Opinion
6:23-cv-04229-JD-MGB
02-06-2024
Isaac Brannon Perry Swett, Plaintiff, v. Prisma Health and Greenville Health Authority Police Department, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, originally filed this civil action in the Greenville County Magistrate's Court, raising state law tort claims and a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”). (Dkt. No. 1-1.) The case was removed to federal court on August 24, 2023. (Dkt. No. 1.) On September 13, 2023, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint, bringing an ADA claim, and state law intentional infliction of emotional distress, tortious interference with health, and tortious interference with business relations claims. (Dkt. No. 15.)
Currently before the Court is Defendants' Amended Motion to Dismiss, or, in the alternative, Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. (Dkt. No. 17.) Pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e), D.S.C., all pretrial matters in cases involving pro se litigants are referred to a United States Magistrate Judge for consideration. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Defendants' Motion (Dkt. No. 17) be GRANTED.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This case arises from Plaintiff's prior employment with Defendant Prisma Health (“Prisma”). (Dkt. No. 15.) According to Plaintiff, he was employed by Prisma as a Nursing Specialty Technician from April of 2019 through January of 2020. (Id. at 4.) He claims that, on January 3, 2020, he was placed on administrative leave by his manager “due to concerns about statements [he] made regarding firearms.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that “[a]lmost all of these conversations occurred with [Greenville Health Authority Police Department] Officer Stan Ashley, and most of them were mutual conversations where both participants joked about shooting each other.” (Id.) A couple of weeks after he was placed on administrative leave-January 15, 2020-Plaintiff was terminated. (Id. at 3.)
Soon after, Plaintiff received a trespass notice, which was issued to him by Defendant Greenville Health Authority Police Department (“GHAPD”) on Prisma's behalf. (Id.) Pursuant to the trespass notice, Plaintiff was banned from “any and all” Prisma properties. (Id.) The trespass notice read:
On Sunday January 5, 2020, the GHA Police Department was made aware that Isaac Brannon Perry Swett (former Nursing Specialty Technician at Hillcrest Memorial Hospital; Swett's employment was terminated on January 16, 2020) has made concerning statements (i.e. “punching nurses in the face” if asked to complete an ER task, inquiring what would happen if he “took a police officer's firearm”), suicidal ideation, and has shown a fascination with AR-15 assault rifle which Isaac Swett advised that his uncle has this rifle where both reside. Isaac Swett drives a 2009 Ford Mustang . . . and his Prisma Health ID Badge has been deactivated; Isaac Swett was placed on Trespass Notice by a Greenville Health Authority Police Officer on January 16, 2020; if Isaac Swett is found to be on Prisma Health property, contact the Greenville Health Authority Police ....(Dkt. No. 17-2 at 2) (emphasis omitted). The notice given to Plaintiff further stated that it would “remain in effect and [] not expire.” (Id.)
On May 11, 2020, Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) through the South Carolina Human Affairs Commission. (Dkt. No. 17-3.) In the charge, Plaintiff stated:
I began my employment with Prisma Health as a Nurse Specialty Technician in April 2019. My performance was satisfactory. I was terminated on January 16, 2020.
On January 5, 2020, I received a call from Kodee Spearman, Nurse Manager, informing me I was being placed on administrative leave pending an investigation into a conversation I had with another hospital employee. I denied the insinuated perception of the conversation and attempted to offer an explanation which included details of my medical condition, but to no avail. I was given instructions to complete specific tasks with the employee assistance program and I completed the requirements. On January 16, 2020, I received a call from Kodee Spearman and Karen Brown, Human Resources Manager, stating the investigation was completed and I was being terminated. The employee I was having the conversation with does not have a medical condition and still has his job, but I was suspended and terminated.
I believe I have been discriminated against in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended.(Id. at 2.) On December 18, 2020, the parties entered into a Settlement Agreement and General Release (the “Settlement Agreement”), resolving Plaintiff's EEOC charge. (Dkt. No. 17-4.)
Nonetheless, Plaintiff filed the instant civil action in the Greenville County Magistrate's Court on July 17, 2023. (Dkt. No. 1-1.) Defendants removed the case to federal court on August 24, 2023. (Dkt. No. 1.) On August 31, 2023, Defendants filed an Answer and a Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative, Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. (Dkt. Nos. 8, 9.) On that same day, this Court issued an Order pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising Plaintiff of the dismissal procedure and the possible consequences if he failed to adequately respond to the motion. (Dkt. No. 12.)
