Opinion
1:23-CV-00232-RAL
09-21-2023
CHARLES SWINT, Plaintiff v. L.J. OLIVER, EARL JONES, PATRICIA THOMPSON, STEVEN SOLOWODA, LT. FLOYD, DR. RUSH, UM. SEMORE, Defendants
Richard A. Lanzillo, Chief United States Magistrate Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMEDATION ON MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
ECF NO. 6
Susan Paradise Baxter, United States District Judge
I. RECOMMENDATION
It is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff Charles Swint's motion for a preliminary injunction (ECF No. 6) be denied.
II. REPORT
Swint, an individual incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Albion ("SCI-Albion") commenced Ms pro se civil rights action by filing a Complaint, Motion for Preliminary Injunction, and several supplemental documents with the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania on or about April 6, 2023. See ECF Nos. 1, 1-1. The Commonwealth Court transferred the action to the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County, and Defendants subsequently removed it to this Court. See Id. Defendants include SCI-Albion personnel L.J. Oliver, Earl Jones, Patricia Thompson, Steven Solowoda, Lt. Floyd, and UM Semore (collectively, "Corrections Defendants"). Dr. Rush is also a Defendant. The Complaint alleges that Defendants violated Swift's Eighth Amendment rights by allegedly placing him in a cell with a dangerous inmate and subsequently failing to protect Swint from him and other inmates. Swift seeks an emergency transfer as well as compensatory and punitive damages.
b. The Motion for Injunctive Relief and Evidentiary Hearing
In his motion for injunctive relief, Swift "avers he is seeking a[n] injunction ... for unsafe conditions to await a tragic event, such as an actual assault ... to prevent a substantial risk of serious injury ... on top of the actual assaults that happened already." ECF No. 1-1, p. 8. The motion is based on allegations of his Complaint that "[his] life has been in danger [at SCI-Albion] since 2021 when officials] had [him] tell on other inmates regarding drugs" they were bringing into the prison. ECF No. 101, p. 11. These inmates, including Swint's cellmate, Peter In, "were abusing [him] physically" and "sexually, and extorting [him]." Id. Semore had placed Swift in a cell with this "abusive, assaultive, and problematic inmate" despite Swint's vocal concerns. "On 2-15-21 [,] Lt. Sullivan, Lt. Franz, and Steven Solowada took a statement from [Swint] .. . where he told them that several inmates were physically assaulting him" and "extorting him for money," as well as "information on drug dealers and how the drugs were getting into the instition." Id., p. 10. Security received this statement, in which Swint named inmates "Peter In, Spud, Gutter, Saquill Shields, Brian Wright, and TL, all known gang members with Muslim ties that were paying others to assault [him]." Id. Security placed Swint in the Restricted Housing Unit for his protection but later released him back to general population to cell with Kareem Todd, "a friend to those [he] wronged." Id. Todd received word from those inmates "to hurt [Swint] which he did, physically, sexually," and "mentally," and also "extorted [him] further for money." Id. He reported this abuse to Sgt. Jones on July 3,"2021, "and was sent to medical for treatment on a bloody lip." Id. Jones opened a PREA investigation and sent him to a new unit (FA).
According to the Complaint, word within FA Unit "got out through the Muslims and the Crip Gang that [he] was a rat," "owed money," "and to hurt [him]." Id. "After months of being extorted and fed drugs," Swint complained to Floyd that inmates Arthur Jones, Bosten, Bell, and Walker threatened to assault him unless he paid them. Id. He also gave Floyd the drugs he had been given "with a statement and Cash App info." Id., p. 11. On December 8, 2022, Floyd placed him back in the RHU for his safety. According to the Complaint, however, upon his release from the RHU, he was placed in a cell with active gang member Demetrius Coleman, despite having expressed concerns over Coleman's ties to the Muslims and Crips. Thereafter, Coleman first "punched [him]" and then "showed [him] a knife" while telling him that he would kill Swint if reported this assault. Id., p. Believing Coleman, he stayed quiet and complied with his demands that Swift "wash[] his clothes" and "deliver[] his drugs." Id. Coleman and inmates "TL, Monster, and Jamica . . . took turns extorting [him] for money to stay safe." Id. On January 12, 2023, Swint went to Security to report this situation, where he gave a statement to Lt. Duke. Afterwards, he was moved to the RHU again for his safety.
