Switzer v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

17 Citing cases

  1. Von Brimer v. Whirlpool Corp.

    362 F. Supp. 1182 (N.D. Cal. 1973)   Cited 13 times

    ( 88 F. Supp. 747) See also Switzer v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 226 F.2d 329 (6 Cir. 1955) to the same effect. Unlike many of the tax cases and patent infringement cases relied on by plaintiffs, the grant of powers in the document in question contains none of the reservations of rights found in those cases and upon which the courts often based their findings of license, or lack of control.

  2. Von Brimer v. Whirlpool Corp.

    536 F.2d 838 (9th Cir. 1976)   Cited 126 times
    Rejecting appellants' argument that trial court's order excluding exhibits was dispositive of case and thus amounted to extreme sanction of dismissal under 37(b)(C) requiring showing of bad faith, and instead concluding that evidence was excluded under 37(b)(B)

    Any assignment or transfer short of one of these, is a mere license, giving the licensee no title in the patent, and no right to sue at law in his own name for an infringement. Appellants urge us to adopt the approach of Switzer v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 226 F.2d 329 (6th Cir. 1955). They maintain that case stands for the proposition that where the language of an instrument transferring interest in a patent is "at all unclear or ambiguous" a court "must" look to the "total factual complex surrounding the transaction."

  3. Merck Co. v. Smith

    261 F.2d 162 (3d Cir. 1958)   Cited 28 times
    In Merck, a pre-Danielson case, the same Court of Appeals held that a transfer of all of the substantial rights in a patent would qualify the transferor for capital gains treatment, but a transfer of anything less is called a license, with the proceeds subject to ordinary income tax rates.

    E.g., Waterman v. Mackenzie, 1891, 138 U.S. 252, 11 S.Ct. 334, 34 L.Ed. 923; Kenyon v. Automatic Instrument Co., 6 Cir., 1947, 160 F.2d 878. E.g., Watson v. United States, 10 Cir., 1955, 222 F.2d 689; Switzer v. Commissioner, 6 Cir., 1955, 226 F.2d 329; United States v. Carruthers, 9 Cir., 1955, 219 F.2d 21; Edward C. Myers, 1946, 6 T.C. 258. E.g., Lockhart v. Commissioner, 3 Cir., 1958, 258 F.2d 343, 348-349; United States v. Carruthers, 9 Cir., 1955, 219 F.2d 21; Kavanagh v. Evans, 6 Cir., 1951, 188 F.2d 234.

  4. Magnus v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

    259 F.2d 893 (3d Cir. 1958)   Cited 5 times
    In Magnus v. Commissioner, 259 F.2d 893 (3d Cir. 1958), the agreement provided that either party could terminate after two years by giving three months notice in writing, with the agreement to continue in effect unless such notice was given. The court held that despite this termination provision, the agreement considered as a whole did not actually give the grantor a right to terminate at will.

    Hickman v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 29 T.C. 864. There, the Court distinguished the Tax Court's decision in the instant case on the ground that "the patent [in Magnus] was not sold to the corporation by one of its two controlling stockholders, but instead was transferred to the corporation as a capital contribution." Lockhart v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, supra, note 12; Switzer v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 6 Cir., 1955, 226 F.2d 329; Watson v. United States, 10 Cir., 1955, 222 F.2d 689; Reid v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 1956, 26 T.C. 622, 632. Stearns Magnetic Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 7 Cir., 1954, 208 F.2d 849; Champayne v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 1956, 26 T.C. 634, 645; Magee-Hale Park-O-Meter Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 1956, 15 T.C.M. 254; Differential Steel Car Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 1951, 16 T.C. 413, 423; Heatbath Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 1950, 14 T.C. 332, 347; Coplan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, supra, note 9.

  5. Switzer Bros., Inc. v. Chicago Cardboard Co.

    252 F.2d 407 (7th Cir. 1958)   Cited 38 times
    In Switzer Brothers, Inc. v. Chicago Cardboard Co., 252 F.2d 407, 412 (7th Cir. 1958), the successful appellee devoted the majority of its efforts to an alternative ground for affirmance that had not been reached by the district court and was not necessary to be reached by the court of appeals.

