Opinion
No. 15-cv-0226 RB/SMV
05-14-2015
ALREE B. SWEAT III, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF LAS CRUCES, JAIME MONTOYA, MIRANDA BAKER, PAUL LUJAN, and FNU SANCHEZ, Defendants.
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Appointment of Counsel [Doc. 13], filed on May 11, 2015. Plaintiff is incarcerated and proceeding pro se in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. He reports that he has limited access to the law library, that he lacks knowledge of the law, and that his incarceration presents difficulties in litigating his claim. [Doc. 13] at 1.
However, United States District Courts lack the authority to appoint counsel to represent indigent prisoners in § 1983 cases. Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989). In certain exceptional circumstances, a court may request the voluntary assistance of counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). In deciding whether to request voluntary assistance of counsel, courts should consider "the merits of the litigant's claims, the nature of the factual issues raised in the claims, the litigant's ability to present his claims, and the complexity of the legal issues raised by the claims." Rucks v. Boergermann, 57 F.3d 978, 979 (10th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). Ultimately, the burden is on the plaintiff "to convince the court that there is sufficient merit to his claim to warrant [a request for voluntary assistance] of counsel." Hill v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 393 F.3d 1111, 1115 (10th Cir 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Court is not convinced that there is sufficient merit or complexity in Plaintiff's claims to warrant requesting the voluntary assistance of counsel. Moreover, thus far, Plaintiff has been adequately presenting his claims.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Plaintiff's Motion for Appointment of Counsel [Doc. 13] is DENIED at this time;
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ _________
STEPHAN M. VIDMAR
United States Magistrate Judge