Opinion
IP 01-1150-C-T/K
December 6, 2001
B Derrick D Eley Attorney at Law, Indianapolis, IN.
Adrian Mendoza Kane Abbott Ltd, Chicago, IL.
Though this Entry is a matter of public record and is being made available to the public on the court's web site, it is not intended for commercial publication either electronically or in paper form. The reason for this caveat is to avoid adding to the research burden faced by litigants and courts. Under the law of the case doctrine, the ruling or rulings in this Entry will govern the case presently before this court. See, e.g., Trs. of Pension, Welfare, Vacation Fringe Benefit Funds of IBEW Local 701 v. Pyramid Elec., 223 F.3d 459, 468 n. 4 (7th Cir. 2000); Avitia v. Metro. Club of Chicago, Inc., 49 F.3d 1219, 1227 (7th Cir. 1995). However, a district judge's decision has no precedential authority and, therefore, is not binding on other courts, on other judges in this district, or even on other cases before the same judge. See, e.g., Howard v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 160 F.3d 358, 359 (7th Cir. 1998) ("a district court's decision does not have precedential authority"); Malabarba v. Chicago Tribune Co., 149 F.3d 690, 697 (7th Cir. 1998) ("district court opinions are of little or no authoritative value"); United States v. Articles of Drug Consisting of 203 Paper Bags, 818 F.2d 569, 571 (7th Cir. 1987) ("A single district court decision . . . has little precedential effect. It is not binding on the circuit, or even on other district judges in the same district."). Consequently, though this Entry correctly disposes of the legal issues addressed, this court does not consider the discussion to be sufficiently novel or instructive to justify commercial publication of the Entry or the subsequent citation of it in other proceedings.
The Plaintiffs sued the Defendants under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging claims arising out of an incident at the Defendant Pizza King's restaurant on or about July 5, 1999. The Plaintiffs allege that they were patrons of the restaurant and were subject to harassment and denied services and public accommodation by Defendant Pizza King and its employee because of their sex and race.
On August 23, 2001, Defendants filed their motion to dismiss, seeking dismissal of Plaintiffs' Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(c). Because neither the motion nor the supporting memorandum contains a certificate of service as required, the court on October 31, 2001, ordered the Defendants to serve the motion and supporting memorandum no later than November 9, 2001, and to file a certificate of service with the court by that date, and allowed the Plaintiffs until November 30, 2001, to respond. (Sched. Ord., dated 10/31/01 at 2.) The Defendants filed their Certificate Of Service on November 7, 2001, indicating that their motion to dismiss and supporting memorandum were served on Plaintiffs' counsel by United States mail on November 6, 2001. As of this date, December 6, 2001, the Plaintiffs have not responded to the Defendants' motion, and the motion is subject to summary ruling. See S.D. Ind. L.R. 7.1(a).
Discussion
The Defendants contend that the Plaintiffs' Complaint should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Capitol Leasing Co. v. FDIC, 999 F.2d 188, 191 (7th Cir. 1993). The court, however, "may properly look beyond the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint and view whatever evidence has been submitted on the issue to determine whether in fact subject matter jurisdiction exists." Id. The Defendants contend that Plaintiff Renee Swarn's claims are barred because she entered into a release and settlement agreement with Defendant Pizza King relative to the events and transactions that serve as the basis for her claims. The Defendants also contend that the claims of Plaintiffs John Doe, Lila Unknown, and Leslie Robin Johnson, are barred because the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over their claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(c).
As for the first contention, the Defendants have submitted a Complaint of Discrimination filed by Ms. Swarn with the Indiana Civil Rights Commission ("ICRC"), No. PAra20010004, against Pizza King. (Defs.' Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss, Ex. C.) The Complaint of Discrimination alleges public accommodation discrimination based on race occurring on July 5, 1999. (Id.) On or about December 5, 2000, Ms. Swarn executed a Mediation Agreement, which was executed by an authorized representative of Pizza King and the Alternative Dispute Resolution Director for the ICRC. (Id., Ex. D.) The parties agreed to full settlement of the matter raised by the Complaint of Discrimination. Ms. Swarn agreed that the Agreement "shall constitute her withdrawal, with prejudice, of this complaint and any complaint filed with any other anti-discrimination agency, which involves the events and transactions at issue in this complaint." (Id. at 2.) On February 14, 2001, the Director of the ICRC entered a dismissal of Complaint No. PAra20010004 pursuant to the settlement agreement.
The Agreement is signed by "Renee Swarn". The court, therefore, has corrected the typographical error in the caption of the Complaint which misspelled this Plaintiff's first name as "Rennee." From this point on, the caption in this case shall reflect the correct spelling.
Therefore, the court concludes that Ms. Swarn's Complaint should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Defendants next argue that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claims of Plaintiffs, John Doe, Lila Unknown, and Leslie Robin Johnson, because they have not complied with the notice requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(c). That statute provides in pertinent part:
The Defendants' motion to dismiss does not seek dismissal of the Complaint of Plaintiff, Rachelle Swarn, and the court has no information regarding her compliance or noncompliance with § 2000a-3(c).
In the case of an alleged act or practice prohibited by this subchapter which occurs in a State . . . which has a State . . . law prohibiting such act or practice and establishing or authorizing a State . . . authority to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof, no civil action may be brought under subsection (a) of this section before the expiration of thirty days after written notice of such alleged act or practice has been given to the appropriate State . . . authority. . . .42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(c). The Seventh Circuit has held that "[t]he requirements of Section 2000a-3(c) are jurisdictional and, unless those requirements are met, the federal courts do not have jurisdiction to decide the dispute." Stearnes v. Baur's Opera House, Inc., 3 F.3d 1142, 1144 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding plaintiff's failure to notify state authority authorized to grant or seek relief for an alleged violation of Title II before filing complaint in federal court barred plaintiff's claim); accord Hill v. Shell Oil Co., 78 F. Supp.2d 764, 769 (N.D.Ill. 1999) ("Because the requirements of § 2000a-3(c) are jurisdictional, failure on the part of plaintiffs to satisfy the 30-day state notice rule would warrant dismissal of their Title II claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction."). Plaintiffs, John Doe, Lila Unknown, and Leslie Robin Johnson, do not contest the Defendants' assertion that they failed to give written notice to the ICRC thirty days before filing their Complaint in this case. This failure deprives this court of subject matter jurisdiction to hear their claims.
Accordingly, the Defendants' motion to dismiss will be GRANTED.
Conclusion The court finds that the Defendants' motion to dismiss should be GRANTED and the Complaint of Plaintiffs, Rene Swarn, John Doe, Lila Unknown, and Leslie Robin Johnson, will be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
The Defendants seek dismissal with prejudice. However, a dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) is not a decision on the merits and thus is a dismissal without prejudice. See, e.g., Leaf v. Supreme Court of State of Wis., 979 F.2d 589, 595 (7th Cir. 1992).
The Defendants' motion to dismiss does not seek dismissal of the Complaint of Plaintiff, Rachelle Swarn, and the court has no information regarding her compliance or noncompliance with 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(c). The Defendants are reminded that pursuant to this court's Scheduling Order of October 31, 2001, they have until December 31, 2001, within which to file motions under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b).
The court, finding no just reason for delay, pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, directs entry of an Order of Dismissal, dismissing with prejudice the Complaint of Plaintiffs, Renee Swarn, John Doe, Lila Unknown, and Leslie Robin Johnson.
ALL OF WHICH IS ORDERED this 6th day of December 2001.