urt of Honor v. Hutchens, Ind. App., 79 N.E. 409; Johnson v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 224 Iowa 797, 276 N.W. 595; Myers v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., 124 Kan. 191, 257 P. 933, 55 A.L.R. 542; Vance v. Life Casualty Ins. Co., 184 Miss. 604, 186 So. 647; Stean v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 24 N.M. 346, 171 P. 786; Woodbery v. New York Life Ins. Co., 129 Misc. 365, 221 N.Y.S. 357; Wechsler v. New York Life Ins. Co., 147 Misc. 8, 262 N.Y.S. 196; Bankers Life Co. of Des Moines, Iowa, v. Horton, 189 Okla. 591, 118 P.2d 402; Hall v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, 19 Pa. Super. 31; Perilstein v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 345 Pa. 604, 29 A.2d 487; Childress v. Fraternal Union of America, 113 Tenn. 252, 82 S.W.2d 832; Scales v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 155 Tenn. 412, 295 S.W. 58, 55 A.L.R. 537; Carothers v. Atlanta Life Ins. Co., 178 Tenn. 485, 159 S.W.2d 830; Howard et al. v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., Tex.Civ.App., 289 S.W. 114; Southwestern Life Ins. Co. v. Houston, Tex.Civ.App., 121 S.W.2d 619; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Newport, 1 Wn.2d 511, 96 P.2d 449. In this same connection, plaintiff relies on contra cases which hold that after the contestable period has run, the incontestable clause prevents a defense of denial of suicide coverage.
The incontestability clause should not be applied to change the meaning of the terms of the policy or to enlarge its coverage. Southwestern Life Ins. Co. v. Houston, 121 S.W.2d 619 (Tex.Civ.App. 1938, writ ref'd); Great American Reserve Ins. Co. v. Fry, 418 S.W.2d 716 (Tex.Civ.App. 1967, n.r.e.); Fisher v. United States Life Ins. Co. in City of N.Y., 249 F.2d 879 (4th Cir. 1957). Whatever might have been the effect of the incontestability provisions if the policies issued by Minnesota Mutual had excluded coverage at the time of their issuance for any member of the Credit Union then disabled, that is not the question before us. The original policy coverage here was clearly valid.
The provision of the policy is clear and unambiguous, and on the agreed facts insured was engaged in military service within the meaning of the provision of the policy. State Mutual Ins. Co. v. Harman, Ga. App., 33 S.E.2d 105; Life Casualty Ins. Co. v. McLeod, 70 Ga. App. 181, 27 S.E.2d 871; Lindsey v. Life Casualty Ins. Co., 70 Ga. App. 190, 27 S.E.2d 877; Bending v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 74 Ohio App. 182, 58 N.E.2d 71; Field v. Western Life Indemnity Co., Tex.Civ.App., 227 S.W. 530, error refused 240 S.W. XVII; Southwestern Life Ins. Co. v. Houston, Tex.Civ.App., 121 S.W.2d 619; Travelers' Prot. Ass'n v. Prinsen, 291 U.S. 576, 54 S.Ct. 502, 78 L.Ed. 999; Bradshaw v. Farmers' Bankers' Life Ins. Co., 107 Kan. 681, 193 P. 332, 11 A.L.R. 1091; Coit v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., Cal.Sup., 168 P.2d 163; 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 511; Miller v. Liberty Nat. Life Ins. Co., 243 Ala. 250, 9 So.2d 132; Northam v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 231 Ala. 105, 163 So. 635, 111 A.L.R. 622. Vickers, Leigh Thornton, of Mobile, for respondent.
I disagree. Ambiguity should not be found in a strained or technical interpretation of a contract when a reasoned construction renders all the provisions of the contract enforceable and consistent. See Southwestern Life Ins. Co. v. Houston, 121 S.W.2d 619, 625 (Tex.Civ.App. — Fort Worth 1938, writ ref'd). A reasoned construction in the case at bar would, in my view, result in reading the contract as promising Dech employment for at least the one-year period, and at the pay, suggested in appellee's letters.