On September 13, 2023, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint, rendering Defendants' pending motion moot. (Dkt. Nos. 15, 31.) In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff, who is autistic, alleges that he was given the trespass notice and terminated because of his disability, in violation of the ADA. (Dkt. No. 15.) As support, Plaintiff explains that he “made [Prisma] aware of his disability in April or May 2019, and indicated that social miscommunications could occur due to his disability.” (Id.) He explains that, after the concerning conversations, he was evaluated by a Prisma Employee Assistance Program counselor, his treating psychiatrist, and his treating counselor, and “was determined not to be a risk to [him]self or others.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims that Prisma was aware that he was not a risk, but he was still terminated and served with the trespass notice. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that Officer Ashley, with whom he was speaking during the problematic conversations, “does not have autism” and therefore “was not issued a trespass notice, continued to work for the [GHAPD], and was never even placed on administrative leave.” (Id.) Accordingly, Plaintiff brings the instant civil action against Defendants claiming that they violated the ADA. (Id.)
In addition, Plaintiff claims that Prisma is “the largest healthcare corporation in the state, which requires any EMT[]s, paramedics, firefighters, law enforcement officers, or other first responders to enter Prisma Health properties in the course of their duties.” (Id.) Because of the trespass order, Plaintiff claims he is barred “from being able to work virtually any first responder job in the Upstate or in any surrounding areas, constituting an unlawful obstruction of [his] employment with other entities.” (Id.) As such, Plaintiff brings a state law tortious interference with business relations claim. (Id.) Plaintiff further claims that Defendants' actions significantly diminished his “mental health and emotional state,” and significantly worsened his psychiatric conditions-“specifically anxiety, treatment-resistant depression, and bipolar disorder.” (Id. at 5.) Thus, he also brings state law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and “tortious interference with health.” (Id.) Plaintiff requests that Defendants rescind the trespass notice in writing. (Id. at 6.) He requests actual, compensatory, and punitive damages, as well. (Id.)
In response to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, Defendants filed a new Answer and Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative, Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. (Dkt. Nos. 16, 17.) The Court again issued an Order pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising Plaintiff of the dismissal procedure and the possible consequences if he failed to adequately respond to Defendants' motion. (Dkt. No. 19.) Plaintiff responded on October 31, 2023, and Defendants replied to Plaintiff's response on November 7, 2023. (Dkt. Nos. 23, 25.) As such, the motion before the Court has been fully briefed and is ripe for disposition.
LEGAL STANDARD
“After the pleadings are closed-but early enough not to delay trial-a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Rule 12(c), Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 12(c) motions “dispose of cases in which there is no substantive dispute that warrants the litigants and the court proceeding further.” See Lewis v. Excel Mech., LLC, 2:13-cv-281-PMD, 2013 WL 4585873, at * 1 (D.S.C. Aug. 28, 2013) (citing 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1368 (3d ed. 2010)). Courts follow “a fairly restrictive standard” in deciding Rule 12(c) motions, as “hasty or imprudent use of this summary procedure by the courts violates the policy in favor of ensuring to each litigant a full and fair hearing on the merits of his or her claim or defense.” See Fitzhenry v. Indep. Order of Foresters, No. 2:14-cv-3690-DCN, 2015 WL 3711287 (D.S.C. June 15, 2015) (internal citations omitted).
A motion for judgment on the pleadings is analyzed under the same standard as a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Burbach Broad. Co. of Del. v. Elkins Radio Corp., 278 F.3d 401, 405-06 (4th Cir. 2002). When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court should “accept as true all well-pleaded allegations and should view the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993). However, the Court “need not accept the legal conclusions drawn from the facts” nor “accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” Eastern Shore Mkts., Inc. v. J.D. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000).
Rule 12(b)(6) permits the dismissal of an action if the complaint fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Rule 12(b)(6), Fed.R.Civ.P. “In reviewing a motion to dismiss an action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) . . . [a court] must determine whether it is plausible that the factual allegations in the complaint are ‘enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.'” Andrew v. Clark, 561 F.3d 261, 266 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “A plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). The complaint must show more than a “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (noting that while Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation”).
