Opinion
FBTCV166060241S
01-31-2017
Tanu Suneja v. Carol Sung
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Edward T. Krumeich, J.
Defendants have moved to strike the Second and Third Counts of the Complaint dated October 17, 2016, on the ground that plaintiff has failed to allege conduct that would satisfy the pleading requirements under Connecticut General Statutes 14-295 and common-law recklessness. For the reasons stated below, the motion is denied.
The Standards for Deciding a Motion to Strike
" The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). " [A] motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court . . . [The court] construe[s] the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency . . . Thus, [i]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied . . . Moreover, [the court notes] that [w]hat is necessarily implied [in an allegation] need not be expressly alleged . . . It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted . . . Indeed, pleadings must be construed broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Coppola Construction Co. v. Hoffman Enterprises Ltd. Partnership, 309 Conn. 342, 350, 71 A.3d 480 (2013). " If any facts provable under the express and implied allegations in the plaintiff's complaint support a cause of action . . . the complaint is not vulnerable to a motion to strike." Bouchard v. People's Bank, 219 Conn. 465, 471, 594 A.2d 1 (1991). On the other hand, " [a] motion to strike is properly granted if the complaint alleges mere conclusions of law that are unsupported by the facts alleged." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Santorso v. Bristol Hospital, 308 Conn. 338, 349, 63 A.3d 940 (2013).
The Split in Authority on Pleading Multiple Damages Under C.G.S. § 14-295
There is a split in authority among the Superior Court Judges as to pleading requirements to state a claim under C.G.S. § 14-295. See generally Reddick v. Guirguis, 2016 WL 3266120 **2-3 (CTSup.Ct. New Haven 2016) (Wilson, J.). The " majority view" holds that it is not necessary to allege facts that would show common-law recklessness but merely to follow " the plain meaning of statutory language in § 14-295 [which] requires only that a plaintiff plead a violation of one or more of the enumerated statutes named therein, and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injuries." Liedke v. Paquette, 2010 WL 3447840 *2 (CTSup.Ct. New Britain 2010) (Swienton, J.). Accord Sears v. Brooks, 2015 WL 9871320 **4-5 (CTSup.Ct. Hartford 2015) (Noble, J.). The contrary view, sometimes referred to as the " minority view, " is based on the necessity of fact-pleading under our rules P.B. 10-1 and holds " the plaintiff must plead particularized facts that when taken as true would show that the defendant acted with reckless disregard. The facts must show that the defendant consciously chose a course of action despite the fact that the defendant did know, or reasonably should have known, that the action posed serious danger to others." Reddick, 2016 WL 3266120 *3 (citations omitted).
In my opinion the " minority review" is most consistent with the plain language of Section 14-295 and its legislative history; the fact-pleading rule under Practice Book § 10-1 should apply to pleading statutory and common-law recklessness. See Stelma v. Comerella, 2014 WL 4637548 (Conn.Super. 2014) (Sferrazza, J.); Rogers v. Dellop, 2013 WL 2350620 *1-8 (Conn.Super. 2013) (Sommers, J.) [56 Conn.L.Rptr. 152, ]. See generally, Jack v. Scanlon, 4 Conn.App. 451, 455, 495 A.2d 1084 (2009).
" As aptly stated in Eustace v. Adley Express Co., [1 Conn.Supp. 58, 59 (1935)], and reiterated in Goldfarb v. Bragg, [39 Conn.Supp. 228, 229, 475 A.2d 346 (1983)], 'the imposition of the penalty of double or treble damages should be reserved for cases which involve offenses more serious than simple negligence. Such a penalty should be imposed only where the violation of the rules of the road has been deliberate or at least under conditions which indicate that the defendant was conducting himself with reckless disregard of the rights of others." Jack, 4 Conn.App. at 455.
The complaint in this case satisfactorily described reckless conduct, driving at an excessive rate of speed while intoxicated, that would demonstrate intentional, willful or recklessindifference to the safety of others. Jack, 4 Conn.App. at 455. Compare State v. Miller, 122 Conn.App. 631, 635, 999 A.2d 844 (2010); State v. Sandra Q., 51 Conn.App. 463, 467-68, 724 A.2d 1127 (1999) (" [w]hile speed alone may be insufficient to warrant a conviction for reckless driving, it may be taken into consideration to show a reckless disregard of consequences"). See generally, Bishop v. Kelly, 206 Conn. 608, 614-15, 539 A.2d 108 (1988).
" Recklessness requires a conscious choice of a course of action either with knowledge of the serious danger to others involved in it or with knowledge of facts which would disclose this danger to any reasonable man, and the actor must recognize that his conduct involves a risk substantially greater . . . than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent . . . More recently, we have described recklessness as a state of consciousness with reference to the consequences of one's acts . . . It is more than negligence, more than gross negligence . . . The state of mind amounting to recklessness may be inferred from conduct. But, in order to infer it, there must be something more than a failure to exercise a reasonable degree of watchfulness to avoid danger to others or to take reasonable precautions to avoid injury to them . . . Wanton misconduct is reckless misconduct . . . It is such conduct as indicates a reckless disregard of the just rights or safety of others or of the consequences of the action. The result is that [wilful], wanton, or reckless conduct tends to take on the aspect of highly unreasonable conduct, involving an extreme departure from ordinary care, in a situation where a high degree of danger is apparent . . . It is at least clear . . . that such aggravated negligence must be more than any mere mistake resulting from inexperience, excitement, or confusion, and more than mere thoughtlessness or inadvertence, or simply inattention . . ." (Internal citations omitted.) (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corporation, 317 Conn. 357, 382-83, 119 A.3d 462 (2015).
The motion to strike the Second and Third Counts is denied.