Swarey v. Desert Capital Reit, Inc.

12 Citing cases

  1. AMA Sys. v. 3B Tech.

    1:21-cv-01472-JRR (D. Md. Nov. 9, 2023)

    “The Fourth Circuit ‘has construed Section 1965(d) as authoriz[ing] nationwide service of process and, thus, the exercise of personal jurisdiction in any district court,' subject to due process considerations under the Fifth Amendment.” Becker v. Noe, No. ELH-18-00931, 2019 WL 1415483, at *17 (D. Md. Mar. 27, 2019) (quoting Swarey v. Desert Capital REIT, Inc., No. DKC 11-3615, 2012 WL 4208057, at *7 (D. Md. Sept. 20, 2012)).

  2. Waller v. Nelson

    4:22-cv-00120 (W.D. Va. Jun. 21, 2023)

    “Some [RICO] claims may be so ‘implausible, insubstantial, or frivolous' that they fail to state a ‘colorable' RICO claim.” Nunes v. Fusion GPS, 531 F.Supp.3d 993, 1003 (E.D. Va. 2021) (quoting D'Addario v. Geller, 264 F.Supp.2d 367, 388 (E.D. Va. 2003)). “In assessing whether a claim is colorable, courts look to whether a plaintiff pleads a RICO violation by alleging (1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity, as well as (5) injury in the plaintiff's business or property (6) by reason of the RICO violation.” Swarey v. Desert Cap. REIT, Inc., No. CIV.A. DKC 11-3615, 2012 WL 4208057, at *8 (D. Md. Sept. 20, 2012) (cleaned up). Plaintiffs fall woefully short of stating a plausible RICO claim.

  3. Hardwire, LLC v. Ebaugh

    Civil JKB-20-0304 (D. Md. Aug. 26, 2021)   Cited 6 times

    18 U.S.C. § 1965(d). The Fourth Circuit interprets § 1965(d) to '"authorize nationwide service of process and, thus, the exercise of personal jurisdiction in any district court,' subject to due process considerations under the Fifth Amendment."Becker v. Noe, Civ. No. ELH-18-0931, 2019 WL 1415483, at *17 (D. Md. Mar. 27, 2019) (quoting Swarey v. Desert Capital REIT, Inc., Civ. No. DKC-11-3615, 2012 WL 4208057, at *7 (D. Md. Sept. 20, 2012)). There is a circuit split with respect to which provision of § 1965 authorizes nationwide service of process.

  4. Bhambhani v. Innovative Health Sols.

    Civ. Action RDB-19-0355 (D. Md. Aug. 3, 2021)

    As Judge Chasanow of this Court has explained, RICO provides a basis for exercising personal jurisdiction over a defendant as to RICO claims, therefore making it permissible to assert pendent personal jurisdiction over a RICO defendant as to a plaintiff's state law claims. See Swarey v. Desert Capital REIT, Inc., No. DKC-11-3615, 2012 WL 4208057, at *7-*8 (D. Md. Sept. 22, 2012). Therefore, if the Plaintiffs have sufficiently stated a claim against Kuhlman in Counts One and Two which allege civil RICO violations, this Court may exercise pendent personal jurisdiction over Defendant Kuhlman, and an analysis of his contacts with the State of Maryland is unnecessary.

  5. Tessemae's, LLC v. McDevitt

    Civil Action No. GLR-20-2013 (D. Md. Mar. 31, 2021)

    Such an allegation requires a plaintiff to plead facts showing: "1) conduct; 2) of an enterprise; 3) through a pattern; 4) of racketeering activity." Swarey v. Desert Capital REIT, Inc., No. DKC-11-3615, 2012 WL 4208057, at *11 (D.Md. Sept. 20, 2012) (quoting Morley v. Cohen, 888 F.2d 1006, 1009 (4th Cir. 1989)). Section 1962(b) of RICO further requires a showing that the defendant: (1) acquired or maintained; (2) through a pattern of racketeering activity; (3) interest in or control of; (4) any enterprise; (5) engaged in interstate commerce.