Rule 12(c) motions limit the court's review to the pleadings and “any documents and exhibits attached to and incorporated into the pleadings.” See Hughes v. Med. Depot, Inc., No. 2:18-cv-2187-RMG, 2019 WL 1772401, at *1 (D.S.C. Apr. 23, 2019) (internal citations omitted). For purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court “may [] consider documents attached to the complaint . . . as well as those attached to the motion to dismiss, so long as they are integral to the complaint and authentic.” Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem'l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 179-80 (4th Cir. 2009); see also Simons v. Montgomery Cty. Police Officers, 762 F.2d 30, 31 (4th Cir. 1985).
In drafting this Report and Recommendation, the undersigned has considered only documents that are attached to, incorporated into, and/or integral to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. The authenticity of any such documents is not disputed. (See generally Dkt. Nos. 15, 17-1, 23-1, 25.)
Because Plaintiff is representing himself, these standards must be applied while liberally construing his filings in this case. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
DISCUSSION
In their Motion, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint should be dismissed for several reasons: (1) Plaintiff executed a release of his current claims against Defendants in a Settlement Agreement between Plaintiff and Prisma that was signed on December 18, 2020; (2) Plaintiff is barred from bringing his ADA claim because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies; (3) Plaintiff's lawsuit is barred by the applicable statute of limitations; and (4) the allegations in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint do not state a claim under South Carolina law. (Dkt. No. 17-1 at 2.) The undersigned considers Defendants' arguments, below.
I. Settlement Agreement
Defendant contends that Plaintiff's claims in this civil action are precluded by the Settlement Agreement. (Dkt. No. 17-1.) In response, Plaintiff claims that the Settlement Agreement should not bar his claims because he only settled with Prisma “because he was not in a good position to pursue further action related to his employment discrimination due to both financial instability, and the worsening of his medical conditions as a direct result of Defendants' actions.” (Dkt. No. 23-1 at 10.) Plaintiff further claims that “[t]he settlement only released [Defendants] from liability prior to the date of the settlement” but “[t]he claims in question concern discrimination and unlawful treatment of Plaintiff continuing to the present, thereby occurring after the date of the civil settlement.” (Id. at 11.)
The Settlement Agreement was entered into in December of 2020 and is signed by both Plaintiff and Defendant Prisma. (Dkt. No. 17-4.) The pertinent portions of the Settlement Agreement read:
WHEREAS, Swett filed an EEOC Charge lawsuit against Prisma, EEOC Charge No. 436-2020-00201, SCHAC No. 3-20-225D (“Action”), alleging disability discrimination;
WHEREAS, Prisma ha[s] denied and continues to deny any and all liability to Swett;
WHEREAS, the Parties recognize the outcome in the Action and any subsequent litigation and appeal is uncertain, and achieving a final result through litigation and appeal requires additional risk, time, and expense; and
WHEREAS, the Parties desire to compromise, settle, and resolve all disputes; and,
WHEREAS, as more specifically outlined below, Swett desires to dismiss his claims, with prejudice, and to fully and completely release Prisma from any and all liability and to reach full accord and satisfaction of all claims he has against [] Prisma.
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the payment of monies and in further consideration of the promises, covenants, and releases hereinafter set forth, the sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, the Parties agree as follows: ....