He also communicated his fears to Dr. Rush verbally and in a written statement, as well as to the PRC on January 25, 2023. In response, Sgt. Jones "said he would have security come see [him] to gather a statement" and "talk about a transfer for [his] safety." Id. Lt. Floyd took a statement from him on February 9, 2023 and sent PREA coordinator Lt. Baxter "to get a statement as well. To date[,] the investigation is open." Id. He asserts that he has also complained "in writing, to all the named officials" about the aforementioned incidents, and he "can't live anywhere in the institution due to the Crips and the Muslims paying money to have [him] hurt." Id., p. 9.
On September 20, 2023, the undersigned conducted an evidentiary hearing on Swint's motion for injunctive relief. During the hearing, Swint reiterated man of the foregoing allegations in his testimony. See ECF No. 16. He further testified that though he is currently in the RHU, certain activities require him to interact with the inmates he fears, such as picking up his medications. As such, he has refused to pick up his medication, which includes prescriptions for various mental health conditions, including anxiety, depression, bipolar, paranoia, and agoraphobia.
In response to Swint's testimony and allegations, Defendants called Lt Floyd. He testified that prison personnel had investigated Swint's reports of threats and found them unsubstantiated. He explained that Swint had only reported a few of the incidences alleged in his complaint and concerning which he testified. He testified that although Swint had reported that Coleman had threatened him, the first indication that he had assaulted Swint was his testimony during the hearing. He also testified that no records relating to Swint support a past assault. He added that the prison's investigation of Swint's reports of threats revealed inconsistencies and mistruths in Swint's statements. He stated that no investigation found Swint's concerns substantiated.
a. Standard of Review
As a matter of substance, the party seeking preliminary injunctive relief has the burden of demonstrating: (1) a reasonable probability of success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) that the issuance of an injunction will not result in greater harm to the non-moving party; and (4) that the public interest would best be served by granting the injunction. Council of Alternative Political Parties v. Hooks, 121 F.3d 876, 879 (3d Cir. 1997); Opticians Ass'n of America v. Independent Opticians of America, 920 F.2d 187, 191-92 (3d Cir. 1990).
As the moving party, Swint bears the burden of producing evidence to support the first two factors. See Acierno v. New Castle Cty., 40 F.3d 645, 653 (3d Cir. 1994). Accordingly, the movant must provide facts that clearly support a finding that immediate and irreparable injury will result to the movant if preliminary relief is denied. See United States v. Stazola, 893 F.2d 34, 37 n.3 (3d Cir. 1990); Hohe v. Casey, 868 F.2d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 1989); ECRI v. McGraw-Hill Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir. 1987) (it is not enough to merely show irreparable harm: the plaintiff has the burden of showing immediate irreparable injury, which is more than merely serious or substantial harm and which cannot be redressed with money damages). Absent support for either of the first two factors, a court must deny the request for a preliminary injunction. See Acierno, 40 F.3d at 653 (3d Cir. 1994); Adams v. Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475, 484 (3d Cir. 2000).
The purpose of the preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the rights of the parties can be fairly and fully litigated and determined by strictly legal proofs and according to the principles of equity. Wetzel v. Edwards, 635 F.2d 283, 286 (4th Cir. 1980). Thus, the grant of injunctive relief is an "extraordinary remedy which should be granted only in limited circumstances." American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Winback and Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Frank's GMC Truck Center, Inc. v. General Motor Corp., 847 F.2d 100, 102 (3d Cir. 1988)).
Moreover, in the prison context, a request for injunctive relief "must always be viewed with great caution because 'judicial restraint is especially called for in dealing with the complex and intractable problems of prison administration.'" Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Rogers v. Scurr, 676 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir. 1982)). Preliminary injunctive relief is "not a tool for prisoners to use to regulate 'in every way, every day, the terms and conditions of plaintiff s confinement simply because they are "in court" ...'". Stiel v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 2017 WL 2656646, at *4 (D.N.J. June 19, 2017) (quoting Muhammad v. Director of Corrections, 2009 WL 161075, at *1 (E.D. Ca. Jan. 22, 2009)). Thus, where a plaintiff requests an injunction that would require the Court to interfere with the administration of a prison, "appropriate consideration must be given to principles of federalism in determining the availability and scope of equitable relief." Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 379 (1976). The federal courts are not overseers of the day-to-day management of prisons. Prison officials require broad discretionary authority as the "operation of a correctional institution is at best an extraordinarily difficult undertaking." Wolff v. McDonnell 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974). Accordingly, prison administrators should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that are needed to preserve internal order and to maintain institutional security. Beard v. Banks, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 2578 (2006); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 527 (1979).
b. Discussion
a. Swint has failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits.
As noted above, the burden on a party seeking injunctive relief is "particularly heavy" where the party is seeking to alter (rather than preserve) the status quo. Punnett, 621 F.2d at 582. See also Anderson v. Davila, 125 F.3d 148, 156 (3d Cir. 1997) ("The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo, not to decide the issues on their merits."). Thus, his request for an emergency transfer (a form of mandatory relief) must be viewed with exacting scrutiny and extreme caution. Burton, 2017 WL 4284345, at *6.
The record fails to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits. Swift's allegations and testimony of inmates' general threats and extortion demands lack the specificity necessary for a viable § 1983 claim. Further, the Court credits Floyd's testimony regarding the prison's findings that Swint's reports could not be substantiated and that his allegations were frequently inconsistent. The Court made observed the same during the hearing. Regardless, Swint acknowledged that on virtually each occasion he reported safety concerns to the Defendants, they moved him to the RHU and opened an investigation. Defendants therefore appear to be taking steps to ensure Swift's safety. Swint's testimony that he currently resides in the RHU and has been able to stay separated from the inmates supports this conclusion. The Court further notes that Swift's failure to accept his medication for treatment of his mental health conditions may be contributing to his fears for his safety and that further counseling and/or a mental health evaluation may be appropriate.
The current record also does not support a "probability of irreparable harm if relief is not granted." Hohe v. Casey, 868 F.2d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 1989). His motion largely alleges past incidents of alleged threats and bad acts of other inmates that involve no imminent threat of harm. See Synthes, Inc. v. Gregoris, 228 F.Supp.3d 421, 440 (E.D. Pa. 2017) ("Any irreparable harm must be imminent."); Burton, 2017 WL 4284345, at *9 (declining to grant preliminary relief in the absence of evidence "that there is an imminent risk of irreparable injury") (emphasis in original). See Boyd v. Larson, 2017 WL 1904278, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 2017) ("A preliminary injunction cannot be issued based on past harm.") (quoting Fischer v. Goord, 981 F.Supp. 140, 168 (W.D.N.Y. 1997)). And Swift's fears of future injury are too speculative to constitute imminent, irreparable harm. Bailey v. Gagnon, 2009 WL 982694, at *2 (W.D. Pa 2009) (citing Dice v. Clinicorp, Inc., 887 F.Supp. 803, 809 (W.D. Pa 1995)) ("to show irreparable harm, "the claims injury cannot merely be possible, speculative, or remote."); Campbell Soup Co. v. ConAgra, Inc., 977 F.2d 86, 91-92 (3d Cir. 1992) (emphasis added) (The "requisite feared injury or harm must be irreparable, not merely serious or substantial,") and it "must be of a peculiar nature, so that compensation in money cannot atone for it."). What's more, Swint's current placement in the RHU substantially diminishes the likelihood of imminent injury from the inmates who reside elsewhere in the prison.
Swint's failure to support a likelihood of success on the merits and an imminent risk of irreparable harm is fatal to his motion.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, it is respectfully recommended that Swint's motion for preliminary injunction (ECF No. 6) be denied.
IV. NOTICE
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties may seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of objections to respond thereto. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections may waive appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).