Opinion
No. 1998 C.D. 2014
06-17-2015
William J. Sweeney, Jr. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, Appellant
BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE COVEY
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driving Licensing (DOT) appeals from the Lackawanna County Common Pleas Court's (trial court) October 15, 2014 order reversing DOT's order suspending William J. Sweeney, Jr.'s (Licensee) driving privileges. The sole issue before the Court is whether Licensee's violation of Section 13(a)(16) of The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act (Controlled Substance Act) requires a six-month suspension of Licensee's operating privilege. After review, we reverse.
Act of April 14, 1972, P.L. 233, as amended, 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16) (knowingly or intentionally possessing a controlled substance).
On June 13, 2014, DOT mailed Licensee a notification advising him that his operating privileges were being suspended for six months as a result of his conviction for violating Section 13(a)(16) of the Controlled Substance Act. Licensee appealed from the suspension to the trial court. On October 15, 2014, the trial court held a hearing, wherein, the Commonwealth presented Licensee's driving record, which contained a certified report of Licensee's conviction (DL-21D form) (Conviction Report). No other evidence was presented by either party at the hearing. By October 15, 2014 order, the trial court reversed DOT's order, finding that "a summary conviction of possession of a small amount of marijuana . . . does not appear to trigger [a] mandatory suspension . . . ." Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 54a. DOT appealed to this Court.
"This Court's scope of review is limited to determining whether the trial court committed an error of law or manifestly abused its discretion in reaching its decision." Dinsmore v. Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 932 A.2d 350, 353 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007).
DOT argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law in sustaining Licensee's appeal because DOT's unrebutted evidence established that Licensee was convicted of violating Section 13(a)(16) of the Controlled Substance Act. We agree.
By May 4, 2015 order, this Court precluded Licensee from filing a brief for violating this Court's previous order directing that he file a brief within a specified period of time.
Section 1532(c) of the Vehicle Code requires DOT to "suspend the operating privilege of any person upon receiving a certified record of the person's conviction of any offense involving the possession, sale, delivery, offering for sale, holding for sale or giving away of any controlled substance . . . ." 75 Pa.C.S. § 1532(c) (emphasis added). Licensee was convicted of violating Section 13 of the Controlled Substance Act, which provides in relevant part:
Section 1532(c)(1)(i) of the Vehicle Code provides that the period of suspension shall be: "For a first offense, a period of six months from the date of the suspension." 75 Pa.C.S. § 1532(c)(1)(i). --------
(a) The following acts and the causing thereof within the Commonwealth are hereby prohibited:
. . . .
(16) Knowingly or intentionally possessing a controlled or counterfeit substance by a person not registered under this act, or a practitioner not registered or licensed by the
appropriate State board, unless the substance was obtained directly from, or pursuant to, a valid prescription order or order of a practitioner, or except as otherwise authorized by this act.35 P.S. § 780-113. It is well established that
'[i]n a license suspension case, the only issues are whether the criminal court convicted the licensee, and whether [DOT] acted in accordance with applicable law.' Glidden v. Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 962 A.2d 9, 12 (Pa.[]Cmwlth.[]2008). [DOT] bears the initial burden to establish a prima facie case that a record of conviction supports a suspension.Rawson v. Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 99 A.3d 143, 147 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014).
[DOT] 'meets its burden by submitting into evidence its certified record of conviction demonstrating' the offense underlying the conviction. Gayman v. Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 65 A.3d 1041, 1044 (Pa.[]Cmwlth.[]2013). 'Upon this showing, the burden of proof then shifts to the licensee to present 'clear and convincing evidence' to rebut the presumption of correctness raised by [DOT's] certified records.' Id. (quoting Carter v. Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 838 A.2d 869, 872 (Pa.[]Cmwlth.[]2003)).Rawson, 99 A.3d at 150-51. In the instant case, DOT's submission of Licensee's Conviction Report which was admitted into evidence satisfied its burden of proof. Licensee presented no evidence.
It appears that the trial court reversed DOT's suspension because it surmised that Licensee was convicted of a summary offense since the Conviction Report was signed by a magisterial district judge, and Licensee stated that his conviction was for possession of a small amount of marijuana. However, the record evidence does not support the trial court's conclusion that Licensee was convicted of a summary offense, or that a summary conviction would require a different result. First, Section 1515 of the Judicial Code provides that district judges have jurisdiction to accept guilty pleas for misdemeanors under the Controlled Substance Act. 42 Pa.C.S. § 1515(a)(6). Second, Section 1532(c) of the Vehicle Code is silent as to the grading of the conviction. It only requires a conviction of an offense involving the possession of a controlled substance. Notwithstanding, Section 13(b) of the Controlled Substance Act provides: "Any person who violates . . . clauses . . . (15) through (20) . . . of subsection (a) shall be guilty of a misdemeanor[.]" 35 P.S. § 780-113(b). Lastly, Licensee did not present any evidence to rebut the presumption of correctness raised by the Conviction Report. Thus, in accordance with well-established law and precedent, we must reverse the trial court's order and reinstate DOT's six-month suspension of Licensee's operating privileges.
For all of the above reasons, the trial court's order is reversed.
/s/_________
ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
ORDER
AND NOW, this 17th day of June, 2015, the Lackawanna County Common Pleas Court's October 15, 2014 order is reversed.
/s/_________
ANNE E. COVEY, Judge