3. Swett hereby voluntarily, irrevocably, fully, and completely RELEASES, ACQUITS, AND FOREVER DISCHARGES Prisma and its current and former parents, subsidiaries, divisions, affiliates, related business entities, predecessors, all current and former board members, trustees, officers, partners (both limited and general), managers, directors, agents, employees, relatives, successors, assigns, insurers, attorneys, affiliates, and related business entities (hereinafter referred to as “Released Parties”) from any and all claims, causes of action, demands, liabilities, debts, or damages accrued as of the date of execution of this Agreement (known or unknown), including, but not limited to, claims of employment discrimination, retaliation or any other claims, under the Americans With Disabilities Act; any claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967; any claims under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”); any claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (“Title VII”); 42 U.S. Code §1981, any claims for lost or unpaid wages or other employee benefits; claims for breach of contract or breach of contract accompanied by fraudulent act; as well as any state law claims under any state law alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress, pain, suffering, or anxiety, negligence, outrageous conduct, invasion of privacy, harassment, assault, battery, defamation, slander, conspiracy, wrongful or constructive discharge or any other actions arising in tort or contract; and any additional claims under state, federal, or local law. This release shall include, but not be limited to, all those claims which were or could have been asserted in the Charge entitled Mr. Isaac B. Swett v. Prisma Health,
EEOC Charge No. 436-2020-00801; SCHAC No. 3-20-225D. It is the Parties' intent to release all claims which can legally be released but no more than that. Additionally, Swett acknowledges that this Agreement constitutes full ACCORD AND SATISFACTION of all claims covered by the release provisions of this Paragraph. Swett acknowledges that the waiver of rights or claims in this section is in exchange for the consideration in Paragraph 1 above, and is in addition to anything of value to which he might otherwise be entitled. Swett covenants that he shall not in any way encourage or assist any person or entity (including, but not limited to, any past, present, or future employee(s) of Prisma[)] to take or participate in any legal or administrative action against Prisma, except as otherwise required or protected by law. ....
13. Swett represents and warrants that he was not coerced, threatened, or otherwise forced to sign this Agreement, and that his signature appearing hereinafter is genuine. Swett understands that this Agreement contains a full release of ALL claims now existing by him against Prisma, and that he is waiving only past and existing claims, but not claims which may arise after the date this Agreement is executed. Swett understands that he is receiving valuable consideration under this Agreement that he would not otherwise be entitled to receive and acknowledges that the consideration is sufficient for the release.(Id. at 3-4, 8.)
Plaintiff does not contest that he signed the Settlement Agreement, nor does he contest that the Settlement Agreement absolves Prisma of liability for his past claims. (See generally Dkt. No. 23-1.) Rather, Plaintiff asserts that the release does not bar the claims he now brings in this civil action because the release did not cover future actions. (Dkt. No. 23-1 at 10.) In reply, Defendants contend that the claims Plaintiff now brings cannot be considered new claims based upon new actions. (Dkt. No. 25 at 2.) The undersigned agrees with Defendants. The allegations in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint center around: (1) Plaintiff being prohibited from Prisma properties due to the trespass order; (2) Plaintiff's inability to work because of the trespass order; and (3) Plaintiff's psychiatric health following the trespass order. (See generally Dkt. No. 15.) In other words, the Amended Complaint describes continued consequences from the original issuance of the trespass order in 2020-it does not, however, allege new actions by Defendants. (Id.)
Further, the claims Plaintiff brings in this civil action accrued prior to him signing the Settlement Agreement and are, therefore, barred. (Id.) As noted, the Settlement Agreement released Prisma and its agents “from any and all claims, causes of action, demands, liabilities, debts, or damages accrued as of the date of execution of this Agreement (known or unknown).” (Dkt. No. 17-4) (emphasis added). Here, Plaintiff raises an ADA claim and state law tort claims. (See generally Dkt. No. 15.) An ADA claim accrues “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.” A Soc'y Without a Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 348 (4th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation and citation omitted). State law tort claims accrue on “the date when the injury resulting from the wrongful conduct either is discovered or may be discovered by the exercise of reasonable diligence.” Gillman v. City of Beaufort, 368 S.C. 24, 27 (Ct. App. 2006). In this case, Plaintiff knew of the trespass order preventing him from entering “any and all” Prisma properties well before he entered into the Settlement Agreement. (See generally Dkt. No. 15.) He also knew or should have known the impact the trespass order would have on his ability to work as a first responder. (Id.) Because Plaintiff knew or should have known of the alleged injuries underlying his current claims before the Settlement Agreement was executed, his claims are precluded by the release contained in the Settlement Agreement. (Dkt. No. 17-4.)
