Sutter v. Hutchings

78 Citing cases

  1. Tibbs v. Studebaker's of Savannah

    362 S.E.2d 377 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987)   Cited 7 times
    In Tibbs, supra at 643 (a), the principal opinion, citing both Sutter, supra and Southern Bell, supra, concludes "`one who provides alcoholic beverages to a noticeably intoxicated person, knowing that the person will soon be driving a vehicle, may be liable for a third party's injuries caused by the negligence of the intoxicated driver.'"

    Appellant contends the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of appellee in that (a) a cause of action against appellee exists as a matter of law and (b) genuine issues of material fact remain as to that cause of action. (a) "Under Sutter [v. Hutchings, 254 Ga. 194 ( 327 S.E.2d 716) (1985)], one who provides alcoholic beverages to a noticeably intoxicated person, knowing that the person will soon be driving a vehicle, may be liable for a third party's injuries caused by the negligence of the intoxicated driver." Southern Bell Tel. c. Co. v. Altman, 183 Ga. App. 611, 612 ( 359 S.E.2d 385) (1987).

  2. Riley v. H H Operations

    263 Ga. 652 (Ga. 1993)   Cited 29 times
    In Riley v. H H Operations, 263 Ga. 652 (436 S.E.2d 659) (1993), the Court held that when the General Assembly enacted OCGA § 51-1-40, it abrogated the common law rule set forth in Sutter and created a new cause of action.

    We must disapprove this interpretation. When the legislature enacted the Act in 1988, it abrogated the common law rule set forth in Sutter v. Hutchings, 254 Ga. 194 (1) ( 327 S.E.2d 716) (1985), and created a new cause of action. Under the common law rule, the provider of alcohol incurred no liability unless he or she actually knew the purchaser was underage and would be driving soon thereafter.

  3. Divecchio v. Mead Corp.

    361 S.E.2d 850 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987)   Cited 7 times
    In Divecchio v. Mead Corp., 184 Ga. App. 447 (1) (361 S.E.2d 850), it was held that a Sutter-type cause of action "would lie where one provides alcoholic beverage to [an] adult who is about to drive a vehicle.

    1. In Sutter v. Hutchings, 254 Ga. 194 ( 327 S.E.2d 716) (1985), the Supreme Court decided that OCGA §§ 3-3-22 and 3-3-23 were designed to protect third parties from the dangers of providing alcoholic beverages to noticeably intoxicated persons and minors, respectively. In Sutter, the Supreme Court held that the third parties had a cause of action against one who had provided alcoholic beverage to a noticeably intoxicated minor, knowing that the minor would soon be driving a vehicle.

  4. Bishop v. Fair Lanes Bowling, Inc.

    623 F. Supp. 1195 (N.D. Ga. 1986)   Cited 1 times

    The Riverside Enterprises court's statement of the law with respect to the civil liability of a seller of alcoholic beverages has been cast into doubt, however, by a recent decision of the Georgia Supreme Court. In Sutter v. Hutchings, 254 Ga. 194, 327 S.E.2d 716 (1985), the Supreme Court held that because the statutes prohibiting the furnishing of alcoholic beverages to a noticeably intoxicated person and to a person under 19 years of age (Ga. Off'l Code Ann. §§ 3-3-22 and 3-3-23(a)(1)) were enacted to "protect third parties as well as those noticeably intoxicated and under 19," a cause of action against the provider of alcoholic beverages to a noticeably intoxicated minor, by any party injured by the provision of such beverages to the intoxicated minor, exists under Ga. Off'l Code Ann. § 51-1-6.

  5. Landis v. Rockdale County

    206 Ga. App. 876 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992)   Cited 10 times
    In Landis, supra, we assumed, for purposes of the defendants' motion for summary judgment at issue, that the Rockdale County deputy sheriff observed a noticeably intoxicated driver who approached and spoke to him while he was directing traffic at an intersection.

    Such a relationship does not exist here. Sutter v. Hutchings, 254 Ga. 194 ( 327 S.E.2d 716) (1985), is also cited by appellant as a case in which defendant was liable to plaintiff for a third party's act. The duty found there was imposed in two specific Code sections, OCGA §§ 3-3-22 and 3-3-23 (a). It was these two requirements which supplied the duty contemplated in OCGA § 51-1-6, which the Court held extended to third parties as well as to those noticeably intoxicated.

