Accordingly, we conclude the trial court erred in concluding that the statutes operated defensively to prevent Mr. Sager from arguing his injuries were the result of negligence or advancing any other factual theory that draws support from the evidence. See Sun Chevrolet, Inc. v. Crespo, 613 So.2d 105, 107 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (holding that section 775.089(8), Florida Statutes, "applies to a criminal defendant only" and cannot be used "to exercise collateral estoppel offensively").
Accordingly, we conclude the trial court erred in concluding that the statutes operated defensively to prevent Mr. Sager from arguing his injuries were the result of negligence or advancing any other factual theory that draws support from the evidence. See Sun Chevrolet, Inc. v. Crespo, 613 So.2d 105, 107 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (holding that section 775.089(8), Florida Statutes, "applies to a criminal defendant only" and cannot be used "to exercise collateral estoppel offensively"). Further, to the extent the trial court read Burch as imposing a blanket prohibition on vicarious liability claims premised upon the weaponization of the dangerous instrumentality, the analysis was slightly incomplete.
Sun State, on the other hand, asks that we construe Caetano's "intentional misconduct" language very literally to exclude from the doctrine's application any type of intentional misuse of a vehicle, including reckless driving. Although such a construction seems contrary to the result reached in Caetano, one district court has cited Caetano for the proposition espoused by Sun State. See Sun Chevrolet, Inc. v. Crespo, 613 So.2d 105 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (doctrine only applies to negligent operation of vehicle, citing Caetano). While we do not fully agree with either party's position, we reject Sun State's position because we disagree with its interpretation of Caetano. Alternatively, to the extent that Caetano may be read to stand for the proposition that any type of intentional misuse of a vehicle results in the severance of liability under the doctrine, we decline to follow it. We conclude that such a proposition is inconsistent with the Florida Supreme Court's decisions that created and refined the doctrine, the established tort precepts upon which the doctrine was based, and the policies underlying the doctrine.
Sun Chevrolet has had no opportunity to fully and fairly litigate its vicarious liability for the actions alleged in the instant case, and thus cannot be collaterally estopped from introducing evidence that Rodriguez was not negligent, a necessary element for recovery under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine.Sun Chevrolet, Inc. v. Crespo, 613 So. 2d 105, 107-08 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (citations omitted). Accordingly, plaintiff must prove the Sexual Battery in its case against Lee Memorial, and Lee Memorial is not precluded from disputing the existence of the Sexual Battery.
The defendants have not met their burden of proof to conclusively show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, thus precluding summary judgment. See Wills v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 351 So.2d 29 (Fla.1977) ; Sun Chevrolet, Inc. v. Crespo, 613 So.2d 105 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) ; Florida East Coast Ry. v. Metro. Dade County, 438 So.2d 978 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). Accordingly, we reverse the final summary judgments entered in favor of the City, Groundskeepers, and Alfaro, and remand the cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The defendants have not met their burden of proof of conclusively showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, and thus entry of summary judgment was improper.See Wills v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 351 So.2d 29 (Fla. 1977); Sun Chevrolet, Inc. v. Crespo, 613 So.2d 105 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993); Florida East Coast Ry. v. Metro. Dade County, 438 So.2d 978 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). Accordingly, the orders denying the plaintiff's motion to recuse and granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants are reversed.
These statutes estop a defendant from denying the essential elements of a crime in a subsequent civil proceeding involving the same matters. See Board of Regents of the State of Florida v. Taborsky, 648 So.2d 748 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994), rev. denied, 654 So.2d 920 (Fla. 1995); Sun Chevrolet, Inc. v. Crespo, 613 So.2d 105 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993). This matter is properly resolved by summary judgment.
A summary judgment cannot stand where genuine issues of material fact exist. Sun Chevrolet v. Crespo, 613 So.2d 105 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993). In this case the evidence is conflicting with regard to whether Kelly knew about the safety problems and whether his conduct amounted to gross negligence or willful and wanton disregard for Marquez's safety.