In such case based upon the testimony the State Industrial Commission may find that the disability is a result of an accidental injury. Swift Co. v. Brown, 202 Okla. 572, 216 P.2d 294."
In Baker v. Harris, Okla., 302 P.2d 129, and Nu-Way Laundry Cleaners v. State Industrial Commission, 194 Okla. 101, 147 P.2d 795-796, cited by claimant, there was medical testimony reasonably tending to connect the disability with the injury. In Swift Company v. Brown, 202 Okla. 572, 216 P.2d 294, also cited by claimant, the doctor ruled out disease as a cause of claimant's condition. In the case at hand, however, there is an entire absence of medical evidence tending to establish that claimant's condition was of traumatic origin, and particularly that it was caused by the alleged injury, other than claimant's testimony that he went to a doctor D. in Shreveport, who told claimant that claimant had a disc and that he attributed it to driving.
We have repeatedly held that the disability resulting from an accidental injury is to be determined from medical evidence and is a question of fact, and, if there is any competent evidence reasonably tending to support the finding of the State Industrial Commission, an award based thereon will not be disturbed on review by this Court. State Highway Dept. v. Powell, Okla., 258 P.2d 1189; City of Kingfisher v. Jenkins, 168 Okla. 624, 33 P.2d 1094; Magnolia Petroleum Co., v. Clow, 163 Okla. 302, 22 P.2d 378; Burch v. Slick, 167 Okla. 639, 31 P.2d 110, and Swift Co. v. Brown, 202 Okla. 572, 216 P.2d 294. Award sustained.
ate that such disability was caused by the accidental injury sustained on the date above mentioned. While it is true that the doctor does not in exact words directly so state he refers to the case history obtained in which respondent states that prior to the time he sustained his injury he was able to and did hard manual labor and since that time he has not been able to do so; that respondent prior to the injury was to a certain extent afflicted with arthritis and that such condition was aggravated by the injury sustained on August 21, 1952, and that he now has 50 per cent permanent partial disability to his body as a whole. Considering the report as a whole we think the doctor states sufficient facts from which the Commission might reasonably draw the conclusion that respondent's disability as fixed by the doctor was caused or aggravated and brought about by the accidental injury sustained on the date above mentioned. Bishop's Restaurant, Inc., v. McKim, 208 Okla. 631, 258 P.2d 170; Swift Co. v. Brown, 202 Okla. 572, 216 P.2d 294. Petitioners referring to the evidence of the doctor appointed by the trial commissioner to the effect that respondent's disability is due in part to his previous condition and in part to the injury sustained on the date above mentioned states the Commission was in error in finding that respondent's entire disability was caused by the injury and in support thereof cite Schoenfield Hunter Drilling Co. v. Combs, 167 Okla. 397, 30 P.2d 162; Washita County Gin Co. v. Colbert, 162 Okla. 276, 19 P.2d 1080.
The rule should be more readily applied in cases of a change of condition where the actual or real controversy involves not the cause of the disability but the extent thereof and whether there has been a change in condition. The petitioners made no attempt to show either by cross-examination or offer of medical evidence that any other accident or disease caused claimant's present condition. Under the above rule and the rule announced in City of Kingfisher v. Jenkins, 168 Okla. 624, 33 P.2d 1094 and Swift Co. v. Brown, 202 Okla. 572, 216 P.2d 294, we hold there is competent evidence reasonably tending to support the finding that the change in condition was due to the original injury. Award sustained.
Under the rule announced by this court in City of Kingfisher v. Jenkins, 168 Okla. 624, 33 P.2d 1094, we are of the opinion and hold that there is competent evidence reasonably tending to support the finding of the State Industrial Commission that Patrick N. Tate died of an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment. See, also, in this connection Swift Co. v. Brown, 202 Okla. 572, 216 P.2d 294. In a second proposition petitioners argue that the claim was improperly filed because it was presented by William H. Tate, administrator of the estate of Patrick N. Tate, and should have been presented by Fred Tate and Lillie Tate.
Tidewater Associated Oil Co. v. Ale, 191 Okla. 414, 130 P.2d 991. In Swift Co. v. Brown, 202 Okla. 572, 216 P.2d 294, we said: "* * * Although Dr. Henry was not given a statement or history of the accidental injury by claimant, the State Industrial Commission had a complete description of the injury by claimant and of the sequence of events leading up to the disability, and Dr. Henry stated the disability was not due to the usual cause, towit: stricture.
In such case based upon the testimony the State Industrial Commission may find that the disability is a result of an accidental injury. Swift Co. v. Brown, 202 Okla. 572, 216 P.2d 294. We have noticed the cases from other jurisdictions treating of the evidence required to sustain a finding as to the disability.