Opinion
Argued September 11, 1973
October 18, 1973.
Unemployment compensation — Unemployment Compensation Law, Act 1936, December 5, P. L. (1937) 2897 — Words and phrases — Willful misconduct — Scope of appellate review — Findings of fact — Sufficient evidence — Questions of law — Loafing — Credibility — Weight of evidence — Inferences.
1. An employe discharged for willful misconduct connected with his work is ineligible for benefits under the Unemployment Compensation Law, Act 1936, December 5, P. L. (1937) 2897. [291]
2. Willful misconduct so as to preclude recovery of workmen's compensation benefits can be an act of wanton or willful disregard of the employer's interests, a deliberate violation of the employer's rules, a disregard for the standards of behavior which an employer has a right to expect of an employe, or negligence indicating an intentional disregard of the employer's interest or of the employe's duty and obligation to the employer. [291]
3. In an unemployment compensation case, findings of the referee or Unemployment Compensation Board of Review are conclusive if supported by the evidence, and, in the absence of fraud, review on appeal is confined to questions of law. [291]
4. In an unemployment compensation case where an issue arises as to whether conduct constitutes loafing and willful misconduct, questions of credibility, weight of the evidence and inferences to be drawn therefrom are for the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, not for an appellate court. [292]
Argued September 11, 1973, before Judges CRUMLISH, JR., MENCER and BLATT, sitting as a panel of three.
Appeal, No. 636 C.D. 1972, from the Order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review in case of In Re: Claim of Franklin D. Young, No. B-109706-B.
Application to Bureau of Employment Security for unemployment compensation benefits. Application denied. Applicant appealed to the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review. Denial affirmed. Applicant appealed to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. Remanded to Board. (Order of September 10, 1971, 603 C.D. 1971.) Benefits awarded by Unemployment Compensation Board of Review. Employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. Held: Affirmed.
Andrew J. Forbes, with him Cramp, D'Iorio, McConchie Surrick, for appellant.
Sydney Reuben, Assistant Attorney General, with him Israel Packel, Attorney General, for appellee.
This is an appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board) granting Claimant-Employee benefits.
On January 13, 1971, Claimant was released from his job with Sun Shipbuilding Dry Dock Company (Appellant) because he had received his third "pink slip." The reason given Claimant for receiving his third pink slip and therefore his discharge was "loafing" on the job.
"Pink slips" are warnings given to those employees who, in Appellant's estimation, are not abiding by established working rules and procedures. The recipient of a "pink slip" can question the issuance of such a slip through union grievance procedures.
It was a published rule of the Appellant that any employee receiving three pink slips would be discharged.
Claimant's application for unemployment compensation benefits was initially denied by the Bureau of Employment Security, a Referee and the Board. However, after Petition by the Claimant, agreement of the Board and Order of this Court, the record of this case was remanded for the purpose of taking additional testimony. In light of the new testimony presented, the Board granted Claimant benefits.
Appellant now comes to us.
Section 402(e) of the Unemployment Compensation Law, Act of December 5, 1936, P. L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P. S. § 802 (e), (Law) provides that a Claimant shall be ineligible for compensation any week in which his unemployment is due to his discharge or suspension from work for "willful misconduct" connected with his work.
Although "willful misconduct" is not defined by the Law, case law has determined that the term includes an act of wanton or willful disregard of the employer's interests, a deliberate violation of employer's rules, a disregard for the standards of behavior which an employer has a right to expect of an employee, or negligence indicating an intentional disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. Harmer Unemployment Compensation Case, 206 Pa. Super. 270, 213 A.2d 221 (1965); Curran Unemployment Compensation Case, 181 Pa. Super. 578, 124 A.2d 404 (1956).
Appellant contends that Claimant was absent from his work station for forty-five minutes, and that this behavior constitutes "loafing" under Appellant's rules, and "willful misconduct" under the law.
Claimant, however, testified, in response to Appellant's contentions, that during the forty-five minutes in question, he was either within three feet of his work station warming his hands at an open fire provided by Appellant or at the men's room.
In an unemployment compensation appeal, findings of the Referee or Board, if supported by the evidence and in the absence of fraud, shall be conclusive, and the jurisdiction of a reviewing court is confined to questions of law. U.S. Steel Corporation v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 9 Pa. Commw. 206, 303 A.2d 852 (1973).
Appellant and Claimant here provided the Board with different versions of the facts leading up to and culminating in his dismissal for "loafing." Keeping in mind that the credibility of witnesses, weight of their testimony, and reasonable inferences to be drawn from such testimony are for the Board, Philadelphia Coke Division, Eastern Associated Coal Corporation v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 6 Pa. Commw. 37, 293 A.2d 129 (1972), our independent review of the record reveals that the Board's findings of fact are substantiated by the evidence and must be affirmed.
We have reviewed the Appellant's other arguments and have determined they are also without merit and bear no further discussion.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 18th day of October, 1973, the Order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review dated May 16, 1972, is hereby affirmed.