We must follow the rule that "[w]hile the [trial] court may consider when and how the property was accumulated, it is not obligated to do so." Swenson v. Swenson, 85 S.D. 320, 324, 181 N.W.2d 864, 866 (1970). Further, defendant was permitted to retain all of the income-producing property.
Defendant contends that because little if any of the property that he now has an interest in was acquired during the duration of the marriage and because the bulk of his property consists of the inheritance from his father's estate, the award of fifteen percent is clearly excessive. Although it is true in Swenson v. Swenson, 85 S.D. 320, 181 N.W.2d 864, and De Witt v. De Witt, 86 S.D. 59, 191 N.W.2d 177, we pointed out that a substantial portion of the property owned by the defendants therein had been acquired by inheritance, we also pointed out in the Swenson case that "While the court may consider when and how the property was accumulated, it is not obligated to do so." 85 S.D. at 324, 181 N.W.2d at 866.
(Emphasis added.) This statute overruled Swenson v Swenson, 181 N.W.2d 864 (SD, 1970), which held that fault could be considered in property distribution. Virginia: See Marion v Marion, 11 Va. App. 659; 401 S.E.2d 432 (1991) (fault that has an economic effect upon the marital property or its value may be considered); Aster v Gross, 7 Va. App. 1; 371 S.E.2d 833 (1988) (although the Virginia property division statute provides that the court may take into account the circumstances and factors in bringing about the end of the marriage, the only fault that counts in equitable distribution is economic fault).
Apparently, Balvin v. Balvin, 301 N.W.2d 678 (S.D. 1981), instructs us that it is within the discretion of the trial court to include or not include property which was either inherited or brought into the marriage by one of the parties. In Buseman v. Buseman, 299 N.W.2d 807, 809-10 (S.D. 1980), this Court quoted a 1970 decision of ours, Swenson v. Swenson, 85 S.D. 320, 324, 181 N.W.2d 864, 866 (1970); therein, we stated: "We must follow the rule that `[w]hile the [trial] court may consider when and how the property was accumulated, it is not obligated to do so.'" (Brackets in original; emphasis supplied.)
When dividing property, trial courts may consider when and how property was acquired. Swenson v. Swenson, 85 S.D. 320, 181 N.W.2d 864 (1970). The trial court characterized all property that was not clearly owned by Douglas or Georgiana individually as ranch property.
" Kressly v. Kressly, 77 S.D. at 148, 87 N.W.2d at 603. A trial court is granted broad discretion in making a property division, Bolenbaugh v. Bolenbaugh, 1975, S.D., 237 N.W.2d 12; Pochop v. Pochop, 1975, S.D., 233 N.W.2d 806; Swenson v. Swenson, 1970, 85 S.D. 320, 181 N.W.2d 864, but must keep in mind these material factors. Tyler v. Tyler, S.D., 233 N.W.2d 804.
Peterson v. Peterson, 71 S.D. 314, 24 N.W.2d 35, 37; Meyer v. Meyer, 76 S.D. 268, 77 N.W.2d 559. The various factors which must be considered by the trial court in the making of an equitable division of the property are well settled and need not be repeated here. See Kressly v. Kressly, 77 S.D. 143, 87 N.W.2d 601; Peterson v. Peterson, supra; Swenson v. Swenson, 1970, 85 S.D. 320, 181 N.W.2d 864; Schroeder v. Schroeder, 74 S.D. 385, 53 N.W.2d 293; and Meyer v. Meyer, supra. In the present case, the divorce was granted to the defendant on her cross-complaint for an offense of the plaintiff.