To the extent Plaintiff contends that he can maintain his claims against Defendant GHAPD even if his claims against Prisma are precluded by the Settlement Agreement, he is mistaken. Indeed, the Amended Complaint does not allege that GHAPD discriminated against Plaintiff on account of his disability. (See generally Dkt. No. 15.) In fact, the Amended Complaint does not even allege that GHAPD knew of Plaintiff's disability prior to serving him with the trespass order at issue. (Id.) As such, the Amended Complaint does not state a valid ADA claim against GHAPD. (Id.) Similarly, the Amended Complaint does not allege that GHAPD tortiously interfered with Plaintiff's health or business relations, nor that GHAPD intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon Plaintiff. (Id.) Rather, the Amended Complaint makes clear that Prisma was responsible for issuing the trespass notice about which Plaintiff complains; GHAPD merely served it on Plaintiff. (Id.)
To the extent Plaintiff claims that the Settlement Agreement should not be enforced since he signed it only “because he was not in a good position to pursue further action related to his employment discrimination due to both financial instability, and the worsening of his medical conditions as a direct result of Defendants' actions,” the undersigned finds this argument unconvincing. (Dkt. No. 23-1 at 10.) To the extent this statement can be construed as an allegation of fraud and misrepresentation, Plaintiff must present evidence to support this assertion. House v. Aiken Cnty. Nat. Bank, 956 F.Supp. 1284, 1290 (D.S.C.), aff'd, 103 F.3d 118 (4th Cir. 1996). However, Plaintiff fails to present any evidence demonstrating that he was induced to enter the Settlement Agreement because of fraud or misrepresentation. See id.; see also Reed v. Big Water Resort, LLC, No. 2:14-cv-1583-DCN-MGB, 2016 WL 7435620, at *11-12 (D.S.C. Apr. 5, 2016), adopted, 2016 WL 2935891 (D.S.C. May 20, 2016).
Plaintiff does not dispute that he signed the Settlement Agreement, nor does he dispute that he had a full and fair opportunity to review the Settlement Agreement before signing it. (See Dkt. No. 23-1); see also Burwell v. S.C. Nat. Bank, 288 S.C. 34, 39 (1986) (“One cannot complain of fraud and misrepresentation in the contents of a document if the truth could have been ascertained by reading it.”); Sydnor v. Conseco Fin. Servicing Corp., 252 F.3d 302, 306 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting that “an elementary principle of contract law is that a party signing a written contract has a duty to inform himself of its contents before executing it”). The terms of the Settlement Agreement are fair to Plaintiff and not one-sided, which indicates that Plaintiff was not fraudulently induced into signing it. (See generally Dkt. No. 17-4.) In fact, the record reflects that Plaintiff was represented by counsel leading up to settlement and was afforded an opportunity to consult with counsel before signing the Settlement Agreement. (Id.) These conditions do not suggest unfair bargaining power, as Plaintiff seems to contend.
To the extent Plaintiff claims that the Settlement Agreement is a “take-it-or-leave-it” contract of adhesion, the undersigned notes that Plaintiff was not required to sign the Settlement Agreement and could have proceeded with litigation. Even if the Settlement Agreement could be construed as a contract of adhesion, the terms of the Settlement Agreement are fair to Plaintiff, negating any inference of unconscionability. See Damico v. Lennar Carolinas, LLC, No. 2020-001048, 2022 WL 4231032, at *6 (S.C. Sept. 14, 2022) (“[A]dhesive contracts are not unconscionable in and of themselves so long as the terms are even-handed”) (emphasis in original)).
To the extent Plaintiff argues that the Settlement Agreement is unclear, overly broad and/or against public policy, these arguments also lack merit. The release provision of the Settlement Agreement plainly and succinctly describes the claims that Plaintiff is agreeing to release, and limits such claims to those accruing prior to the date of the agreement. See Fisher v. Stevens, 355 S.C. 290, 297 (Ct. App. 2003) (“An exculpatory agreement will be held to contravene public policy if it is so broad that it would absolve [the defendant] from any injury to the [plaintiff] for any reason.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). In other words, the release is not overly broad, ambiguous, or in violation of public policy. (Dkt. No. 17-4 at 3-4.)
Ultimately, the record reflects that the parties mutually agreed to fair and reasonable terms and conditions that are memorialized in the Settlement Agreement. Those terms and conditions include Plaintiff's release of the claims set forth in this civil action. (See Dkt. No. 17-4.) Plaintiff has simply presented no evidence to suggest fraud or misrepresentation and has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact about the validity, enforceability, and applicability of the Settlement Agreement. (See generally id.) Unfortunately for Plaintiff, “having second thoughts about the results of a settlement agreement does not justify setting aside an otherwise valid agreement.” Young v. F.D.I.C., 103 F.3d 1180, 1195 (4th Cir. 1997).
