[¶ 12] "A party's status as a good faith purchaser without notice of a competing interest is a mixed question of fact and law." Swanson v. Swanson, 2011 ND 74, ¶ 9, 796 N.W.2d 614 (quoting Diocese of Bismarck Trust v. Ramada, Inc., 553 N.W.2d 760, 768 (N.D. 1996) ). This Court has determined the facts "necessary to determine whether a party has attained the status of a good-faith purchaser without notice constitute findings of fact.

A purchaser who fails to make the requisite inquiry cannot claim good-faith purchaser status and will be charged with constructive notice of all facts that the inquiry would have revealed. SeeSwanson v. Swanson , 2011 ND 74, ¶ 10, 796 N.W.2d 614. Purchasers of property are charged with constructive notice of the contents of duly recorded documents. SeeBakken v. Duchscher , 2013 ND 33, ¶ 15, 827 N.W.2d 17.

“[A] good faith purchaser must acquire rights without actual or constructive notice of another's rights.” Farmers Union Oil Co. of Garrison v. Smetana, 2009 ND 74, ¶ 16, 764 N.W.2d 665 (quoting Diocese of Bismarck Trust v. Ramada, Inc., 553 N.W.2d 760, 768 (N.D.1996)); see also Swanson v. Swanson, 2011 ND 74, ¶ 9, 796 N.W.2d 614. Actual notice is express information of a fact, N.D.C.C. § 1–01–23, and constructive notice is notice imputed by the law to a person who does not have actual notice, N.D.C.C. § 1–01–24. “Every person who has actual notice of circumstances sufficient to put a prudent person upon inquiry as to a particular fact and who omits to make such inquiry with reasonable diligence is deemed to have constructive notice of the fact itself.”

[¶15] "North Dakota uses a tract index system for recording real estate transactions, which makes all instruments easily accessible by focusing on the tract of land in question, rather than on the grantor or grantee of the land." Swanson v. Swanson, 2011 ND 74, ¶ 15, 796 N.W.2d 614. A tract index lists each recorded transaction related to each tract or specified parcel of land.

"This Court has 'consistently held that a purchaser who fails to make the requisite inquiry cannot claim the protection of a good-faith purchaser status' under N.D.C.C. § 47-19-41." Desert Partners IV, L.P. v. Benson, 2016 ND 37, ¶ 14, 875 N.W.2d 510 (quoting Swanson v. Swanson, 2011 ND 74, ¶ 10, 796 N.W.2d 614). "Rather, a person who fails to make the proper inquiry will be charged with constructive notice of all facts that such inquiry would have revealed."

On the other hand, a trial court’s ultimate determination a party acted in good faith constitutes a conclusion of law." Swanson v. Swanson , 2011 ND 74, ¶ 9, 796 N.W.2d 614 (citations omitted). "A good-faith purchaser must acquire rights without actual or constructive notice of another’s rights.

[¶ 14] This Court has “consistently held that a purchaser who fails to make the requisite inquiry cannot claim the protection of a good-faith purchaser status” under N.D.C.C. § 47–19–41. Swanson v. Swanson, 2011 ND 74, ¶ 10, 796 N.W.2d 614. “Rather, a person who fails to make the proper inquiry will be charged with constructive notice of all facts that such inquiry would have revealed.” Id.

Neither the district court nor Sall has relied upon laches to support the court's denial of all claims more than two years old. Furthermore, “laches does not arise from a delay or lapse of time alone, but is a delay in enforcing one's rights which works a disadvantage to another.” Schmidt v. Schmidt, 540 N.W.2d 605, 608 (N.D.1995); see also Swanson v. Swanson, 2011 ND 74, ¶ 24, 796 N.W.2d 614; VND, LLC v. Leevers Foods, Inc., 2003 ND 198, ¶ 45, 672 N.W.2d 445. The party invoking laches has the burden of proving he was prejudiced because his position has become so changed during the delay that he cannot be restored to the status quo. Schmidt, at 608. Sall has not argued that he was prejudiced by a change in his position during the delay in this case.

Neither the district court nor Sail has relied upon laches to support the court's denial of all claims more than two years old. Furthermore, "laches does not arise from a delay or lapse of time alone, but is a delay in enforcing one's rights which works a disadvantage to another." Schmidt v. Schmidt, 540 N.W.2d 605, 608 (N.D. 1995); see also Swanson v. Swanson, 2011 ND 74, ¶ 24, 796 N.W.2d 614; VND, LLC v. Leevers Foods, Inc., 2003 ND 198, ¶ 45, 672 N.W.2d 445. The party invoking laches has the burden of proving he was prejudiced because his position has become so changed during the delay that he cannot be restored to the status quo. Schmidt, at 608. Sail has not argued that he was prejudiced by a change in his position during the delay in this case.

" Id. A purchaser may qualify under the bona fide purchaser rule even though he does not pay the full market value for the property, if the consideration paid is reasonably adequate. See id., citing Alexander v. Andrews, 135 W.Va. 403, 413-414 (1951); see also Swanson v. Swanson, 796 N.W.2d 614, 633 (N.D. 2011). Plaintiff testified that she gave Tafaro an $81,495 loan in exchange for both a promissory note to repay the loan and a life insurance policy to secure the note.