But just as "[g]eneral propositions do not decide concrete cases," Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting), "general denials" do not defeat motions for summary judgment. Sweats Fashions, Inc. v. Pannill Knitting Co., Inc., 833 F.2d 1560, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Nor can summary judgment be avoided by asserting an entirely new claim for relief. Because plaintiff does not contest defendant's interpretation of the contract or point out the existence of any genuine issue of material fact, the court will grant defendant's motion.
Saab cites a series of cases in this court stating the general rule that in responding to a motion for summary judgment, the "non-movant may not rest on its conclusory pleadings but, under Rule 56, must set out . . . what specific evidence could be offered at trial." Sweats Fashions, Inc. v. Pannill Knitting Co., Inc., 833 F.2d 1560, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1987); see also Crown Operations Int'l, Ltd. v. Solutia Inc., 289 F.3d 1367, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (stating that the "non-moving party must affirmatively demonstrate by specific factual allegations that a genuine issue of material fact exists for trial"). Based on Rule 56 and these and other authorities, Saab argues that "[b]ecause the Government failed to offer any evidence to rebut the mountain of evidence submitted with Saab's Motion for Summary Judgment, the lower court erred in not granting summary judgment to Saab."
A dispute is genuine only if, on the entirety of the record, a reasonable jury could resolve a factual matter in favor of the non-movant. Sweats Fashions v. Pannill Knitting Co., 833 F.2d 1560, 1562, 4 USPQ2d 1793, 1795 (Fed. Cir. 1987). The party opposing a motion for summary judgment must point to an evidentiary conflict created on the record at least by a counterstatement of facts set forth in detail in an affidavit by a knowledgeable affiant.
Cf. Sweats Fashions, Inc. v. Pannill Knitting Co., 833 F.2d 1560, 1565, 4 USPQ2d 1793, 1798 (Fed. Cir. 1987). As the Board noted below, Christman's prior use in U.S. commerce cannot be discounted solely because he was aware of appellant's use of the mark in Japan.
Upon review of Ullenberg's list of facts which it alleges are material, and in genuine dispute, we discern none that meets the standard of Rule 56. The issues Ullenberg raises are either immaterial because not necessary to decide the merits, see, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ("Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment."), or not genuinely disputed because Ullenberg did not provide sufficient, favorable, factual evidence or bases for factual inference upon which a jury might return a verdict for Ullenberg, the nonmoving party, id. at 248-49, 106 S.Ct. at 2510; Sweats Fashions, Inc. v. Pannill Knitting Co., 833 F.2d 1560, 1564, 4 USPQ2d 1793, 1795 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Accordingly, because there is no genuine issue of material fact, the question is whether JVC is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The recent trilogy of Supreme Court cases establishes that "[s]ummary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed 'to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.'" Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 327, 106 S.Ct. at 2555 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 1); see also Sweats Fashions, Inc. v. Pannill Knitting Co., 833 F.2d 1560, 1562, 4 USPQ2d 1793, 1795 (Fed. Cir. 1987). LAG makes much of a perceived "unfairness" in the grant of summary judgment against it in that summary judgment "precluded" LAG from trial procedures such as presenting its evidence by live witnesses and cross-examining witnesses of its opponent.
The court concluded that there was no objective evidence of nonobviousness sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. Sweats Fashions, Inc. v. Pannill Knitting Co., 833 F.2d 1560, 1562-63, 4 USPQ2d 1793, 1795-96 (Fed. Cir. 1987). The court then considered the claimed invention as a whole and found that all of the claims in the '635 patent would have been obvious to one having that level of skill in the art — considering the Springer article, the Allen and Westerfield article, and the Stalcup patent.
According to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) and (e), "[w]here a movant [for summary judgment] has supported its motion with affidavits or other evidence which, unopposed, would establish its right to judgment, the non-movant may not rest upon general denials in its pleadings or otherwise." Sweats Fashions v. Pannill Knitting Co., 833 F.2d 1560, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Instead, the burden is placed upon the non-movant to "proffer countervailing evidence sufficient to create a genuine factual dispute."
Such bald allegations do not suffice to create a genuine issue of material fact on a motion for summary judgment. See, e.g.,Sweats Fashions Inc. v. Pannill Knitting Co., 833 F.2d 1560, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (in opposing a motion for summary judgment, a nonmovant may not rest upon mere denials, "but must proffer countering evidence sufficient to create a genuine factual dispute.") The Government attempts to dismiss the timing device in Pop-Up Wackaroos as a mere "battery-saving feature."
Critically, "[s]ummary judgment need not be denied merely to satisfy a litigant's speculative hope of finding some evidence [through discovery] that might tend to support a complaint." Sweats Fashions, Inc. v. Pannill Knitting Co., Inc., 833 F.2d 1560, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (quoting Pure Gold, Inc. v. Syntex (U.S.A.), Inc., 739 F.2d 624, 627 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). "A party may not simply assert in its brief that discovery is necessary and thereby overturn summary judgment when it failed . . . to set out reasons for the need for discovery in an affidavit."