Opinion
8064 Index 654917/16
01-10-2019
SUTTON 58 ASSOCIATES LLC, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Philip PILEVSKY, et al., Defendants–Appellants.
Friedman Kaplan Seiler & Adelman LLP, New York (Robert S. Smith of counsel), for appellants. Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP, New York (Ronald S. Greenberg of counsel), for respondent.
Friedman Kaplan Seiler & Adelman LLP, New York (Robert S. Smith of counsel), for appellants.
Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP, New York (Ronald S. Greenberg of counsel), for respondent.
Friedman, J.P., Gische, Oing, Singh, Moulton, JJ.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Shirley Werner Kornreich, J.), entered on or about March 8, 2018, which denied defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, unanimously reversed, on the law, with costs, and the motion granted. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.
Plaintiff's claims, in which the sole damages plaintiff claims are losses resulting from the delay of a real estate project due to the bankruptcy filing of two nonparty entities,
are preempted by federal law (see Astor Holdings, Inc. v. Roski, 325 F.Supp.2d 251, 262–263 [S.D. N.Y.2003] ). We note that in the bankruptcy proceedings, plaintiff moved to dismiss Mezz Borrower's petition as filed in bad faith but voluntarily withdrew that motion. As in National Hockey League v. Moyes , 2015 WL 7008213, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153262 (D. Ariz., Nov. 12, 2015, No. CV–10–01036–PHX–GMS), and unlike Davis v. Yageo Corp. , 481 F.3d 661 (9th Cir.2007), plaintiff's damages arise only because of the bankruptcy filings.
In light of the above disposition, we need not reach the parties' arguments about the Noerr–Pennington doctrine and veil-piercing.