Various state courts when considering similar problems of retroactivity of taxing statutes have reached substantially identical conclusions. Fullerton Oil Co. v. Johnson, 2 Cal.2d 162, 168, 39 P.2d 796; Sweetland v. Franchise Tax Board, 192 Cal.App.2d 316, 13 Cal.Rptr. 432; Norman v. Bradley, 173 Ga. 482, 160 S.E. 413; City National Bank v. State Tax Commission, 251 Iowa 603, 102 N.W.2d 381; Fidelity Columbia Trust Co. v. Reeves, 287 Ky. 522, 154 S.W.2d 337; Olvey v. Collector of Revenue, 233 La. 985, 99 So.2d 317. Thorpe v. Mahin, 43 Ill.2d 36, 250 N.E.2d 633, appears to have reached a contrary conclusion but the decision was based primarily on the court's interpretation of the Illinois statute — Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 120, art. 2 (1969) — which expressly provided that the tax should operate prospectively beginning August 1, 1969. A tax on realized capital gain does not operate in a retroactive manner merely because ascertainment of the amount of the gain is measured by the difference between the sale price received during the tax year and the taxpayer's basis which may have been established at some earlier time.
We cannot avoid the conclusion that the construction is sound — that the Oregon property was not "permitted to be received under [ORS 316.281] without the recognition of gain or loss," ORS 316.266 (8) (a), but, rather, that plaintiff acquired the property tax free because there was no statutory authority in Oregon to impose a tax. The only case with similar facts cited is Sweetland v. Franchise Tax Board, 192 Cal.App.2d 316, 13 Cal Rptr 432, which is, to some extent, relied on by the defendant. The case involved an exchange of corporate stock and the application of the Federal Internal Revenue statutes (which have been adopted in California by reference) to such an exchange made pursuant to a plan of corporate reorganization.