Opinion
Civil Action 1:20-cv-03318-CMA-SKC
07-08-2021
RENEE SWEET Plaintiff, v. DOUGLAS COUNTY, STATE OF COLORADO, and DOUGLAS COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, STATE OF COLORADO, Defendants.
RECOMMENDATION RE: DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT [#16]
S. KATO CREWS, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This matter arises from a Colorado state court action wherein Douglas County sought to enforce a zoning resolution against Plaintiff Renee Sweet (“enforcement action”). [#5 at ¶29.] In the enforcement action, Plaintiff filed her answer and a Motion for a More Definite Statement pursuant to Colo. R. Civ. P. 12(e), wherein she sought clarification on the legal differences between an ordinance and a resolution. [Id. at ¶ 10.] The trial court denied Plaintiff's Motion. [Id. at ¶11.] After attempting to research the answer herself, to no avail, she filed the present case seeking the same relief-an opinion or ruling from this court on the differences between resolutions and ordinances under Colorado law, and guidance regarding against whom they are enforceable. Although Plaintiff denies challenging the constitutionality of “adoption of Zoning by Resolution, ” she does argue the County's enforcement of the zoning resolution is an “end-run” around the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. [Id. at ¶¶23, 32.] In addition, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief staying the enforcement action. [Id. at p.13.]
The Court uses “[#]” to refer to specific docket entries in CM/ECF.
These facts are drawn from Plaintiff's Amended Complaint and are presumed true for the purpose of ruling on Defendants' Motion.
To the extent Plaintiff sought to stay the enforcement action at the trial court level, the bench trial occurred in March 2021, and therefore, the request is moot.
Defendant Douglas County seeks dismissal on the basis, inter alia, this Court should abstain pursuant to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). [#16.] District Judge Arguello referred the Motion to this Court for a recommendation. [#17.] The Court has considered the Motion, related briefing, and applicable case law. No. hearing is necessary. For the following reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS the Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED.
ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
Plaintiff proceeds pro se; thus, the Court liberally construes her pleadings. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). But the Court does not act as her advocate. Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
As courts of limited jurisdiction, federal courts must have a specific legal basis for their jurisdiction. See Morris v. City of Hobart, 39 F.3d 1105, 1111 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing Castaneda v. INS, 23 F.3d 1576, 1580 (10th Cir. 1994)). The determination of a court's subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law. Madsen v. U.S. ex rel. U.S. Army, Corps of Eng'rs, 841 F.2d 1011, 1012 (10th Cir. 1987). “A court lacking jurisdiction cannot render judgment but must dismiss the cause at any stage of the proceedings in which it becomes apparent that jurisdiction is lacking.” Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co., 495 F.2d 906, 909 (10th Cir. 1974). “The burden of establishing subject-matter jurisdiction is on the party asserting jurisdiction.” Montoya v. Chao, 296 F.3d 952, 955 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)).
B. Younger Abstention Doctrine
Younger and its progeny dictate that “federal courts not interfere with state court proceedings by granting equitable relief-such as injunctions of important state proceedings or declaratory judgments regarding constitutional issues in those proceedings-when such relief could adequately be sought before the state court.” Rienhardt v. Kelly, 164 F.3d 1296, 1302 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716 (1996)). Younger abstention applies when:
(1) there is an ongoing state criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding, (2) the state court provides an adequate forum to hear the claims raised in the federal complaint, and (3) the state proceedings involve important state interests, matters which traditionally look to state law for their resolution or implicate separately articulated state policies.Chapman v. Oklahoma, 472 F.3d 747, 749 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting Crown Point I, LLC v. Intermountain Rural Elec. Ass'n, 319 F.3d 1211, 1215 (10th Cir. 2003)). If those three conditions exist, “Younger abstention is non-discretionary and, absent extraordinary circumstances, a district court is required to abstain.” Id. (quoting Crown Point I, LLC, 319 F.3d at 1215). The Court concludes all three Younger conditions exist regarding the relief Plaintiff seeks.
1. Ongoing State Civil Action
The enforcement action proceeded to a bench trial on March 19, 2021, and the trial court entered a permanent injunction order against Plaintiff. [#24 at p.3; #24-1.] Plaintiff filed her Notice of Appeal with the Colorado Court of Appeals on May 12, 2021. [#24-1.] This Court has taken judicial notice of the appellate court's docket, and it is clear the appeal remains pending. See Colorado Court of Appeals Register of Actions, 2021CA671 (attached as Exhibit 1). Consequently, the Colorado enforcement action is ongoing for purposes of the Younger analysis. See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 14 n. 13 (1987) (a pending appeal before a state court indicated state proceedings were ongoing for Younger purposes).
A court may properly consider facts subject to judicial notice, state court pleadings, and matters of public record. Pace v. Swerdlow, 519 F.3d 1067, 1072 (10th Cir. 2008).
