See also, e.g., Fisher v. Scafati, 439 F.2d 307 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 939, 91 S.Ct. 2256, 29 L.Ed.2d 719 (1971); United States ex rel. Hughes v. McMann, 405 F.2d 773 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v. Nash, 563 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1977); Gilpin v. United States, 415 F.2d 638 (5th Cir. 1969); Holleman v. Duckworth, 700 F.2d 391 (7th Cir. 1983); Evans v. United States, 375 F.2d 355 (8th Cir. 1967), rev'd sub. nom. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), appeal after remand, 416 F.2d 310 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1014, 90 S.Ct. 1248, 25 L.Ed.2d 428 (1970); United States v. Robinson, 439 F.2d 553, 142 U.S.App.D.C. 43 (D.C. Cir. 1970). It is then clear that Cagle, supra, and Swicegood v. State, 50 Ala. App. 105, 277 So.2d 380 (1973), have a solid foundation in constitutional law and are hereby affirmed. Indeed, to attempt to overrule these cases would be but an effort to overrule the United States Supreme Court, a power which does not reside with this Court.
Such a general inquiry into what rights appellant was informed of is not sufficient to prove that appellant made a voluntary statement. Similar facts occurred in Swicegood v. State, 50 Ala. App. 105, 277 So.2d 380 (1973), where the State merely asked "Did you advise him of his rights?" to which the response was "Yes, sir.
Stokes, however, testified that Clark had made incriminating statements to him on April 19 after having been transported from Montana to Headland, Alabama. While Stokes did testify that Clark had been advised of his right on April 17 by another officer, Clark contends that Stokes did not set forth the Miranda warnings with sufficient clarity to overcome the presumption of inadmissibility. See Ex parte Johnson, 620 So.2d 709 (Ala. 1993) citing Swicegood v. State, 50 Ala. App. 105, 277 So.2d 380 (Ala.Cr.App. 1973). Further more, Clark argues that the length of time between any Miranda warnings given to him on April 17 in Montana and incriminating statements made by him on April 19 in Alabama was significant and, therefore, rendered his statements inadmissible.
An in-custody statement by an accused is prima facie involuntary and inadmissible; to overcome this presumption, the State must first establish that before the defendant gave his statement the police informed him of his rights, as required by Miranda. Ex parte Callahan, 471 So.2d 463 (Ala. 1985). See, also, Swicegood v. State, 50 Ala. App. 105, 277 So.2d 380 (1973). To this end, the State must spell out with clarity and precision the specific Miranda warnings the police gave to the defendant.
On the trial of a person for the alleged commission of a particular crime, evidence of his doing another act, which itself is a crime, is not admissible if the only probative function of such evidence is to show his bad character or his inclination or propensity to commit the type of crime for which he is being tried. Loggins v. State, 52 Ala. App. 204, 290 So.2d 665 (1974); Swicegood v. State, 50 Ala. App. 105, 277 So.2d 380 (1973). As a general rule, however, a defendant who takes the stand in his own behalf during a criminal trial can be questioned on cross examination about prior convictions for crimes involving moral turpitude.
In Ex parte Johnson, 620 So.2d 709, 711 (Ala. 1993), the Alabama Supreme Court held that "the general question of whether the Miranda warnings were given does not adequately establish whether the warnings were properly given and understood by the defendant." The Alabama Supreme Court cited Swicegood v. State, 50 Ala.App. 105, 277 So.2d 380 (1973), Arthur v. State, 575 So.2d 1165 (Ala.Crim.App. 1990), Robinson v. State, 399 So.2d 902 (Ala.Crim.App. 1981), and Thomas v. State, 370 So.2d 1066 (Ala.Crim.App. 1978), as additional precedent supporting its ruling in Johnson. A complete Miranda predicate (as opposed to the voluntariness predicate) would include all of the following.
(R. 111.) The appellant concedes that, in attempting to establish a predicate for the admission of the statement, the State did more than ask generally whether McEwin had advised the appellant of his Miranda rights — a practice that was condemned in Swicegood v. State, 50 Ala. App. 105, 277 So.2d 380 (Ala.Crim.App. 1973), and Ex parte Johnson, 620 So.2d 709 (Ala.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 905, 114 S.Ct. 285, 126 L.Ed.2d 235 (1993). Nevertheless, citing Ex parte Price, 725 So.2d 1063 (Ala. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1133, 119 S.Ct. 1809, 143 L.Ed.2d 1012 (1999), he contends that the State's evidence was "still not sufficiently detailed to satisfy the requirements of a Miranda predicate."
See, also, Swicegood v. State, 50 Ala. App. 105, 277 So.2d 380 (1973). To this end, the State must spell out with clarity and precision the specific Miranda warning the police gave to the defendant.
The generalized statement that "[Arthur] was read his Miranda rights" is not a sufficient predicate. See Swicegood v. State, 50 Ala. App. 105, 277 So.2d 380 (1973). The "plain error" was exacerbated by the prosecutor's references to Arthur's assertions of his right to remain silent and his right to consult with an attorney.
Because an in-custody statement by an accused is prima facie involuntary and inadmissible, the predicate laid for the admission of the statement is entirely inadequate. The assumption of the trial judge was unauthorized and has been rejected by the courts of this State. Thomas v. State, 370 So.2d 1066, 1069 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. quashed, 370 So.2d 1070 (Ala. 1979); Swicegood v. State, 50 Ala. App. 105, 277 So.2d 380 (1973). The State must show the precise and specific warnings given the accused so that the trial judge may make a determination of the compliance or noncompliance with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); Thomas, supra; Kelley v. State, 366 So.2d 1145, 1149, n. 3 (Ala.Cr.App. 1979).