Superintendent Insp. of Bldg of Cambridge v. Villari

6 Citing cases

  1. New London v. Leskiewicz

    110 N.H. 462 (N.H. 1970)   Cited 26 times
    Defining variance as the "authority granted to the owner to use his property in a manner otherwise violative of the zoning regulations"

    Hence the issue presented on this appeal, which is whether the defendants can rent space for tenting trailers and for camping trailers, cannot be resolved by a determination of whether such trailers come within article III (F) of the ordinance which regulates the use of "trailers and/or mobile homes" in all districts of the town. Rather, the issue is whether the use of such trailers is a method ordinarily and reasonably adopted to make the original use granted to the defendants available to them without constituting a substantial change in the nature and purpose of that original use or whether on the contrary, the use of these trailers would constitute such a departure from the original use as to constitute a new and impermissible use. Frost v. Lucey, 231 A.2d 441, 447, 448 (Me. 1967); Connecticut Sand Stone Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of App., 150 Conn. 439, 190 A.2d 594 (1963); Town of Bridgewater v. Chuckran, 351 Mass. 20, 217 N.E.2d 726 (1966); Superintendent I of Bldgs. v. Villari, 350 Mass. 176, 213 N.E.2d 861 (1966). The burden of establishing that the use in question is fundamentally the same use and not a new and impermissible one is on the party asserting it. This is in accordance with the general policy of zoning to carefully limit the extension and enlargement of nonconforming uses. Arsenault v. Keene, 104 N.H. 356, 359, 187 A.2d 60, 62 (1962); Keene v. Blood, 101 N.H. 466, 469, 146 A.2d 262, 264 (1958); Annot., 87 A.L.R.2d 4, 10 (1963).

  2. Bridgewater v. Chuckran

    351 Mass. 20 (Mass. 1966)   Cited 48 times
    In Bridgewater v. Chuckran, 351 Mass. 20, we held that the use of premises as a ready mixed concrete manufactory and center for supply to others could not be justified on the basis of the prior lawful nonconforming use of the premises as a house builder's main yard in which the mixing of concrete was merely incidental to his general business.

    Recent cases have emphasized three tests for determining whether current use of property fits within the exemption granted to nonconforming uses. (1) Whether the use reflects the "nature and purpose" of the use prevailing when the zoning by-law took effect. Massachusetts Broken Stone Co. v. Weston, 346 Mass. 657, 662. Superintendent Inspector of Bldgs. of Cambridge v. Villari, 350 Mass. 176, 177-178. (2) Whether there is a difference in the quality or character, as well as the degree, of use. Brady v. Board of Appeals of Westport, 348 Mass. 515, 523. Building Inspector of Malden v. Werlin Realty, Inc. 349 Mass. 623, 624-625.

  3. County Commissioners of Carroll County v. Zent

    86 Md. App. 745 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991)   Cited 18 times
    Reviewing definitions of accessory use adopted in different jurisdictions

    Id. 281 S.E.2d at 760 (citations omitted, emphasis added). As to other cases finding accessory uses, see Hinkle v. Board of Zoning Adjust. App. of Shelby Co., 415 S.W.2d 97 (Ky. 1967); Silliman v. Falls City Stone Co., 305 S.W.2d 322 (Ky. 1957) (the Court of Appeals of Kentucky held that an asphalt plant was an incidental and customary accessory use to a large nonconforming rock quarry); Superintendent Inspector of Bldgs. of Cambridge v. Villari, 350 Mass. 176, 213 N.E.2d 861 (1966); State v. Smiley, 182 Neb. 211, 153 N.W.2d 906 (1967) (the rental of cargo trailers, where the income was minor compared to the service station's other income, was held to be an accessory use customarily incident to the primary service station use); Dettmar v. County Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 28 Ohio Misc. 35, 273 N.E.2d 921, 922 (1971); Lawrence v. Zoning Bd. of Lower Gwynedd Township, 19 Pa.Cmwlth. 128, 338 A.2d 779 (1975) (boarding of dogs a continuation of prior nonconforming use involving occasionally boarding of dogs in connection with breeding); Gross v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of City of Philadelphia, 424 Pa. 603, 227 A.2d 824 (1967) (a restaurant was determined to be an "accessory use" of a bowling alley, where the evidence showed a large percentage of bowling alleys customarily had restaurants); City of Warwick v. Campbell, 82 R.I. 300, 107 A.2d 334 (1954) (defining accessory use). As to cases not finding accessory uses see Wundsam v. Gilna, 97 Ill. App.3d 569, 52 Ill.Dec. 90

  4. Building Inspector v. Vlahos

    409 N.E.2d 795 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980)   Cited 2 times

    A new and used car and truck dealership was situated on the property, and service and repair work was performed there on vehicles purchased at the dealership as well as elsewhere. The service and repair work was incidental to the primary use of the property as a dealership. See Superintendent Inspector of Bldgs. of Cambridge v. Villari, 350 Mass. 176 (1966); Albee Indus., Inc. v. Inspector of Bldgs. of Waltham, ante 858 (1980). The property was sold in 1968, and from that time until 1973, the defendant Brady sold new and used cars at the location in question.

  5. D'Orlando v. Board of Appeals of Danvers

    362 N.E.2d 937 (Mass. App. Ct. 1977)

    The locus lies in an Industrial II zoning district, in which "no land shall be used and no building or structure shall be erected, altered or used for any other purpose than: [1] [w]arehouses and general office buildings, [2] [l]ight manufacturing, assembling and processing materials and products of every nature, [3] [p]rivate landing areas, to be used solely for the landing and taking off and storing of privately owned airplanes and helicopters, [and] [4] [a]ccessory uses, including signs normally incidental to permitted uses" (ยง IX C of the by-law, as then in effect; brackets supplied). All we know of the use the plaintiff desires to make of the locus is that she proposes to construct a single-story concrete block building for "General Automotive Repair" (contrast Rando v. Board of Appeals of Bedford, 348 Mass. 296, 297 [1965]; Superintendent Inspector of Bldgs. of Cambridge v. Villari, 350 Mass. 176, 177 [1966]; Salah v. Board of Appeals of Canton, 2 Mass. App. Ct. 488, 489-490 [1974]; Seekonk Collision Serv. Inc. v. Selectmen of Seekonk, 4 Mass. App. Ct. 701, 702-704 [1976]), and we are confronted with the pure question of law whether the words "General Automotive Repair" are comprehended within any of [1] through [3] above. The plaintiff (understandably) does not argue that her proposed building is comprehended within (a) either of the types of buildings referred to in [1] or (b) within [3].

  6. Salah v. Board of Appeals of Canton

    314 N.E.2d 881 (Mass. App. Ct. 1974)   Cited 15 times
    Determining the meaning of a term in a zoning bylaw is a question of law for the court

    Bridgewater v. Chuckran, 351 Mass. 20, 21, 24 (1966) (storage of trucks used in permissible contracting business). See Superintendent Inspector of Bldgs. of Cambridge v. Villari, 350 Mass. 176, 177-178 (1966). Section III-E 1 provides: "In a limited Industrial District, the following uses are permitted as of right: . . . (n) Accessory use incidental to a permitted main use, including: (1) quarters for necessary caretakers and watchmen, (2) quarters for the transient accommodation of business visitors, (3) restaurant facilities for and sale of items to, and for the personal convenience of, employees, and (4) display and sale of products of manufacturing activities on the premises."