    On February 9, 1953, the same plaintiffs commenced a suit against James P. Byrne, d/b/a Byrne Wallpaper Paint Store, in the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, praying for the same relief with reference to the same patents as in the instant action. In a proceeding before the Tax Court of the United States, reviewed by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Switzer v. C.I.R., 226 F.2d 329, it was disclosed that the Switzer wives were part owners of the patents in suit. On January 30, 1956, the defendant in the Ohio suit moved for dismissal for want of indispensable parties-plaintiffs.

  6. Switzer Brothers, Inc. v. Byrne

    242 F.2d 909 (6th Cir. 1957)   Cited 22 times
    In Switzer, the two Switzer brothers and their wives executed a non-exclusive license agreement in favor of Switzer Brothers, Inc. in 1946.

    Appellant and the Switzer brothers, after opposing dismissal upon such terms and conditions, withdrew their motion to dismiss the suit. October 28, 1955, in Switzer v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 6 Cir., 226 F.2d 329, this court affirmed a decision of the Tax Court of the United States to the effect that the license agreement executed in favor of appellant by Robert C. Switzer and Patricia Switzer, Joseph L. Switzer and Elise DeGroot Switzer, dated July 30, 1946, and later transactions through 1949, did not constitute an effective assignment for tax purposes of the various patents and applications in which the wives of the Switzer brothers had acquired an interest on or before November 1, 1945. Later, December 16, 1955, the Switzer brothers and their wives quitclaimed to appellant all their right, title, and interest in the patents involved.

  7. HOLZ LTD. v. KASHA

    No. C05-0244 BZ (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2005)

    The inclusion of this language suggests that Speed intended to retain the power to revoke the assignment. Courts have held that for an assignment to be valid, the intent to part with the patent must be clear and unambiguous. Switzer v. C.I.R., 226 F.2d 329 (6th Cir. 1955); McClaskey v. Harbison-Walker Refractories Co., 138 F.2d 493 (3rd Cir. 1943). Under the Utah Code Annotated ยง 16-10a-1422, a dissolved corporation may apply for reinstatement within two years after the effective date of dissolution.

  8. Superior Testers, Inc. v. Damco Testers, Inc.

    309 F. Supp. 661 (E.D. La. 1970)   Cited 1 times

    Accord, Kenyon v. Automatic Instrument Co., 6 Cir. 1947, 160 F.2d 878, 882. See also, Switzer v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 6 Cir. 1955, 226 F.2d 329, 330; Evans v. Kavanagh, E.D.Mich. 1949, 86 F. Supp. 535; Lamar v. Granger, W.D.Pa. 1951, 99 F. Supp. 17, 36. The evidence indicates that Superior never obtained and was never given the right, exclusively or otherwise, to sell the equipment covered by the subject patents.

  9. Watkins v. United States

    149 F. Supp. 718 (D. Conn. 1957)   Cited 2 times

    E.W. Bliss Co. v. United States, 253 U.S. 187, 40 S.Ct. 455, 64 L.Ed. 852. In Switzer v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 6 Cir., 226 F.2d 329, at page 330 the court, after citing Waterman v. Mackenzie, supra, and two Sixth Circuit cases said: "* * * Those cases also point out that whether the instrument constitutes an assignment or a license does not depend upon the name by which it is called, but upon the legal effect of its provisions.

  10. Switzer Brothers, Inc. v. Byrne

    139 F. Supp. 788 (N.D. Ohio 1956)   Cited 2 times

    The defendant moves for dismissal of the complaint on the ground that Patricia Switzer and Elise de G. Switzer are indispensable parties plaintiff and are not parties plaintiff to this action. In the case of Switzer v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 6 Cir., 1955, 226 F.2d 329, the Court found that Patricia D. Switzer and Elise de G. Switzer, respective wives of Robert C. Switzer and Joseph L. Switzer, each received on or before November 1, 1945, an one-eighth interest in the patents involved in this suit. Therefore, since the purported assignment, dated December 16, 1955, cannot be retroactive to the time of filing the original complaint, the fatal defect in parties plaintiff at the inception of the suit has not been cured for the reason the suit should have been brought in the first instance in the names of all the joint-owners of the patents.