Attached to the stipulations which were filed were certain exhibits which were incorporated into the agreement. See Southwestern Life Insurance Co. v. Houston, 121 S.W.2d 619 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1938, writ ref'd.). The stipulations and incorporated exhibits were properly admitted into evidence.
A contract is ambiguous only when there is a genuine uncertainty which of two or more meanings is correct. If only one reasonable interpretation exists, the contract is not ambiguous. Gibson v. Bentley, 605 S.W.2d 337 (Tex.Civ.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Ambiguity will not be found in a strained interpretation of a contract when a reasoned interpretation renders all the provisions of the contract enforceable and consistent. See Southwestern Life Insurance Co. v. Houston, 121 S.W.2d 619 (Tex.Civ.App. — Fort Worth 1938, writ ref'd). We find no ambiguity in the letter of credit.
Suicide, however, may still be interposed as a defense even after the expiration of the time fixed by the incontestable clause, when the policy also contains a clause limiting liability in the event of suicide within a specified time. Southwestern Life Ins. Co. v. Houston, 121 S.W.2d 619 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1938, writ ref'd). In the instant case the parties have agreed to a state of conditions.
One clause cannot be considered by itself; every clause must be considered with reference to the whole instrument as well as with reference to every other clause. Southern Travelers' Ass'n v. Wright, Tex.Com.App., 34 S.W.2d 823; Southwestern Life Ins. Co. v. Houston, Tex.Civ.App., 121 S.W.2d 619, error refused; Pagel v. Pumphrey, Tex.Civ.App., 204 S.W.2d 58, writ refused; Green v. Farmers Merchants State Bank, Tex.Civ.App., 100 S.W.2d 132, writ refused; Guardian Trust Co. v. Bauereisen, 132 Tex. 396, 121 S.W.2d 579."
Glaser v. Henderson, Tex.Civ.App., 2 S.W.2d 987, no writ hist.; St. Mary's Oil Engine Co. v. Allen-Morrow Co., Tex.Civ.App., 20 S.W.2d 266, no writ hist. Each provision in the instrument must be given its reasonable, natural and probable meaning, when considered in relation to the whole. Southwestern Life Ins. Co. v. Houston, Tex.Civ.App., 121 S.W.2d 619, err. ref. Each provision of the instrument must be construed with reference to every other provision so that the effect of one upon the other may be obtained. Brown v. Brown, Tex.Civ.App., 245 S.W.2d 995, err. ref .; Service Life Ins. Co. v. Miller, Tex.Civ .App., 271 S.W.2d 301, ref., n. r. e.
22 S.W.2d 403, 68 A.L.R. 1361. And see Hearin v. Standard Life Ins. Co., 8 F.2d 202 (D.C.E.D.Ark. 1925), which reached a conclusion contrary to the Robbs decision on essentially the same facts. Early decisions in Alabama, Kansas and Texas against the insurer's position have been overruled or superseded by later cases in the same jurisdictions upholding the defense of excepted risk. Compare Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Lovejoy, 201 Ala. 337, 78 So. 299, L.R.A. 1918D, 860 (1918), with Moore v. Bankers' Credit Life Ins. Co., 223 Ala. 373, 136 So. 798 (1931); Supreme Court of Honor v. Updegraff, 68 Kan. 474, 75 P. 477 (1904), with Myers v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., 124 Kan. 191, 257 P. 933, 55 A.L.R. 542 (1927); and Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n v. Payne, 32 S.W. 1063 (Tex.Civ.App. 1895), with Howard v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 289 S.W. 114 (Tex.Civ.App. 1926), and Southwestern Life Ins. Co. v. Houston, 121 S.W.2d 619 (Tex.Civ.App. 1938, error ref.). We think that the clear weight of the better-reasoned authorities is in accord with the holding in Wright v. Philadelphia Life Ins. Co., 25 F.2d 514, 515 (D.C.E.D.S.C. 1927), that a provision in a life insurance contract excluding coverage for death by suicide: