There are also pre- Maksimovic cases in Illinois that support the view that claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress are not categorically preempted by the IHRA. In Sutton v. Overcash, the Illinois Appellate Court found that an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim based on sexual harassment was not preempted by the IHRA because the tort claim required more proof than is necessary to state a claim under the IHRA. 251 Ill. App.3d 737, 191 Ill.Dec. 230, 623 N.E.2d 820, 833 (1993); see also Pavilon v. Kaferly, 204 Ill.App.3d 235, 149 Ill.Dec. 549, 561 N.E.2d 1245, 1250-51 (1990) (same). The application of Maksimovic v. Tsogalis, 177 Ill.2d 511, 227 Ill.Dec. 98, 687 N.E.2d 21 (1997) by federal district courts has led to sometimes inconsistent results.

” Richardson, 221 Ill.Dec. 818, 676 N.E.2d at 628 (citing Richter v. Nw. Mem'l Hosp., 177 Ill.App.3d 247, 126 Ill.Dec. 584, 532 N.E.2d 269 (Ill.App.Ct. 1st Dist. 1988) ). For an award to fall within the range of reasonable compensation, “all the law requires is that the plaintiff present evidence which will establish, with a fair degree of probability, a basis for the assessment of damages.” Sutton v. Overcash, 251 Ill.App.3d 737, 191 Ill.Dec. 230, 623 N.E.2d 820, 838 (Ill.App.Ct. 3d Dist. 1993). It is appropriate to reduce an award when necessary to prevent a departure from the evidence presented at trial.

Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in dismissing her claims because the Act does not abrogate recovery for common law torts of assault, battery, or false imprisonment. Plaintiff relies on a number of cases ( Sutton v. Overcash, 251 Ill. App.3d 737 (1993); Pavilon v. Kaferly, 204 Ill. App.3d 235 (1990); Ritzheimer v. Insurance Counselors, Inc., 173 Ill. App.3d 953 (1988); Bailey v. Unocal Corp., 700 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Clay v. Quartet Manufacturing Co., 644 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Ill. 1986)) and states that the test of whether a common law action is preempted is "whether the Human Rights claim and the cause at bar are so substantially similar that to allow both cases to be litigated is to encourage multiplicity of law suits and the possibility of inconsistent judgments." According to plaintiff, her sexual harassment claim and the claims before this court are not substantially similar.

And Illinois courts have allowed common law causes of actions under an alter ego theory. See Sutton v. Overcash, 623 N.E.2d 820, 832-33 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); Fitzgerald v. Pratt, 585 N.E.2d 1222, 1225 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) ("To plead a common law cause of action under the 'alter ego' theory, plaintiff must allege that the employee is the 'alter ego' of the employer.").

In addition, Grant does not present evidence in which this court could infer that Rayborn exercised control in the management of E-Quality, such being a majority shareholder or corporate officer. See, e.g., Sutton v. Overcash, 251 Ill.App.3d 737, 755, 191 Ill.Dec. 230, 623 N.E.2d 820 (Ill.App.Ct. 1993). Simply put, Grant has not given this court sufficient evidence to determine that Rayborn was E-Quality's alter ego. This court knows nothing of Rayborn's responsibilities and duties within the corporate structure, the discretion he exercised on behalf of the corporation, or even his day-to-day duties at E-Quality.

Defendants argue that the jury's award of back and front pay must be vacated because such damages are not available in an IIED case. However, the jury did not award back and front pay, as those terms connote Title VII damages, but rather was instructed, by means of Illinois Pattern Instruction No. 30.06, that it could award damages for "[t]he value of earnings and benefits lost" and "[t]he present cash value of the earnings and benefits reasonably certain to be lost in the future," typical elements of Illinois tort damages which were explicitly held applicable to employment-related IIED cases in Sutton v. Overcash, 623 N.E.2d 820, 838-39 (Ill.App.Ct. 1993). There is nothing in Hertzberg v. SRAM Corp., 261 F.3d 651 (7th Cir. 2001), which suggests that the Seventh Circuit intended to displace Illinois damages law in a case where Illinois law provides the rule of decision, nor does the court see any reason why, on an Illinois tort claim, the jury should not be permitted to award such damages if they are proximately caused the defendant's conduct.

For the present, the court is persuaded that plaintiff should not be permitted to introduce this evidence. In Sutton v. Overcash, relied on by plaintiff, the plaintiff presented evidence from which a jury could conclude that the emotional distress caused by defendant's behavior caused plaintiff to leave her job. 623 N.E.2d 820, 838-39 (Ill.App.Ct. 1993). In other words, she presented evidence of constructive discharge.

Ritzheimer v. Insurance Counselors, Inc., 173 Ill.App.3d 953, 123 Ill.Dec. 506, 513, 527 N.E.2d 1281, 1288 (5th Dist. 1988). See also Sutton v. Overcash, 251 Ill.App.3d 737, 191 Ill.Dec. 230, 623 N.E.2d 820 (3d Dist. 1993) Pavilon v. Kaferly, 204 Ill.App.3d 235, 149 Ill.Dec. 549, 561 N.E.2d 1245 (1st Dist. 1990). Applying that test, the Ritzheimer court held that "intentional infliction of emotional distress is a common law tort theory, not a `civil rights violation' as defined by the Act."

Id.; See also Sutton v. Overcash, 251 Ill.App.3d 737, 191 Ill.Dec. 230, 242, 623 N.E.2d 820, 832 (1993) (holding that an employee who committed the battery acted as an alter ego of the corporation when the employee was a 50% shareholder of the corporation, was the corporation's vice president and secretary, and the corporation consisted of only the tortfeasor and another physician); Richardson v. County of Cook, 250 Ill.App.3d 544, 190 Ill.Dec. 245, 249, 621 N.E.2d 114, 118 (1993) (holding that defendant hospital entitled to summary judgment where no facts had been presented suggesting that alleged tortfeasors, plaintiff's supervisor and two hospital security guards, were acting under the direction of their employer and mere allegation that the defendants were acting within the scope of their authority was "not equivalent to an allegation that [the employer] authorized [them] to commit the specific acts in question."); Hangebrauck v. Zenith Electronics Corp., 1988 WL 28686, *5 (N.D.Ill.

In such circumstances the attribution of moral responsibility for the actor's conduct to the corporation is quite a different matter from the same process when the actor is merely a foreman or supervisor. In the specific sexual harassment context, employees have successfully sued their corporate employers on an alter ego theory where a gynecologist-assailant was a 50% shareholder, vice-president, secretary and one of two professional employees of the medical corporation ( Sutton v. Overcash, 251 Ill. App.3d 737, 755, 191 Ill.Dec. 230, 242, 623 N.E.2d 820, 832 (3d Dist. 1993)) and where lawyer-assailant Paul Pratt was the sole shareholder of Paul Pratt, P.C. ( Fitzgerald, 223 Ill. App.3d at 789, 166 Ill.Dec. at 204, 585 N.E.2d at 1226). And in the whistle-blower context, an employee's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against an employer bank was held not barred by the Act where "persons acting in their capacity as managers" threatened dismissal, assigned extra hours of onerous work, issued unfavorable reviews and subverted an employee's authority over subordinates in retaliation for the employee's having disclosed the use of improper banking procedures to auditors and federal authorities ( Johnson v. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 199 Ill. App.3d 427, 432, 434, 145 Ill.Dec. 558, 561-62, 557 N.E.2d 328, 331-32 (1st Dist. 1990)).