Sweet v. South Carolina Dept. of Corrections

202 Citing cases

  1. Nadeau v. Helgemoe

    423 F. Supp. 1250 (D.N.H. 1976)   Cited 14 times

    [A] preference for solitary confinement over the probability of death is not a real choice. Sweet v. South Carolina Dept. of Corrections, 529 F.2d 854, 868 (4th Cir. 1975) (Butzner, J., concurring).See also Breeden v. Jackson, 457 F.2d 578, 581-82 (4th Cir. 1972) (Craven, J., dissenting).

  2. Rivera v. Mathena

    No. 18-6615 (4th Cir. Nov. 19, 2019)   Cited 37 times
    Holding that the production of evidence that the plaintiff suffered emotional and mental deterioration, depression, low energy, difficulty sleeping, headaches, and loss of appetite is sufficient to support an Eighth Amendment claim

    Further, "the conditions of solitary or segregated confinement must be measured against what the Supreme Court has termed 'the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.'" Sweet v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 529 F.2d 854, 860 (4th Cir. 1975) (en banc) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)). To sustain an Eighth Amendment claim, a prisoner must show two things: 1) "the deprivation suffered or injury inflicted on the inmate was sufficiently serious (objective component)," and 2) "the prison official acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind (subjective component)."

  3. Dawson v. Kendrick

    527 F. Supp. 1252 (S.D.W. Va. 1981)   Cited 55 times
    Holding that prison violated female inmates' rights when it enabled male inmates and prison staff to peer into female inmates' cells and view them undressing or using toilets

    Prisoners have the right, secured by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, to be reasonably protected from the threat of violence and sexual assault. See Woodhous v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 487 F.2d 889, 890 (4th Cir. 1973); Sweet v. South Carolina Department of Corrections, 529 F.2d 854, 858 (4th Cir. 1975). Prisoners likewise have the right not to be subjected to the unreasonable threat of injury or death by fire.

  4. Thorpe v. Clarke

    37 F.4th 926 (4th Cir. 2022)   Cited 75 times
    Finding as part of a qualified immunity analysis that the plaintiffs' confinement in a step-down program run by the Virginia Department of Corrections impeded a constitutionally protected liberty interest

    Id. at 355. And the Court set its decision apart from earlier ones like Sweet v. South Carolina Department of Corrections , 529 F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1975), which it believed "lacked the benefit of the recent academic literature ... concerning the harmful psychological and emotional effects of prolonged solitary confinement." Porter , 923 F.3d at 358.

  5. Porter v. Clarke

    923 F.3d 348 (4th Cir. 2019)   Cited 163 times
    Holding that long-term solitary confinement might violate the Eighth Amendment when it imposes a " 'substantial risk' of serious psychological and emotional harm"

    Appellants’ Br. at 43–48. First, State Defendants maintain—and our colleague in dissent agrees—that the district court erred because this Court’s decisions in Sweet v. South Carolina Department of Correction , 529 F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1975) (en banc), and Mickle v. Moore , 174 F.3d 464 (4th Cir. 1999), upheld conditions of confinement that are "squarely analogous" to the challenged conditions on Virginia’s death row. Appellants’ Br. at 44.

  6. In re Long Term Administrative Segregation

    174 F.3d 464 (4th Cir. 1999)   Cited 266 times
    Holding that no violation of the Eighth Amendment was shown for conditions of confinement where inmates were confined to their cells for 23 hours per day without a radio or television, received "only five hours of exercise per week," and were not allowed to "participate in prison work, school, or study programs"

    These conditions are indeed restrictive, but the restrictive nature of high-security incarceration does not alone constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Sweet v. South Carolina Dep't of Corrections, 529 F.2d 854, 857 n. 1 (4th Cir. 1975) (en banc). To make out a violation of the Eighth Amendment, the inmates "must show both (1) a serious deprivation of a basic human need; and (2) deliberate indifference to prison conditions on the part of prison officials."

  7. Mitchell v. Rice

    954 F.2d 187 (4th Cir. 1992)   Cited 125 times
    Holding that qualified immunity is not appropriate because a reasonable official should have known that depriving an inmate of out of cell exercise for several months would violate the Eighth Amendment

    This Court has repeatedly stated that when reviewing Eighth Amendment claims, courts must consider the totality of the circumstances. Clay v. Miller, 626 F.2d 345, 347 (4th Cir. 1980); Kirby v. Blackledge, 530 F.2d 583, 587 (4th Cir. 1976); Sweet v. South Carolina Dept. of Corrections, 529 F.2d 854, 865 (4th Cir. 1975). "`Cruel and unusual punishment,' as used in the Eighth Amendment, . . . does not draw its meaning simply from the type of punishment or deprivation imposed; it is often intimately concerned with the time covered by the punishment or deprivation and the reasonable limits of prison supervision."

  8. Sheley v. Dugger

    833 F.2d 1420 (11th Cir. 1987)   Cited 107 times
    Holding that language in the Florida Administrative Code created a liberty interest for prisoners

    In reviewing the Eighth Amendment claims of prisoners confined in segregation, federal courts of appeals have recognized that the length of time in isolation is a factor which must be considered. See, e.g., Bono v. Saxbe, 620 F.2d 609, 614 (7th Cir. 1980); Sweet v. South Carolina Dept. of Corrections, 529 F.2d 854, 861 (4th Cir. 1975) (en banc); O'Brien v. Moriarty, 489 F.2d 941, 944 (1st Cir. 1974). As the First Circuit recently stated,

  9. Allgood v. Morris

    724 F.2d 1098 (4th Cir. 1984)   Cited 38 times
    Holding that deprivations involved by mere placement in segregation does not violate the Eighth Amendment

    In 1975, this Court sitting en banc reiterated that segregated confinement is not per se unconstitutional. Sweet v. South Carolina Department of Corrections, 529 F.2d 854, 860-62 (4th Cir. 1975). In Sweet, the plaintiff, who had requested that he be placed in segregated confinement, brought a civil rights action seeking additional privileges.

  10. Barrett v. Virginia

    689 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1982)   Cited 56 times
    Stating "how prison officials choose to organize their records is quintessentially an administrative matter in which the courts should not intervene"

    A restriction on prisoners' religious expression will not be deemed unconstitutional if the restriction is necessary to safeguard legitimate institutional and penological interests; moreover, correctional officials' appraisal of those interests command great deference on the part of the courts. See Sweet v. South Carolina Department of Corrections, 529 F.2d 854 (4 Cir. 1975) (en banc); cf. Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 128, 97 S.Ct. 2532, 2539, 53 L.Ed.2d 629 (1977) (rights of speech and association); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-05, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 1807, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974) (right to correspond with nonprisoners). But the determinations of prison officials of the need for restrictions are not dispositive; such restrictions are subject to judicial review and will be struck down where they are not "reasonably and substantially justified by considerations of prison discipline and order."