II. Statute of Limitations
Even if Plaintiff's claims were not precluded by the Settlement Agreement, the Amended Complaint should nonetheless be dismissed. Indeed, for the reasons set forth in greater detail below, Plaintiff's claims are time-barred. (See generally Dkt. No. 15.)
Because it is clear that Plaintiff's ADA claim is time-barred, the undersigned need not address Defendants' argument that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to bringing such claim. The undersigned does, however, note that Defendants' exhaustion argument is convincing for the reasons set forth in their briefings. (See generally Dkt. Nos. 17-1; 25.)
“Because . . . the ADA does not contain a statute of limitations, federal courts ‘borrow the state statute of limitations that applies to the most analogous state-law claim.'” Semenova v. Maryland Transit Admin., 845 F.3d 564, 567 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing A Soc'y Without A Name, 655 F.3d at 347). To determine the applicable statute of limitations for an ADA claim, the Fourth Circuit has instructed that a court should look to whether a state law provides a plaintiff with “the same rights and remedies.” See id. (declining to apply Maryland human rights law statute of limitations where it did not provide cause of action for discrimination in provision of public services).
Though Plaintiff contends that his ADA claim is one of disability discrimination in the provision of public services, the allegations in the Amended Complaint make clear that his ADA claim actually arises from his employment with Prisma. (See generally Dkt. No. 15; see also Dkt. No. 23-1 at 7.) When considering the statute of limitations for employment discrimination claims, this Court typically applies the statute of limitations set forth in the South Carolina Human Affairs Law, SC Code Ann. § 1-13-90(d)(6) (“SCHAL”). See Summerell v. Clemson Univ., No. 8:22-cv-00913-TMC-JDA, 2023 WL 7224206, at *2 (D.S.C. Feb. 10, 2023), adopted, 2023 WL 6457781 (D.S.C. Oct. 4, 2023) (noting that courts in this district have continued to apply the SCHAL's one-year statute of limitations in claims arising from employment relationships); see also McLeod v. Univ. of S.C., No. 3:21-cv-00202-SAL-PJG, 2021 WL 2827771, at *2 (D.S.C. Apr. 21, 2021) (“Because the [SCHAL] provides substantially the same rights and remedies as the Rehabilitation Act with respect to employment discrimination, it is the most analogous here.”), adopted, 2021 WL 2827368 (D.S.C. July 7, 2021); Gresham v. Arclabs, LLC, No. 9:19-cv-1237-RMG, 2019 WL 3020931, at *3 (D.S.C. July 10, 2019) (noting “cases apply[] the SCHAL statute of limitations in ADA and Rehabilitation Act employment discrimination cases, a type of discrimination specifically addressed by the South Carolina legislature in the SCHAL” and differentiating employment discrimination claims from other discrimination claims for statute of limitations purposes). The SCHAL recognizes causes of action for disability discrimination in limited circumstances-such as disability discrimination in employment, SC Code Ann. § 1-1380, and in conducting certain examinations or inquiries of a job applicant or employees, SC Code Ann. § 1-13-80-and applies to state agencies, departments, local subdivisions, employers, employment agencies, labor organizations, and local governmental bodies, SC Code Ann. § 1-13-90(c), (d). The SCHAL also contains a catch-all provision, SC Code Ann. § 1-13-90(e), covering complaints about “the existence or occurrence of a practice asserted to be discriminatory on the basis of . . . disability.” Thus, claims under the SCHAL are highly analogous to employment discrimination claims under the ADA.
Discrimination claims covered by the SCHAL are subject to, at most, a one-year statute of limitations. See S.C. Code Ann. § l-13-90(d)(6). Here, the allegedly discriminatory acts underlying Plaintiff's Amended Complaint happened in January of 2020. (See generally Dkt. Nos. 15, 23-1.) Plaintiff filed his original Complaint in July of 2023. (Dkt. Nos. 1-1.) Because Plaintiff filed the instant civil action well outside of the one-year statute of limitations applying to his claims, such claims are time-barred and should therefore be dismissed.
