Opinion
Case No. 98 C 5749
August 23, 2002
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR SUPPLEMENTAL DISCOVERY
A jury returned a verdict for plaintiff in this case on February 26, 2001, and judgment on the verdict was entered on that date. On May 3, 2002, this court ruled on defendant's post-trial motions, denying all motions except a request for remittitur to bring the verdict in conformity with the statutory cap. On May 16, 2002, defendant moved for supplemental discovery, arguing that Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 122 S.Ct. 681 (2002), decided on January 8, 2002, represented a "drastic and unforeseen change in the law" with "enormous repercussions for this case," necessitating a reopening of discovery and possibly a new trial. Defendant also seeks additional discovery to determine whether plaintiff has remained disabled since the date of the trial, for back and front pay purposes. Defendant's motion, with the possible exception of the issue of discovery necessary for any upcoming damages hearing, is denied.
Defendant's explanation of why it waited to file this motion until the court had denied its other post-trial motions makes no sense to the court. Defendant seems to think it was appropriate to see how the court would rule on its pre-Toyota motions before setting forth an additional ground for attacking the verdict. But defendant's delay in raising this issue has cost the court a huge additional expenditure of time, since the court has had to review the record of the trial twice.
First, it is not apparent to this court that Toyota changed the law at all. The Court's unanimous opinion appears rather to be a correction of the Sixth Circuit's erroneous application of the decision in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999), confusing what must be shown to make out a substantial limitation in one putative major life activity, working, with what must be shown to make out a substantial limitation in a major life activity in general. Significantly, while defendant cites numerous post-Toyota cases that are consistent with Toyota, it fails to cite pre-Toyota cases that are inconsistent with Toyota, the sine qua non of demonstrating a change in the law. Minimally, to be entitled to a new start to this litigation, defendant would have to show that the law has changed. As far as this court can tell, the law has not changed and defendant has not shown that it has.
To the extent defendant is actually challenging the identification of "working" as a major life activity, Toyota did not resolve the issue and hence did not change the law in this respect. Besides, there were suggestions in prior cases, such as Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999), that a mere limitation in a person's ability to perform a specific job might not satisfy the ADA, such that counsel could have argued and preserved that issue.
Second, this is not a situation where rulings by this court in the course of this case now appear erroneous in light of Toyota. Indeed, the defense points to no ruling by this court relating to the definition of disability which it maintains was incorrect. The court instructed the jury on a definition of disability that had been agreed upon by the parties. In its Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, or, Alternatively, for a New Trial or Remittitur of Damages, defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that defendant failed to accommodate plaintiff's disability, that a hostile work environment existed and that plaintiff was constructively discharged; there was no argument that plaintiff had failed adequately to prove that she was disabled. Defendant appears to have made a strategic decision not to contest this aspect of plaintiff's case. Defendant cannot now, after losing at trial and losing on its post-trial motions, get a second chance by claiming that plaintiff could not have proven an essential element of her case which defendant chose not to dispute.
With respect to defendant's argument that it is entitled to discovery on plaintiff's condition today, the court will hear the parties at the time of the status hearing in the case. Whether defendant is entitled to such discovery depends to at least some extent on what issues remain to be resolved. Since discovery closed in this case years ago, the court will have to be convinced that the discovery is relevant to some issue yet to be decided, and that defendant should not be limited to discovery it took before the discovery cut-off prior to the trial in this case. The contention, however, that Toyota justifies additional discovery is rejected.
Defendant's motion for supplemental discovery, except possibly to the limited extent described above, is denied.