Similarly, we limit our review to those issues properly exhausted before the agency. Sunoto v. Gonzales, 504 F.3d 56, 59 (1st Cir. 2007).
Where, as here, "the BIA adopts and affirms an IJ's decision, we review the IJ's decision 'to the extent of the adoption, and the BIA's decision as to [any] additional ground.'" Sunoto v. Gonzales, 504 F.3d 56, 59-60 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting Berrio-Barrera v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 163, 167 (1st Cir. 2006)) (alteration in original). We are limited, however, in our ability to review the BIA's decision that Guerra has not shown changed circumstances.
Where, as here, "the BIA adopts and affirms an IJ's decision, we review the IJ's decision to the extent of the adoption, and the BIA's decision as to any additional ground." Sunoto v. Gonzales, 504 F.3d 56, 59-60 (1st Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks, citation and brackets omitted). We review the IJ's findings of fact relied on by the BIA in support of its decision for substantial evidence, meaning we accept the findings "as long as they are supported by reasonable, substantial and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole."
First, this theory was not raised before the IJ or BIA, and is therefore waived due to lack of administrative exhaustion. See Sunoto v. Gonzales, 504 F.3d 56, 59 (1st Cir. 2007). Second, Martínez-Pérez's argument relies on misconstruing Matter of A-R-C-G, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (BIA 2014), overruled by Matter of A-B, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 337 (2018), arguing that this case eliminates the frequency issues with her persecution evidence, because in the domestic violence context a single attacker is sufficient.
First, this theory was not raised before the IJ or BIA, and is therefore waived due to lack of administrative exhaustion. See Sunoto v. Gonzales, 504 F.3d 56, 59 (1st Cir. 2007). Second, Martínez-Pérez's argument relies on misconstruing Matter of A–R–C–G–, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (BIA 2014), overruled by Matter of A-B, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 337 (2018), arguing that this case eliminates the frequency issues with her persecution evidence, because in the domestic violence context a single attacker is sufficient.
We deferentially review the agency's findings of fact under the "substantial evidence" standard. Sunoto v. Gonzales, 504 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir. 2007). Under this approach, we must "uphold the BIA's decision 'unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.'"
"Where, as here, 'the BIA adopts and affirms an IJ's decision, we review the IJ's decision "to the extent of the adoption, and the BIA's decision as to [any] additional ground."'" Lopez-Perezv.Garland, 26 F.4th 104, 110 (1st Cir. 2022) (alteration in original) (quoting Sunotov.Gonzales, 504 F.3d 56, 59-60 (1st Cir. 2007)).
In making the above-described arguments and seeking these forms of relief, Rosa sufficiently raised a challenge to IJ Schools's voluntary departure denial before the BIA, and the BIA erred in deeming that challenge waived. See Benitez v. Wilkinson, 987 F.3d 46, 56 (1st Cir. 2021) (finding that "[t]here was no failure to exhaust" where petitioner's arguments were "clear from his motion" such that "[t]he [BIA] had a full opportunity to consider" them); Sunoto v. Gonzales, 504 F.3d 56, 59 (1st Cir. 2007) (stating that the exhaustion doctrine extends to claims omitted from an appeal as well as those "insufficiently developed before the BIA," and opting to apply the "insufficiently developed" standard "generously" (quoting Silva v. Gonzales, 463 F.3d 68, 72 (1st Cir. 2006))). We also reject the government's alternative argument that Rosa's challenge to the voluntary departure denial is moot under 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(i).
We evaluate "the IJ's decision to the extent of the adoption, and the BIA's decision as to [any] additional ground." López-Pérez v. Garland, 26 F.4th 104, 110 (1st Cir. 2022) (alteration in original) (quoting Sunoto v. Gonzales, 504 F.3d 56, 59-60 (1st Cir. 2007)). "Whether an applicant has met his or her burden for proving eligibility is a question of fact."
(quoting Sunotov.Gonzales, 504 F.3d 56, 59-60 (1st Cir. 2007))).