The Court also concludes the enforcement action is the type of proceeding to which the Younger abstention doctrine applies. See Hunter v. Hirsig, 660 Fed.Appx. 711, 715 (10th Cir. 2016) (the first Younger element involves two subparts: the proceedings must be ongoing and must be the type afforded Younger deference). “[T]he Supreme Court has held that Younger applies to ‘particular state civil proceedings that are akin to criminal prosecutions.'” Id. at 716 (quoting Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 69 (2013)). Civil proceedings akin to criminal prosecutions includes “civil enforcement proceedings, characteristically initiated to sanction the federal plaintiff, i.e., the party challenging the state action, for some wrongful act.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In addition, the Tenth Circuit has described these civil enforcement proceedings as those which are “coercive.” Planned Parenthood of Kan. v. Andersen, 882 F.3d 1205, 1222 (10th Cir. 2018). “Civil enforcement proceedings are coercive when the state initiates the proceedings and the target of those proceedings challenges them as unlawful in federal court.” Id.
In this case, Douglas County initiated the Colorado proceedings by filing a complaint against Plaintiff to enforce provisions of the County's zoning resolutions and to address zoning violations existing on Plaintiff's property. [#16-1.] This is a civil enforcement proceeding whereby the County seeks to enforce its zoning rules or laws against Plaintiff. As the named defendant in the enforcement action, Plaintiff's presence in the Colorado proceedings was mandatory. See Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian Schools, 477 U.S. 619 (1986) (where the state initiated an action against federal plaintiff for violations of a teacher's rights, the proceedings were mandatory). And it is this underlying civil enforcement action that Plaintiff challenges as unlawful in this federal case; therefore, the Court concludes the first element of the Younger doctrine is satisfied.
2. Adequate Forum
“Typically, a plaintiff has an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in state court unless state law clearly bars the interposition of the . . . constitutional claims.” Crown Point I, LLC v. Intermountain Rural Elec. Ass'n, 319 F.3d 1211, 1215 (10th Cir. 2003). The question is not whether the plaintiff did raise the federal claims in state court; rather the pertinent question is whether the federal claims “could have been raised in the pending state proceedings.” J.B. ex rel. Hart v. Valdez, 186 F.3d 1280, 1292 (10th Cir. 1999) (emphasis in original).
Due to the nature of the relief Plaintiff seeks-a “declaratory judgment”regarding enforcement of Douglas County's zoning resolution-the Court concludes Colorado state courts provide an adequate forum for Plaintiff's claims and her requested relief. As Plaintiff acknowledges, she initiated this case specifically seeking answers to questions already postured in the Colorado enforcement action. [#5 at ¶¶10-11.] In her Notice of Appeal to the Colorado Court of Appeals, Plaintiff raises the same arguments she asserts here-to wit, the zoning resolution is not enforceable against her. Furthermore, Plaintiff does not contend her federal claims were barred in the enforcement action. To be sure, she argues to the Colorado Court of Appeals that Douglas County's attempt to enforce the zoning resolution is a violation of her due process rights under the Constitution. [#24-1 at pp.7-10.] Accordingly, the Court concludes the second prong of the Younger doctrine is satisfied.
Under the Declaratory Judgment Act, a court “may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration ....” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). Although nominally a claim for declaratory judgment, Plaintiff seeks, at least in part, an impermissible advisory opinion. [See #5 at p.13.] Because the Court concludes Younger applies, it need not address this issue.
3. Important State Interests
“Matters relating to property law, land use, and zoning ordinances have frequently been held to be ‘important' state interests justifying Younger abstention.” Duran v. Doe, No. 1:11-CV-00279-MCA-KBM, 2012 WL 13001849, at *3 (D.N.M. Mar. 19, 2012) (quoting Laurel Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Wilson, 519 F.3d 156, 167 (4th Cir. 2008)). The Tenth Circuit has specifically concluded that “zoning and nuisance abatement issues are traditional state law matters that implicate important state interests.” Lambeth v. Miller, 363 Fed.Appx. 565, 568 (10th Cir. 2010); see also Guschke v. City of Oklahoma City, 763 F.2d 379, 384 (10th Cir. 1985) (“[T]he state's interest in zoning is great.”). The central question in this case is the enforceability of Douglas County's zoning laws, thus satisfying the third Younger factor.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court recommends finding the Younger abstention doctrine precludes this Court from addressing Plaintiffs claims for relief.6 The Court FURTHER RECOMMENDS the Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED and this case be dismissed.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2), the parties have fourteen (14) days after service of this recommendation to serve and file specific written objections to the above recommendation with the District Judge assigned to the case. A party may respond to another party's objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. The District Judge need not consider frivolous, conclusive, or general objections. A party's failure to file and serve such written, specific objections waives de novo review of the recommendation by the District Judge and waives appellate review of both factual and legal questions. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 148-53 (1985); Makin v. Colorado Dep't of Corrs., 183 F.3d 1205, 1210 (10th Cir. 1999); Talley v. Hesse, 91 F.3d 1411, 1412-13 (10th Cir. 1996).