Evidence connecting the defendant with the crime, in satisfaction of OCGA § 24–4–8, may be slight and it may be entirely circumstantial. Sutton v. State, 295 Ga. 350, 351–352(1), 759 S.E.2d 846 (2014). Further, “evidence of the defendant's conduct before and after the crime may give rise to an inference that [s]he participated in the crime.”

In each, the courts conducted a Strickland analysis notwithstanding their recognition that no right to plead exists. See, e.g., Osley v. United States , 751 F.3d 1214, 1225 (11th Cir. 2014) ; Sutton v. State , 295 Ga. 350, 759 S.E.2d 846, 852 (2014) ; People v. French , No. 308774, 2014 WL 132443, at *5 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2014) (per curiam ). A petitioner raising this variety of Strickland claim thus faces a formidable standard, but we are convinced that Byrd has met it.

"To suggest that counsel should have obtained a [better] deal is pure speculation[,] which is insufficient to satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland ." Sutton v. State , 295 Ga. 350, 355 (6) (c), 759 S.E.2d 846 (2014). OCGA § 16-3-24.2 provides that

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) United States v. Arias, 984 F2d 1139 , 1142 (II) (B) (11th Cir. 1993); see Sutton v. State, 295 Ga. 350 , 353 (3) (759 SE2d 846 ) (2014); Owen v. State, 266 Ga. 312 , 314 (4) (467 SE2d 325 ) (1996). The trial court found that because Smith’s statement was not “clearly inculpatory” of Parrish, severance of Smith’s trial from Parrish’s trial was not mandated.

There is no Bruton violation when the statement on its face does not incriminate the defendant but becomes incriminating only when linked with other evidence introduced at trial. Sutton v. State, 295 Ga. 350 , 353 (3) (759 SE2d 846 ) (2014). Battle urges that the statements at issue were directly incriminating enough so as to violate Bruton .

3. Finally, citing Bruton , 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), Appellant contends that the admission of State's Exhibit 102 violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Bruton held that a defendant's right to be confronted with the witnesses against him is violated when he is tried jointly with a co-defendant who does not testify and the court admits an out-of-court statement by the co-defendant that directly inculpates the defendant. See id. at 135–137, 88 S.Ct. 1620 ; Sutton v. State , 295 Ga. 350, 353 (3), 759 S.E.2d 846 (2014). Exhibit 102 was a signed, handwritten statement that co-defendant Lucas's uncle, who testified at the trial, gave to the police before trial.

Accordingly, he cannot show prejudice from his counsel's failure to have the shell casing independently tested. Sutton v. State, 295 Ga. 350, 355(6)(e), 759 S.E.2d 846 (2014). (c) As an initial matter, the testimony relating to Geiger's 2003 arrest was properly admitted, as “[e]vidence that is relevant and material to an issue in a case is not rendered inadmissible because the defendant's character is incidentally put in issue.”

Additionally, even if there was a violation of the Confrontation Clause, any error was harmless as the testimony did not implicate Penciel, and because there was overwhelming evidence that Penciel was in the vehicle. See Thomas v. State , 300 Ga. 433, 440 (2) (a) (3), 796 S.E.2d 242 (2017) ; Sutton v. State , 295 Ga. 350, 353 (3), 759 S.E.2d 846 (2014) ; Carcamo v. State , 348 Ga. App. 383, 388 (1) (a), 823 S.E.2d 68 (2019). See Miller v. State , 289 Ga. 854, 858 (2) (b), 717 S.E.2d 179 (2011) ("[The] admission of evidence in violation of Crawford [v. Washington , 541 U. S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004) ] will be deemed harmless if there is no reasonable possibility that it contributed to a guilty verdict.")

Ulbrich did not state that Johnson set out to deceive patients, rather Ulbrich expressed an opinion that the diplomas and certificates could deceive clients as justification for Ulbrich's removing them after the criminal investigation into the practice had begun. See Sutton v. State , 295 Ga. 350, 353 (3), 759 S.E.2d 846 (2014) (" Bruton is not implicated where the statement does not facially incriminate appellant and only becomes incriminating when linked with other evidence introduced at trial.") (citation and punctuation omitted); Shelton , 350 Ga. App. at 777 (1), 830 S.E.2d 335 ; Thomas v. State , 268 Ga. 135, 137-138 (6), 485 S.E.2d 783 (1997) (co-defendant's custodial statement that defendant had purchased a gun did not directly inculpate defendant convicted of murder and aggravated assault). The State concedes that Ulbrich's statements were testimonial.

How much weight and credibility to afford the witness testimony identifying Epperson and linking him to the victim was for the jury to determine rather than this Court. See Sutton v. State , 295 Ga. 350, 352 (1), 759 S.E.2d 846 (2014) ; Trammell v. State , 328 Ga.App. 45, 47 (1), 761 S.E.2d 470 (2014). Furthermore, evidence of Epperson's presence at the scene of the shooting and his conduct before and after the shooting of the victim, including his flight from the crime scene, gave rise to an inference that he participated in the shooting.