Swinney v. Haynes

10 Citing cases

  1. Oliver v. Schultz

    885 S.W.2d 699 (Ky. 1994)   Cited 36 times
    Holding that restriction placed in a collateral chain of title cannot bind a subsequent grantee without actual notice of the restriction unless it is included in a subsequent recorded subdivision plat or deed of restrictions

    In Paine v. LaQuinta Motor Inns, Inc., Ky.App., 736 S.W.2d 355, 358 (1987), the court noted that "a subsequent purchaser for value who takes with notice of the restriction may be bound, even though the restriction may not be recorded." In support of this proposition, the Court cited Swinney v. Haynes, 314 Ky. 600, 236 S.W.2d 705 (1951), and Hedges v. Stucker, 237 Ky. 351, 35 S.W.2d 539 (1931). Neither of these cases are truly applicable to the validity of a restrictive covenant purportedly established by an unrecorded instrument, since both involve implied grants or reservations of easements.

  2. Gunter v. Peeples

    NO. 2015-CA-000527-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Feb. 10, 2017)

    that where the owner of an entire tract of land, or of two or more adjoining parcels, employs a part thereof so that one derives from the other a benefit or advantage of a continuous and apparent nature, and sells the one in favor of which such ... easement exists, such easement, being necessary to the reasonable enjoyment of the property granted, will pass to the grantee by implication. 315 S.W.3d at 716, quoting Swinney v. Haynes, 236 S.W.2d 705, 707 (Ky. 1951) (emphasis added). This is precisely what occurred in this case.

  3. Abney v. Miles

    NO. 2011-CA-000958-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 2013)

    "The authorities are agreed, and such is the rule in this state, that where the owner of an entire tract of land, or of two or more adjoining parcels, employs a part thereof so that one derives from the other a benefit or advantage of a continuous and apparent nature, and sells the one in favor of which such continuous and apparent quasi-easement exists, such easement, being necessary to the reasonable enjoyment of the property granted, will pass to the grantee by implication."Swinney v. Haynes, 314 Ky. 600, 603-604, 236 S.W.2d 705, 707 (1951) (quoting Hedges v. Stucker, 237 Ky. 351, 35 S.W.2d 539, 540 (1931)).The legal reasoning of our predecessors was not novel and remains in conformity with the general rule as cited in 25 Am.Jur.2d Easements and Licenses in Real Property § 93 (2004):

  4. Dukes v. Link

    315 S.W.3d 712 (Ky. Ct. App. 2010)   Cited 22 times

    "The authorities are agreed, and such is the rule in this state, that where the owner of an entire tract of land, or of two or more adjoining parcels, employs a part thereof so that one derives from the other a benefit or advantage of a continuous and apparent nature, and sells the one in favor of which such continuous and apparent quasi easement exists, such easement, being necessary to the reasonable enjoyment of the property granted, will pass to the grantee by implication."Swinney v. Haynes, 314 Ky. 600, 603-604, 236 S.W.2d 705, 707 (1951) (quoting Hedges v. Stucker, 237 Ky. 351, 35 S.W.2d 539, 540 (1931)). The trial court found as a matter of law that the easement description in Link's chain of title was sufficient for the existence of an express easement.

  5. Jones v. Sparks

    297 S.W.3d 73 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009)   Cited 121 times
    Affirming trial court's dismissal of unjust enrichment claim because the court found that plaintiff did not confer a benefit upon the defendant or his property

    Kreamer v. Harmon, 336 S.W.2d 561, 563 (Ky. 1960). See also Swinney v. Hayne, 314 Ky. 600, 236 S.W.2d 705 (1951). Generally, in order to prove a quasi-easement by implication of law, a party must show: (1) that there was a separation of title from common ownership; (2) that before the separation occurred the use which gave rise to the easement was so long continued, obvious, and manifest that it must have been intended to be permanent; and (3) that the use of the claimed easement was highly convenient and beneficial to the land conveyed.

  6. McConnell v. Stivers

    Nos. 2004-CA-001835-MR, 2004-CA-001894-MR, 2004-CA-002302-MR, 2004-CA-002213-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 12, 2007)

    Kreamer v. Harmon, 336 S.W.2d 561, 563 (Ky. 1960). See also Swinney v. Haynes, 314 Ky. 600, 236 S.W.2d 705 (Ky. 1951). Generally, in order to prove an easement by implication of law, a party must show: (1) that there was a separation of title from common ownership; (2) that before the separation occurred the use which gave rise to the easement was so long continued, obvious, and manifest that it must have been intended to be permanent; and, (3) that the use of the claimed easement was highly convenient and beneficial to the land conveyed.

  7. McConnell v. Stivers

    No. 2004-CA-001835-MR, 2004-CA-001894-MR, 2004-CA-002302-MR, NO. 2004-CA-002213-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Dec. 8, 2006)

    Kreamer v. Harmon, 336 S.W.2d 561, 563 (Ky. 1960). See also Swinney v. Haynes, 314 Ky. 600, 236 S.W.2d 705 (Ky. 1951). Generally, in order to prove an easement by implication of law, a party must show: (1) that there was a separation of title from common ownership; (2) that before the separation occurred the use which gave rise to the easement was so long continued, obvious, and manifest that it must have been intended to be permanent; and, (3) that the use of the claimed easement was highly convenient and beneficial to the land conveyed.

  8. Carroll v. Meredith

    59 S.W.3d 484 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001)   Cited 147 times
    Explaining "courts applying the strict necessity standard have rejected the creation of an easement by necessity to a portion of a claimant's property where any part of the property abuts or has direct access to a public road" and that Kentucky applies the "strict" necessity standard

    Kreamer v. Harmon, Ky., 336 S.W.2d 561, 563 (1960). See also Swinney v. Haynes, 314 Ky. 600, 236 S.W.2d 705 (1951).Evanik v. Janus, 120 Ill. App.3d 475, 485, 458 N.E.2d 962, 969 (1983); Bob's Ready to Wear, Inc., 569 S.W.2d at 718.

  9. Cole v. Gilvin

    59 S.W.3d 468 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001)   Cited 71 times
    Providing for a conclusive presumption of a dedication to the public after five years of unrestricted use by the general public

    Kreamer v. Harmon, Ky., 336 S.W.2d 561, 563 (1960). See also Swinney v. Haynes, 314 Ky. 600, 236 S.W.2d 705 (1951).Evanik v. Janus, 120 Ill. App.3d 475, 485, 458 N.E.2d 962, 969 (1983); Bob's Ready to Wear, Inc. v. Weaver, Ky.App., 569 S.W.2d 715, 718 (1978).

  10. Paine v. La Quinta Motor Inns, Inc.

    736 S.W.2d 355 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987)   Cited 28 times
    Noting that Kentucky courts "are very egocentric or protective concerning choice of law questions"

    Finally, contrary to what appellants argue, in this situation a subsequent purchaser for value who takes with notice of the restriction may be bound, even though the restriction may not be recorded. Swinney v. Haynes, 314 Ky. 600, 236 S.W.2d 705 (1951); Hedges v. Stucker, 237 Ky. 351, 35 S.W.2d 539 (1931); Restatement of Property §§ 524,525 (1944); 20 Am.Jur.2d Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions §§ 304,305 (1965). Cf. 3 Powell ¶ 411 (4) (1987); 5 Powell ¶ 671.