Opinion
No. CV 04 4002486 S
May 2, 2006
I.
In September 1999, the plaintiff, Superior Products Distributors, Inc. (Superior), extended trade credit to the defendant, Waterbury Masonry Foundation, Inc. (Waterbury), by way of a written agreement. Waterbury used the trade credit to purchase precast concrete panels from Plasticrete Architectural Precast Products (Plasticrete), a division/tradename operated by Superior. On November 17, 2004, Superior initiated an action, alleging that Waterbury failed to pay an outstanding balance due under the parties' agreement. Waterbury filed an answer and a special defense, asserting that the defendant "has paid the debt alleged in the Complaint."
A court-side trial took place on March 14, 2006. Superior introduced the following exhibits: (1) the September 14, 1999 written credit agreement between the parties, (2) an August 2002 invoice in the amount of $28,000 for goods shipped on August 29, 2002 and depicting Waterbury's payments ($15,970.50 on November 13, 2002 and $12,029.50 on December 10, 2002), (3) an October 2002 invoice in the amount of $6,840 for goods shipped on October 1, 2003 and depicting the defendant's partial payment of $4,000 on March 26, 2003 and (4) a summary of Waterbury's outstanding debt and the accompanying finance charges. Based on Superior's summary of debt, Waterbury owes $2,840.00 in principal and $2,480.32 in interest.
Waterbury introduced three exhibits: (1) a copy of the check Waterbury used to pay $15,970.50 to Plasticrete and deposited by Superior Equipment Supplies, (2) a copy of a second check that Waterbury used to pay Plasticrete $12,029.50 and (3) an April 24, 2003 letter written to Sal Guerrera, Waterbury's vice president, alleging damage to some precast panels.
At trial, the defendant did not dispute the accuracy of the plaintiff's exhibits. Instead, Waterbury presented two main defenses: (1) that the goods received by Waterbury were damaged and (2) that Plasticrete, not Superior, is the appropriate plaintiff to bring suit against Waterbury.
After the trial was concluded, Superior requested attorneys fees pursuant to the trade credit agreement. Waterbury objected to the attorneys fees on the grounds that they were not sought in the complaint nor during the trial.
II.
Although Waterbury presented some evidence that Superior sent it damaged goods, the defendant did not specially plead this defense. Evidence "to establish a defense that the goods do not conform to the contract as to kind or quality is not admissible under a general denial." Caslowitz v. Roosevelt Mills, Inc., 138 Conn. 121, 124, 82 A.2d 808 (1951). "Facts which are consistent with such statements [in the complaint], but show, notwithstanding, that the plaintiff has no cause of action, must be specially alleged." Practice Book § 10-50. Thus, to present a defense that the goods were received but were damaged is consistent with the facts alleged in the complaint, i.e., that a debt was owed. Therefore, the defendant was required to plead this defense in his answer. Having failed to do so in these circumstances, this court declines to consider the defense of nonconforming goods.
Even if the court were to consider Waterbury's nonconforming goods defense, the court observes that the defendant failed in its proof.
In this case, "[p]leadings have their place in our system of jurisprudence. While they are not held to the strict and artificial standard that once prevailed, we still cling to the belief, even in these iconoclastic days, that no orderly administration of justice is possible without them. The purpose of a [pleading] is to limit the issues at trial, and such pleadings are calculated to prevent surprise . . . It is fundamental in our law that the right of a [party] to recover is limited to the allegations in his [pleading] . . . Facts found but not averred cannot be made the basis for a recovery . . . Thus, it is clear that [t]he court is not permitted to decide issues outside of those raised in the pleadings . . . A judgment in the absence of written pleadings defining the issues would not merely be erroneous, it would be void." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Monetary Funding Group, Inc. v. Pluchino, 87 Conn.App. 401, 414-15, 867 A.2d 841 (2005). Concerning Waterbury's second defense, that Superior does not have standing to bring suit because the debt alleged is a debt owed to Plasticrete, the court finds Superior's testimony credible that Plasticrete is a division/tradename of Superior. First, the defendant did not deny that he applied for and received trade credit from Superior and that it used the credit to purchase Plasticrete products, as well as other Superior products. Second, the letterhead of the Plasticrete invoice provides: "Plasticrete Architectural Precast Products a member of the SUPERIOR family of companies." Third, the defendant's Exhibit A, a copy of the check that the defendant used to pay Plasticrete, was deposited by Superior Equipment Supplies Div. Of Superior Products Dist., Inc. Finally, Joanne Paradise, the corporate credit manager for Superior, testified on behalf of her company that Plasticrete is a division/tradename of Superior. Thus, the court concludes that Superior, the owner of the division/tradename Plasticrete, has standing to bring this action against Waterbury.
Concerning Waterbury's specially pleaded defense, i.e, that the defendant paid the debt alleged in the complaint, the court concludes that Waterbury did not prove this. Thus, we conclude that Superior met its burden of proof in establishing that a debt is owed by Waterbury. We further conclude that Waterbury, having failed to prove any of its defenses, owes $5,179.24 to Superior.
Plaintiff's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, ¶ 20.
Superior also seeks attorneys fees in this matter. Attorneys fees, however, were not sought either in the complaint or during the trial. In Wosczyna v. Estate of Antone, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain (January 30, 1997, Langenbach, J.) ( 18 Conn. L. Rptr. 671), the court explained that "attorneys fees cannot be awarded to the plaintiff because the plaintiff did not request attorneys fees in its prayer for relief. See Francis T. Zappone Co. v. Mark, 197 Conn. 264, 269 (finding a trial court did not err in not awarding attorneys fees in the absence of any claim for attorneys fees in the prayer for relief, and without any offer of evidence during the trial") . . . Kallas v. Harnen, Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury, Docket No. 303611 (May 10, 1996, Stodolink, J.) (finding a plaintiff who requested only monetary damages and did not request attorneys fees could not recover his attorneys fees because the plaintiff's relief was limited to the allegations of his complaint)." (Citations omitted.) Therefore, Superior's post-trial demand for attorneys fees is denied.
So ordered.