There is no genuine dispute that California would give preclusive effect to the judgment of the Civil Service Commission had Miller brought his § 1983 action in state court. In Swartzendruber v. City of San Diego, 3 Cal.App.4th 896, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 64, 71 (1992), the court gave preclusive effect to the unreviewed findings of the City Civil Service Commission. The facts are remarkably similar to the facts here.
(3b) Plaintiffs contend this doctrine may not be invoked, because their action is under the federal Civil Rights Act; they are wrong. In Swartzendruber v. City of San Diego (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 896 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 64], a discharged police officer brought an action against her former employer for various torts and for violation of the federal Civil Rights Act. She had failed to pursue administrative mandamus under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 to set aside the decision of the city civil service commission upholding her discharge.
In determining the primary right, "the significant factor is the harm suffered." Swartzendruber v. City of San Diego, 3 Cal.App.4th 896, 904 (1992), disapproved on other grounds by Johnson v. City of Loma Linda, 24 Cal.4th 61, 72 (2000). Defendants contend that "California appellate courts have expressly held that an unreviewed administrative decision is binding so as to preclude the plaintiff from later filing a § 1983 claims [sic] arising from the same facts."
Therefore, George contends that the doctrine of res judicata does not bar her FEHA claim because the primary right involved is different. (See Swartzendruber v. City of San Diego (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 896, 904 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 64] [scope of cause of action determined by primary-rights theory], disapproved on other grounds in Johnson v. City of Loma Linda (2000) 24 Cal.4th 61, 72 [ 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 316, 5 P.3d 874].) A motion for summary judgment raises only questions of law. Consequently, on review, we must conduct an independent review of the legal questions raised.
And when administrative proceedings satisfy those requirements, the parties are bound by collateral estoppel and res judicata to the results of “the issues litigated.” Miller, 39 F.3d at 1034 (citing Swartzendruber v. City of San Diego, 3 Cal.App.4th 896, 908 (1992), disapproved of on other grounds by Johnson v. City of Loma Linda, 24 Cal.4th 61, 5 P.3d 874, 881 (2000)).
In other words, the harm for which the MSJ Plaintiffs seek redress for here is identical to the harm at issue in the underlying administrative proceedings—loss of employment. See Eaton, 2012 WL 1669680, at *6 (finding a prior arbitrator's decision barred the plaintiff's § 1983 action based on the Equal Protection Clause because "[w]hile [the] [p]laintiff has presented the court with a new theory for recovery by invoking the equal protection clause and [§] 1983, he has not alleged a new harm," and "[a]s such, California's doctrine of res judicata precludes [the] [p]laintiff's present [§] 1983 action"); Miller, 39 F.3d at 1034-35 (finding that an agency's decision to sustain the County Sheriff's Department's termination of the plaintiff precluded the plaintiff's § 1983 action because the plaintiff only restated his wrongful termination contentions in constitutional terms); Swartzendruber v. City of San Diego, 3 Cal. App. 4th 896, 908 (Ct. App. 1992) (giving preclusive effect to the unreviewed findings of an administrative agency upholding the plaintiff's termination for disobeying a direct order to appear to work in a uniform because the plaintiff's allegations of federal civil rights violations only restated her cause of action for wrongful termination in constitutional terms and finding that the same primary right—the right to continued employment—was at stake in both actions). Plaintiffs also contend there was "no room for litigation of any constitutional retaliation claim" in the administrative appeals.
Id. Relying on Swartzendruber v. City of San Diego, 3 Cal.App.4th 896, 908, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 64 (Cal.App. 4 Dist. 1992), defendants argue that since Miller failed to seek writ review of the Commission's determination in state court, pursuant to Cal. Civ. Pro. Code Section 1094.5 ("Section 1094.5"), that determination is binding on the parties. Swartzendruber follows a well established line of California Supreme Court cases and is fully applicable here.
The policy against vexatious litigation favors applying issue preclusion here because Castillo had an adequate opportunity at the administrative hearing to prove that his discharge was wrongful, and because a single interest is being protected by both the administrative and present proceedings. Castillo argues that, under Swartzendruber v. City of San Diego (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 896, he may bring a claim under the FEHA without overturning the administrative finding against him. ( Id. at p. 910, disapproved in Johnson v. City of Loma Linda, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 72.)
Gales moved for summary adjudication of issues as to each of the affirmative defenses asserted by the defendants. The superior court denied the motion, and then, relying on Swartzendruber v. City of San Diego (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 896, 903 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 64], held that Gales's "failure to file a petition for writ of mandamus [pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5] challenging the City's decision to demote him from lieutenant to sergeant is fatal to his lawsuit for damages." This petition for writ of mandate followed.
Moreover, Ninth Circuit and California decisions both before and after Brosterhous have refuted the proposition that California administrative decisions are not given preclusive effect in § 1983 suits. See, e.g., San Remo Hotel v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 145 F.3d 1095, 1103 (9th Cir. 1998); Swartzendruber v. City of San Diego, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 64, 71-72 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992), disapproved on other grounds in Johnson v. City of Loma Linda, 5 P.3d 874 (Cal. 2000). The district court did not err by giving preclusive effect to the administrative decisions in Appellants' § 1983 case.