  6. Studebaker's of Savannah v. Tibbs

    392 S.E.2d 908 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990)   Cited 5 times

    " (Emphasis supplied.) The Supreme Court of Georgia, in Sutter v. Hutchings, 254 Ga. 194, 195 (1), 197 ( 327 S.E.2d 716) (1985), held "[a] person owes to others a duty not to subject them to an unreasonable risk of harm. [Cit.] More specifically, OCGA § 3-3-22 provides that `no alcoholic beverage shall be sold ... given, provided, or furnished to any person who is in a state of noticeable intoxication,' and OCGA § 3-3-23 (a) (1) provides that `No person knowingly, by himself or through another, shall furnish (or) cause to be furnished ... any alcoholic beverage to any person under 19 years of age' except for medical or religious purposes, or in the home with parental consent. "It could be argued that the duty or obligation created by these Code sections runs only to persons noticeably intoxicated or under 19, and not to others.

  7. S. Bell Tel. Tel. Co. v. Altman

    183 Ga. App. 611 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987)   Cited 11 times
    Holding that an employer is not liable for injuries caused by an employee who became intoxicated at employer-sponsored banquet; co-workers took employee for coffee, drove him home, then watched him walk to his front door

    Held: 1. With regard to the claim asserted by Altman's widow, this matter is controlled by Sutter v. Hutchings, 254 Ga. 194 ( 327 S.E.2d 716) (1985), wherein the Supreme Court made it clear that the provider of alcoholic beverages is not liable for injuries suffered by the consumer of such beverages. The appellees' argument that Altman's known past alcoholism removes this case from the dictates of Sutter is unpersuasive.

  8. Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Townsend

    279 Ga. 511 (Ga. 2005)   Cited 26 times
    In Delta Airlines v. Townsend, 279 Ga. 511 (614 SE2d 745) (2005), this Court held that the dram shop act does not apply to sales of alcoholic beverages on airplanes.

    [W]here one provides alcohol to a noticeably intoxicated [individual] knowing that he will soon be driving his car, it is foreseeable to the provider that the consumer will drive while intoxicated and a jury would be authorized to find that it is foreseeable to the provider that the intoxicated driver may injure someone.Sutter v. Hutchings, 254 Ga. 194, 198 (1) ( 327 SE2d 716) (1985). The GDSA

  9. Landis v. Rockdale County

    212 Ga. App. 700 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994)   Cited 16 times
    Holding that a "special relationship" is a prerequisite for an officer to have a duty to protect under Georgia law

    The dissent's imposition of a special duty under the facts of this case places police officers in just such a precarious position. Moreover, by reference to Sutter v. Hutchings, 254 Ga. 194 ( 327 S.E.2d 716) (1985), the dissent appears to be re-asserting the position originally taken in Landis, supra, by creating an expanded common law duty imposed on police officers by analogy to the alcohol provider statutes at OCGA §§ 3-3-22 and 3-3-23. "[T]he rationale underlying our Supreme Court's decision in Sutter, [supra], and OCGA §§ 3-3-22 and 3-3-23 do not provide a basis for the expanded common law duty created by the majority in this case.

  10. Manuel v. Koonce

    206 Ga. App. 582 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992)   Cited 12 times
    Following Saenz, the Court held the parents not liable on theory of negligently allowing access to dangerous instrumentality, where their teenage child, whom they left home alone, obtained alcohol and was subsequently involved in a fatal car accident

    See Whelchel v. Laing Properties, 190 Ga. App. 182, 191 (1) ( 378 S.E.2d 478) (1989) (Beasley, J., concurring specially). Accord Southern Bell Tel. c. Co. v. Altman, 183 Ga. App. 611, 612 (2) ( 356 S.E.2d 385) (1987) (interpreting Sutter v. Hutchings, 254 Ga. 194, 198 ( 327 S.E.2d 716) (1985), which set forth language virtually identical to that in OCGA § 51-1-40 (b)). The uncontroverted evidence of record established that Rowland accompanied Dowling, Steedley, and Hester to Steedley's truck as they departed, and watched as Dowling, not Steedley, drove the truck away.