SUNDAE v. SCOT

7 Citing cases

  1. Stepnes v. Trautman

    A19-0865 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 2020)

    When a debtor files a bankruptcy petition, "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case" become interests of the bankruptcy estate. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2014); see also Sundae v. Scot, 529 N.W.2d 362, 363 (Minn. App. 1995), review denied (Minn. May 31, 1995).

  2. Leffler v. Leffler

    602 N.W.2d 420 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999)   Cited 12 times
    Concluding that, because "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property" become "property of a bankruptcy estate," the appellant had no interest in the property and therefore "lack[ed] a sufficient stake" to invoke the court's jurisdiction

    The bankruptcy estate encompasses "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case." 11 U.S.C. § 541 (a) (1); see also Sundae v. Scot, 529 N.W.2d 362, 363 (Minn.App. 1995). It also includes any causes of action that have accrued to the debtor. Bauer v. Commerce Union Bank, 859 F.2d 438, 441 (6th Cir. 1988); Sundae, 529 N.W.2d at 363.

  3. Appletree Square I v. O'Connor Hannan

    575 N.W.2d 102 (Minn. 1998)   Cited 5 times   1 Legal Analyses

    11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (1988) (amended 1994). See also Sundae v. Scot, 529 N.W.2d 362, 364-65 (Minn.App.) (holding that defamation and abuse of process claims of debtor become estate property upon filing for bankruptcy, regardless of whether claims are assignable under state law), pet. for rev. denied, (Minn. March 31, 1995).

  4. Wallick v. Period Homes, Ltd.

    252 Ga. App. 197 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001)   Cited 10 times
    Holding that a material question of fact existed with regard to whether written notice not specifying the reasons for a contract's termination coupled with oral notice specifying those reasons constituted substantial compliance with a requirement of written notice specifying those reasons

    Thus, the damage claim here arising out of Period Homes's alleged breach of the contract to purchase the estate's primary asset is a "product" or "proceeds" of the estate, or at least is traceable to or sufficiently rooted in a prepetition interest that was already a part of the estate, and thus became property of the estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541 (6) and (7).In Re Doemling, supra, 116 Bankr. at 50; Sundae v. Scott, 529 N.W.2d 362, 364 (Minn.App. 1995); see Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 380 ( 86 S. Ct. 511, 15 L.Ed.2d 428) (1966); Field v. Transcontinental Ins. Co., 219 B.R. 115, 119 n. 7 (E.D.Va. 1998), aff'd, 173 F.3d 424 (4th Cir. 1999). See Haley v. Dow Lewis Motors, Inc., 72 Cal.App.4th 497, 504-506 (I) (Cal.App. 1999) (wrongful foreclosure on bankruptcy estate property is a claim that is property of estate); Bostanian v. Liberty Savings Bank, 52 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1083-1085 (II) (C) (Cal.App. 1997) (same).

  5. SUNDAE v. SCOT

    No. C4-95-2645 (Minn. Ct. App. Jun. 18, 1996)

    On appeal ( Sundae I), we affirmed the dismissal of Sundae's defamation and abuse of process claims, but reversed and remanded the racial discrimination claim, holding that that claim was personal to Sundae. Sundae v. Scot, 529 N.W.2d 362 (Minn.App. 1995), review denied (Minn. May 31, 1995).

  6. Niedermeier v. St. Joseph Hospital

    188 Misc. 2d 107 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001)

    Doemling's ultimate holding — that post-petition personal injury claims are the property of the debtor in a chapter 11 proceeding rather than the property of the bankruptcy estate — has been followed by most of the courts that have since addressed the issue. Cf, e.g., In re Durrett, 187 B.R. 413 [debtor filed chapter 11 petition in November, 1990, and was involved in airplane crash July, 1991; : potential proceeds of personal injury action arising from the crash are not includable in the bankruptcy estate]; Sundae v. Scot, 529 N.W.2d 362 [Minn. CA] [debtor filed chapter 11 petition in July, 1990; on five occasions in 1991 and 1992, debtor was subject of public statements about him by Minneapolis city agency concerning real property owned, transferred or abandoned by him; and in 1993, debtor, a native of India, filed action for libel and slander, abuse of process, and racial discrimination, arising out of such public statements; held: post-petition causes of action for libel, slander and abuse of process are rooted in pre-petition property ownership and, therefore, under Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, are assets of the bankruptcy estate; however, post-petition racial discrimination claim is inherently personal to debtor, in the same way a personal injury claim would be (citing In re Doemling, supra), and, hence, is property of the debtor, not the bankruptcy estate]; and cf. also, Patrick A. Casey, P.A. v. Hochman, 963 F.2d 1347 [CA 10] [debtor filed chapter 11 petition in January 1982, and invented a medical device i

  7. Niedermeier v. St. Joseph Hosp.

    188 Misc. 2d 107 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001)

    Doemling's ultimate holding—that postpetition personal injury claims are the property of the debtor in a chapter 11 proceeding rather than the property of the bankruptcy estate— has been followed by most of the courts that have since addressed the issue. (Cf., e.g., In re Durrett, 188 Bankr 413 [debtor filed chapter 11 petition in November 1990, and was involved in airplane crash July 1991; held: potential proceeds of personal injury action arising from the crash are not includable in the bankruptcy estate]; Sundae v Scot, 529 NW2d 362 [Minn Ct App] [debtor filed chapter 11 petition in July 1990; on five occasions in 1991 and 1992, debtor was subject of public statements about him by Minneapolis city agency concerning real property owned, transferred or abandoned by him; and in 1993, debtor, a native of India, filed action for libel and slander, abuse of process, and racial discrimination, arising out of such public statements; held: postpetition causes of action for libel, slander and abuse of process are rooted in prepetition property ownership and, therefore, under Segal v Rochelle (382 US 375), are assets of the bankruptcy estate; however, postpetition racial discrimination claim is inherently personal to debtor, in the same way a personal injury claim would be (citing In re Doemling, supra), and, hence, is property of the debtor, not the bankruptcy estate]; cf. also, Patrick A. Casey, P. A. v Hochman, 963 F2d 1347, 1351 [10th Cir] [debtor filed chapter 11 petition in January 1982, and invented a medical device