March 25, 2000, would still have been untimely, even under the longer time period.
This Court has previously found that the Board did not err by finding that the applicable statute of limitations may be tolled in "situations akin to fraud." New Castle County v. Lester, Del. Supr., 337 A.2d 319 (1975). However, even if the Court, in the instant case, found that the five year statute of limitations did not begin to run until the date that Syed should have become aware of the alleged fraud, May 31, 1994, the time limit for filing his claim expired on May 31, 1999 and his petition would still have been time barred. As a result, the Court finds that, although the Board erred by applying the general statute of limitations set forth in 10 Del. C. § 8106 in determining that Syed's petition was time barred rather than the appropriate five-year time limit, its error was not prejudicial to Syed. Syed's petition was also time barred under the applicable statute of limitations even if the Board had determined that the appropriate statute of limitations began to run at the date most favorable to Syed, May 31, 1994.
Syed also claims that the Board erred by failing to rescind its Order dated May 22, 1997. Specifically, Syed argued before the Board that the Order was fraudulent because it was not a review of a compensation agreement, as indicated in the caption of the Order. The Board determined that:
. . . recission of the Board's Order from May 22, 1997 is inappropriate. The Order was incorrectly captioned as a "Review of Compensation Agreement" when, in fact, it was a dismissal of Claimant's Petition to Determine Additional Compensation Due filed on April 17, 1996, for the payment of medical expenses. However, the terms of the agreement are clear and were accepted by both parties, with Claimant again being represented by counsel, and approved by the Board.
Upon review of the record and the Board's May 22, 1997 Order, the Court finds that the Board's findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. The Court notes that, although the title of the Order reads, "Review of Compensation Agreement (Order)," the first sentence of the Order references Syed's Petition to Determine Additional Compensation Due filed on April 17, 1996.
Syed's next argues that the Board erred as a matter of fact and law by concluding that his allegations concerning the concealment of material information about his long term disability plan were not within the subject matter of the Board. In support of his argument, Syed reiterates his claim that he entered into the 1993 settlement agreement due to Hercules' fraudulent promises to pay him benefits under its long term disability plan. Syed argues that, because the Board has jurisdiction under 19 Del. C. § 2377 to approve an employer's alternative system of compensation for injured employees, "then it also has jurisdiction to hear if the terms of those plans were properly disclosed to the claimants because those payments were used as a substitute for workers' compensation benefits."
The Board determined in its August 31, 2000 decision that Syed's allegations of concealment of information in conjunction with the long term disability plan was not within its jurisdiction. The Board reasoned:
The Board is empowered to hear and decide all matters arising under 19 Del. C., Chapter 23, or the "Workers' Compensation Act." The adjudication of allegations of fraud and material misrepresentation occurring within the context of a contract for private long term disability benefits between an employer and its employee are not properly matters within 19 Del. C., Chapter 23.
The Court finds that the Board did not err as a matter of law by determining that Syed's claims regarding misrepresentation of the long term disability plan was outside its subject matter jurisdiction. As Hercules points out, the 1993 settlement agreement does not provide that commutation of Syed's workers' compensation disability benefits was premised on the continuation of his benefits under Hercules' long term disability plan. Rather, the agreement merely provides that the partial disability benefits which Syed would receive through workers' compensation would not be set off against his long term disability benefits. The Court cannot find that this provision in the agreement provides the Board with jurisdiction to determine the validity or construction of the private contract for long term disability benefits between Hercules and Syed. Therefore, Syed's argument must fail.
Syed's next argument in support of his appeal is that the Board erred as a matter of fact and law by finding that no implied agreement existed between Hercules and Syed for the payment of total disability benefits covering the period from April 1, 1992 until March 31, 1994. Syed argues that, "it is undisputed that the employer made payments equal to two-thirds of Claimant's salary from April 1, 1992 to March 31, 1994. It is also undisputed that these payments were made because of Claimant's work injuries of January 31, 1992. Claimant contends that these payments were made under a feeling of compulsion and therefore, an implied agreement existed."