Even if the Court were to construe Plaintiff's ADA claim as one for disability discrimination in the provision of public services, it would still be time-barred. The statute of limitations for this type of ADA claim is three years, and Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit more than three years after Defendants' allegedly discriminatory acts. (See Dkt. Nos. 1-1, 15); see also Semenova v. Maryland Transit Administration, 845 F.3d 564, 566 (4th Cir. 2017) (holding that when a state's anti-discrimination statute “does not contain a cause of action for disability discrimination in the provision of public services, the closer state-law analog to [an ADA] claim is a general civil action”); see also Timpson by & through Timpson v. Anderson Cnty. Disabilities & Special Needs Bd., 31 F.4th 238, 250 (4th Cir. 2022) (explaining that three-year statute of limitations applied for disability discrimination in provision of public services claim in wake of Semenova).
Because it is clear that Plaintiff's state law claims are time-barred, the undersigned need not address Defendants' argument that Plaintiff fails to assert valid state law claims upon which relief may be granted. (See generally Dkt. No. 17-1.)
With respect to Plaintiff's state law claims, they are also barred by the applicable statute of limitations. (See generally Dkt. No. 15.) In South Carolina, tort and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims have, at most, a three-year statute of limitations. See S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-530; S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-110; see also Parkman v. Univ. of S.C., No. 01-1596, 2002 WL 1792098, at *11 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that under South Carolina law, a three-year statute of limitations governs intentional infliction of emotional distress claims).
The statute of limitations begins to run when a cause of action accrues, i.e., when it “reasonably ought to have been discovered.” Dean v. Ruscon Corp., 321 S.C. 360, 468 (1996). In other words, the statute begins to run when a plaintiff has notice that he might have a remedy for a harm. Id. “The injured party must act with some promptness where the facts and circumstances of an injury place a reasonable person of common knowledge and experience on notice that a claim against another party might exist.” Id.
As noted above, Plaintiff's claims relating to the trespass order accrued well before he entered into the Settlement Agreement; rather, such claims accrued when Plaintiff received notice of the trespass order in January of 2020. (See generally Dkt. No. 15.) At that time, Plaintiff knew or should have known that the trespass order would impact his ability to work as a first responder due to his inability to enter Prisma properties. (Id.) Again, he did not file the instant civil action until July of 2023. (Dkt. No. 1-1.) As such, his state law claims are time-barred.
C. Continuing Violation Doctrine
To the extent Plaintiff claims that his claims are not barred by the statute of limitations because the trespass order constitutes an ongoing or continuing discriminatory action, this argument is unconvincing. (Dkt. No. 23-1.) “The continuing-violation doctrine applies to claims based upon a defendant's ongoing policy or pattern of discrimination rather than discrete acts of discrimination.” Hill v. Hampstead Lester Morton Ct. Partners LP, 581 Fed.Appx. 178, 181 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing Holland v. Washington Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d 208, 219-20 (4th Cir. 2007); Williams v. Giant Food Inc., 370 F.3d 423, 429 (4th Cir. 2004)). “In general, to establish a continuing violation[,] the plaintiff must establish that the unconstitutional or illegal act was a fixed and continuing practice.” Nat'l Adver. Co. v. City of Raleigh, 947 F.2d 1158, 1166 (4th Cir. 1991) (brackets, ellipses, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). However, a “continuing violation is occasioned by continual unlawful acts, not continual ill effects from an original violation.” Id.; see also A Soc'y Without A Name, 655 F.3d at 348 (noting that “continual unlawful acts are distinguishable from the continuing ill effects of an original violation because the latter do not constitute a continuing violation”).
Here, the “continuing violation” about which Plaintiff complains is being unable to find work because he cannot enter Prisma properties. (See Dkt. Nos. 15, 23-1.) This is not a new or continuing violation, but rather a continued ill effect of Prisma issuing the trespass notice (which specifically stated that it would “remain in effect and [] not expire”) in the first instance. (See Dkt. Nos. 15, 23-1; see also Dkt. No. 17-2 at 3.) As such, the continuing violation doctrine is inapplicable and cannot save Plaintiff's claims. See Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 536 U.S. at 113 (“[D]iscrete discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred, even when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges.”).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative, Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Dkt. No. 17) be GRANTED.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court Post Office Box 835 Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).