  6. RX Trials, LLC v. Coastal Biomedical Research, Inc.

    Case No. 1:18-cv-02289-JMC (D. Md. Aug. 26, 2019)

    To establish a pattern of racketeering activity Plaintiff must show: "(1) at least two predicate acts occurred within ten years of each other; (2) the predicate acts were related; and (3) the acts ' amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity.'" Swarey v. Desert Capital REIT, Inc., 2012 WL 4208057, at *12 (D. Md. Sept. 20, 2012) (quoting H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989)). Acts are related if they "have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events."

  7. Terry v. Swift Transp.

    1:16cv256 (M.D.N.C. Sep. 22, 2017)   Cited 3 times
    Excusing untimeliness of answer to amended complaint filed seven days past deadline when there had been no request for entry of default

    Under these circumstances, the third Payne factor supports setting aside any default otherwise entered. See Swarey v. Desert Capital REIT, Inc., Civil Action No. DKC 11-3615, 2012 WL 4208057 (D. Md. Sep. 20, 2012) (finding that the third Payne factor weighed in favor of setting aside default where plaintiff did not offer evidence of defendants' personal culpability for delayed response).

  8. Crussiah v. Attia

    Civil Action No. PX 15-2516 (D. Md. Jul. 26, 2016)   Cited 1 times
    Granting motion to dismiss where plaintiff brought § 1983 claims against private physicians who shared a close nexus with hospitals that received government funding

    The Court, therefore, sua sponte dismisses Counts 10 through 27 of Plaintiff's Complaint. See Swarey v. Desert Capital REIT, Inc., No. DKC 11-3615, 2012 WL 4208057, at *15 (D. Md. Sept. 20, 2012) (dismissing plaintiff's RICO claims sua sponte because plaintiff could not satisfy all of the elements of a RICO claim with respect to the silent defendants); see also Carson v. NCOP Acad. for Paralegals, No. WN-94-2263, 1995 WL 819050, at *1 (D. Md. Feb. 21, 1995) (dismissing claims sua sponte on a 12(b)(6) motion "where [the] plaintiff cannot be possibly awarded relief"); Smith v. Heshmat, No. PWG-14-679, 2015 WL 926027, at *3 (D. Md. Mar. 3, 2015) (dismissing a § 1983 claim sua sponte). Although Dr. Macarthy appears to have been served, ECF No. 10, he has neither answered the complaint nor otherwise responded.

  9. Cohen v. Ins. Consultants, Inc.

    CIVIL NO.: WDQ-14-0768 (D. Md. Feb. 25, 2015)   Cited 3 times

    Cohen's RICO claims lack any merit. "To state a claim for a substantive violation of RICO, the complaint must set forth facts that, if proven, would establish: '(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity.'" Swarey v. Desert Capital REIT, Inc., No. DKC 11-3615, 2012 WL 4208057, at *11 (D. Md. Sept. 20, 2012) (quoting Morley v. Cohen, 888 F.2d 1006, 1009 (4th Cir. 1989)). In relation to his RICO claim, Cohen only states that "[t]he Defendants through their conduct detailed above and below conspired, conducted, and participated, directly and indirectly, in the conduct of the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity . . . ."

  10. Wallace v. Trost

    Civil Action No. DKC 13-3473 (D. Md. Sep. 4, 2014)   Cited 5 times
    Dismissing claims against four defendants who did not move to dismiss because the claims were identical with respect to all defendants

    The court will sua sponte dismiss the case as to all of the remaining Defendants. See Swarey v. Desert Capital REIT, Inc., Civ. Action No. DKC 11-3615, 2010 WL 4208057, at *15 (D.Md. Sept. 20, 2012) (sua sponte dismissing civil RICO count as to defendants who did not move for dismissal because plaintiffs' allegations in support of their RICO count was identical as to all of the defendants); Hawkins v. Chick, No. DKC 09-0661, 2009 WL 4017953, at *6-7 (D.Md. Nov. 19, 2009) (dismissing RICO claims sua sponte as to all defendants, including those who had not affirmatively sought such relief, where the plaintiff failed to allege a necessary element of a RICO violation); Chong Su Yi v. Social Sec. Admin., 554 F.App'x 247, 248 (4th Cir. 2014) ("[F]rivolous complaints are subject to dismissal pursuant to the inherent authority of the court, even when the filing fee has been paid."); Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 307-08 (1989) ("Section 1915(d) . . . authorizes courts to dismiss a 'frivolous or malicious' action, but there is little doubt they would have power to do so even in the absence of this statutory provision."). D. Plaintiff's Motions