Despite Syed's claim to the contrary, the Court finds that the Board specifically addressed this issue in its written decision. The Board stated:
. . . actual Agreements between the Claimant and Hercules were entered into acknowledging a compensable work accident, the payment of two weeks of total disability benefits, and the commutation of payment of partial disability benefits. Claimant was represented by an attorney in these actual agreements. Furthermore, the specific issue of total disability ongoing from July 1994 was denied by the Board after its November 14, 1994 hearing on Claimant's petition for recurrence of total disability benefits. Therefore, the Board disagrees with Claimant that any implied agreement exists between the parties.
Again, the Court finds that the Board's findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Syed is correct that Delaware courts have recognized implied agreements between an employer and employee for payment of workers' compensation benefits. However, in order to find an implied agreement exists, "the finder of fact must first ascertain that the employer "considered itself obliged' or "felt compelled' under the [Workers' Compensation] Act to make the payment." McCarnan V. New Castle County, Del. Supr., 521 A.2d 611, 614 (1987).
The Court finds that Syed has again confused the issue of his payments under Hercules' long term disability plan, to which he refers in the above-quoted argument, with his payments under the workers' compensation statutes. In this case, any compulsion by Hercules to pay Syed for his disability arose under the private long term disability plan, not the workers' compensation statutes. As Hercules contends, the fact that Hercules paid Syed benefits through its long term disability plan does not provide evidence of an implied agreement to pay workers' compensation benefits between Hercules and Syed.
To the contrary, Syed and Hercules entered into express agreements for payment of partial and total disability benefits as outlined above. The Board determined that Syed was not totally disabled for purposes of workers' compensation benefits on November 14, 1994. Syed was represented by an attorney during each of these proceedings. As a result, the Court finds that the Board's determination that no implied agreement existed between the parties is supported by substantial evidence in the record and that the Board did not err as a matter of law in making that determination.
Finally, Syed argues that the Board denied him due process of law, specifically by ignoring his motion filed on June 20, 2000, by denying him the benefit of a full hearing to consider his allegations of fraud, and by failing to allow him to cross-examine Hercules' witnesses. Syed attaches to his opening brief a letter dated June 20, 2000 asking for a "legal hearing" and alleging that the Board's November 14, 1994 order resulted from Hercules' fraud. Although Syed is correct that he submitted this letter prior to the Board's decision, dated August 31, 2000, Syed submitted the letter nearly three months after his petition dated March 23, 2000 and nearly a month after the Board's May 25, 2000 hearing. Therefore, any allegations raised for the first time in Syed's June 20, 2000 correspondence were not properly before the Board and the Board did not err by failing to consider them.
Syed also claims that the Board erred by failing to hold a full evidentiary hearing in order to resolve the issue of fraud. As set forth above, the Board determined that Syed's allegations of fraud were time barred. The Court has determined that the Board, although it applied the wrong statute of limitations, correctly determined that the claims were time barred. As a result, the Court cannot find that the Board erred by failing to hold an additional hearing to consider Syed's allegations of fraud.
Finally, Syed claims that the Board failed to consider all of the evidence submitted by Syed in support of his motion. Specifically, Syed refers to a letter he sent to the Court on November 13, 2000 indicating that he believed the record submitted by the Board to the Court was incomplete. The Court requested the remaining documents from the Board, which the Board subsequently submitted. There is no evidence that the Board failed to consider these documents in deciding Syed's claims or that their omission from the record submitted to the Court was anything more than an oversight. As a result, the Court cannot find that Syed has shown that the Board failed to consider the evidence he submitted in reaching its decision. In conclusion, the Court finds that the Board did not err as a matter of law by denying Syed due process of law in connection with the March 25, 2000 hearing.
Therefore, as a result of the foregoing, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the decision of the Industrial Accident Board.
IT IS SO ORDERED.